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In American culture, reliance on expertise has become so commonplace that it is 
virtually impossible to avoid. It is the way we delegate the contents of our busy lives and 
defer authority in the interest of being efficient. Conventional wisdom defines an expert 
as someone who knows more about a subject or can perform better than the average 
person. However, expertise is not simply about one person’s skills being different from 
another’s. It is also fundamentally contingent on a struggle for ownership and legitimacy. 
Thus, it is subject to rhetoric. S/he who succeeds in persuading the public that s/he is an 
expert and that s/he is a better expert than any alternative, earns credibility, 
acknowledgement and power. Experts argue for the legitimacy of what they do. They 
articulate their experiences persuasively and always in the context of a rhetorical contest. 
 vi
The public ultimately validates one form of expertise over the other. To be an expert is to 
gain sanctioned rights to a specific area of knowledge or experience. 
My dissertation posits expertise as a rhetorical construct. It investigates how 
expertise is negotiated as a function of the rhetorical situation, its participants and 
constraints. Specifically, I ask: What rhetorical strategies do experts employ to compete 
for authority and legitimacy when they conflict with one another? Each chapter examines 
the rhetorical construction of expertise in a particular context—politics, history, 
medicine, and information. By drawing parallels between different experts from different 
chapters I ultimately identify a series of “unlikely allies.” These are experts whose 
rhetorical strategies for constructing expertise trump differences of context and content. 
My rhetorical analysis demonstrates that, despite their apparent differences, experts have 
a great deal in common rhetorically. Indeed, the recurring use of the same rhetorical 
strategies through vastly different fields of specialization suggests that experts constitute 
a unique rhetorical genre.  
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INTRODUCTION TO THE RHETORIC OF EXPERTISE 
When I was a little girl, my ever-encouraging parents gave me a book titled On 
the Other Side of the River.1 It was a wonderful tale about a town’s social and 
professional interdependence. In the story, the town’s folks were constantly at each 
others’ throats. The baker bickered with the miller. The tailor fought with the farmer. 
None of them got along like good neighbors should. Through the middle of the town ran 
a big river, traversed only by a single bridge. One night during a terrible storm, the bridge 
was washed away and the town’s folks had no way of crossing. Good riddance, they 
figured. Now everyone could live in peace on separate sides. But of course the baker 
eventually ran out of flour and the tailor of thread. In order to get more of what was 
needed, they would have to visit the miller and the farmer. And where were they? On the 
other side of the river! At the end of the book, the town’s people naturally learned their 
lesson, rebuilt the bridge and lived happily ever after. 
Aside from being a touching story about community, this scenario conjures up a 
fundamental question of expertise. The baker has a particular kind, a different kind than 
the doctor’s, banker’s, farmer’s, and tailor’s. Therein lie the nature of their exchange and 
the foundation of their relationships. In American culture, reliance on expertise has 
become so commonplace that it is virtually impossible to avoid. All of us depend on an 
assortment of experts in everyday matters. It is the way we delegate the contents of our 
busy lives and defer authority in the interest of being efficient. If you have ever had 
                                                 
1 Joanne Oppenheim, På Andra Sidan Ån (Sweden: Litteraturfrämjandet, 1987). 
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computer trouble, for example, and turned to the office’s “help desk,” or experienced an 
insect invasion and called an exterminator, you have benefited from expert knowledge. If 
you have a family physician or your taxes are filed by a tax attorney, you have 
contributed to the American economy of expertise. If you vote, you acknowledge another 
person’s capacity to represent your interests and speak in your stead; you have 
participated in the politics of expertise. Every citizen does not, indeed cannot, acquire 
expertise on all subject matters in a complex society like ours. 
Expertise is not simply about one person’s skills being different from another’s. It 
is also grounded in a fierce struggle over ownership and legitimacy. And no one hands 
those things over without a struggle. Certainly, the complementary abilities of the town’s 
people made for a functional collective; the baker was skilled at baking and therefore did 
so all day long while leaving other enterprises to someone else. The crux of the expertise 
issue, however, is that being recognized as an expert generates considerable status and 
power. Those who are deemed deserving of this label make money and appear on 
television. Their opinions are “expert” opinions. Their voices are heard above others’. To 
be an expert, in short, is to rhetorically gain sanctioned rights to a specific area of 
knowledge or experience. 
Whose knowledge and experience, then, is worth the most? Whose is credible? 
Consider another, more contentious illustration. The United States is currently at war. 
That which has been called “the war on terror” is spreading across the globe. A new 
generation of soldiers return from duty. Their wounds and traumas are fresher than older 
veterans’, but the experience of a divisive foreign war is similar. In conversations about 
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politics and military force, these veterans invoke the right to expertise of lived 
experience. “I was there,” they say. “I heard the bombs and saw the destruction. Call me 
an expert on warfare.” In the same conversation a young pacifist speaks up. She has 
studied social movements for global peace and contests the soldier’s claims. Her 
expertise comes from the “trenches” of political activism. “You have been brainwashed,” 
she insists. “Your expertise is founded on delusion.” Finally, yet another joins the 
argument. He is a presidential advisor and represents the gallery of experts that determine 
government actions. He reminds us that decisions of national security must be carefully 
calculated. “Leave it to the experts,” he admonishes. In this category, he does not count 
his two interlocutors. 
The idea that expertise is up for grabs should alert us to the concept’s fundamental 
rhetoricity. All three participants in the prior conversation have to make a case for the 
validity of their perspectives. They have to articulate their experiences persuasively, and 
perform in a particular way to “earn” expertise. Importantly, those rhetorical strategies 
adapt to fit different audiences. Sometimes the solider, activist and advisor all address the 
same audience: the American public. Other times, they speak to an internal audience of 
their peers and confederates. The soldier, for example, speaks to other soldiers and the 
activist to other activists. Either way, the process of establishing oneself as an expert 
entails a judgment from an audience that is contingent on a rhetorical effort. 
My dissertation posits expertise as a rhetorical construct. It investigates how 
expertise is instituted and negotiated as a function of the rhetorical situation, its 
participants and constraints. Specifically, I ask: What rhetorical strategies do experts  
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employ to compete for authority and legitimacy when they conflict with one another? In 
each chapter, I focus on a particular context in which two groups offer competing claims 
for expertise. These contexts illustrate matters in which expertise is particularly 
contentious. Both groups are after the recognition and power that come with general 
acknowledgement of their knowledge and experience. The objective of my dissertation, 
simply put, is to explore the clash of tropes and arguments in the rhetorical construction 
of expertise. This chapter explains in detail the nature and significance of the project. 
What is Expertise? Who is an Expert? 
All definitions of expertise are the function of particular motives and have 
different implications. Anyone who offers a definition shapes that definition to serve 
his/her interests. For example, academics  may define expertise as synonymous with 
knowledge and accreditation. Notably, theoretical knowledge and accreditation are 
precisely the qualities that characterize academic expertise. In contrast, an artist may 
place more emphasis on lived experience as constitutive of expertise. This might 
deemphasize the importance of a certain degree or title. To her colleagues and followers, 
a body of works attesting to the life of an artist may be more compelling. Additionally, 
this may work in the artist’s favor. She may be compensating with experience what she 
lacks in official certification. Whatever the case, any definition of expertise has social, 
political, and material consequences. It does rhetorical work for the person creating the 
definition. 
Scholarship on expertise emerges from many different perspectives: psychology, 
sociology, political science, communication, history, and others. In this section, I survey 
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this research and outline several prevalent themes. This interdisciplinary overview 
suggests that a great deal is already known about the concept of expertise. The wheel 
need not be entirely reinvented. In the following section, however, I demonstrate what a 
rhetorical approach to expertise uniquely contributes. Specifically, I identify its 
contributions where cognitive, cultural-historical-critical, and political theories remain 
underdeveloped. It is my contention that a rhetorical approach to expertise does not 
replace frameworks from other disciplines. Rather, it responds to unaddressed concerns, 
even gaps, in existing knowledge about expertise.  
Autonomy and Attribution 
One of the most frequently recurring themes in expertise research is that there 
exists a tension between autonomy and attribution. Scholars across disciplinary 
boundaries repeatedly return to this issue. For some, expertise is entirely comprised of a 
person’s relationship to her subject matter. An expert in astrophysics is one who has 
extensive knowledge of the topic. Expertise is the term for superior competence. For 
others, expertise exists entirely in the signs and symbols of a person’s relationship to her 
environment and audience. It is an attributed state of being-with-others where one’s 
performance is evaluated irrespective of so-called “real knowledge.” When expertise is 
autonomous, other people’s recognition is irrelevant. A person can possess expert 
knowledge without the others’ acknowledgment. An expert so conceived is the proverbial 
tree in the forest; when she falls – or exercises her expertise – it is beyond the ken of the 
world. However, when expertise is attributed, it exists only as a symbolic relationship. 
One can be an expert only in so far as one is recognized as such. It is then a performance 
 6
that may or may not be indicative of knowledge. The astrophysicist may know her stuff, 
but it does not matter if she fails to persuade others. As long as she is symbolically 
persuasive, it may be of no consequence whether or not the expert possesses superior 
knowledge.  
Some version of this autonomy/attribution theme emerges in several different 
fields of research. In the cognitive sciences, for example, expertise is strictly a measure of 
individual competence.2 It is a mental state. An expert possesses skills or abilities that 
qualify her as more competent than others in specific areas, such as chess.3 Status relative 
to others is irrelevant. The individual has acquired expert abilities through experience, 
practice and training. Anyone could achieve the same capability by going through the 
same process. Whether or not the person is treated as extraordinary is outside of the scope 
of cognitive psychology.  
In cognitive science expertise is thus autonomous rather than attributed. Experts 
are those individuals who “remember more domain-relevant material relative to 
novices.”4 When the term “performance” is used, moreover, it is a measure of how well 
the expert executes her ability. This is the familiar notion by which a professional 
                                                 
2 Roland H. Grabner, Aljoscha C. Neubauer, and Elsbeth Stern, “Superior Performance and Neural 
Efficiency: The Impact of Intelligence and Expertise,” Brain Research Bulletin 69 (2006): 422-439. 
Fernand Gobet, “Expert Memory: A Comparison of Four Theories,” Cognition 66 (1998): 115-152. Jarrod 
Moss, Kenneth Kotovsky, and Jonathan Cagan, “The Role of Functionality in the Mental Representations 
of Engineering Students: Some Differences in the Early Stages of Expertise,” Cognitive Science 30 (2006): 
65-93. Remy M. J. P. Rikers and Fred Paas, “Recent Advances in Expertise Research,” Applied Cognitive 
Psychology 19 (2005): 145-149. 
3 Willian G. Chase and Herbert A. Simon, “The Mind’s Eye in Chess,” in Visual Information Processing, 
ed. W. G. Chase, 215-281 (New York: Academic Press, 1973). Adriaan De Groot, Het Denken Van Den 
Schaker (Amsterdam: Noord Hollandsche, 1946). 
4 Karen R. Brandt, Lauren M. Copper, and Stephen A. Dewhurst, “Expertise and Recollective Experience: 
Recognition and Memory for Familiar and Unfamiliar Academic Subjects,” Applied Cognitive Psychology 
19 (2005): 1113. 
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athlete’s performance is measured in time, distance, weight, etc. For example, we say that 
an Olympian “performed” at her best when she won the gold medal. More surprising, 
perhaps, is that a musical expert’s performance is treated the same way. Instead of 
analyzing it with respect to audience, cognitive researchers focus on the relationships 
between the musician’s training, “deliberate practice” and physiological and mental 
capacities.5 
These capacities, most cognitive scientists agree, are contingent on the mental 
connections established during the development of expert knowledge. One of the most 
important and efficient ways of making such connections is semantically. Bransford and 
Johnson examine the role of semantic context in interpretation.6 Their study provided 
subjects with linguistic information about a particular scenario. Some of the participants 
were also shown an image that related to the story. During the test, participants created 
“semantic products” that reflected reliance both on the contextual cues offered in the 
image and on prior knowledge.7 This suggests that knowledge requires semantic 
representation. It is not contained in the mind unmediated. Studies in semantic memory 
document that experts process information from their domain of expertise at a deeper 
level than novices or laypersons.8 They are able to access semantic representations that 
allow more advanced encoding of new information into pre-existing knowledge 
                                                 
5 K. Anders Ericsson, Ralf Th. Krampe, and Clemens Tesch-Römer, “The Role of Deliberative Practice in 
the Acquisition of Expert Performance,” Psychological Review 100 (1993): 363-406. 
6 John D. Bransford and Marcia K. Johnson, “Contextual Prerequisites for Understanding: Some 
Investigations of Comprehension and Recall,” Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 11 (1972): 
717-726. 
7 Bransford and Johnson, 718. 
8 Brandt, Cooper, and Dewhurst. 
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structures. This linguistic dimension of knowledge will be revisited later in the section on 
a rhetorical approach to expertise.  
Conceptualizing expertise as an individual quality connects cognitive psychology 
with political science. Both study what seems like a matter of personal qualification. The 
notion of civic competence, for example, begs the question of being a qualified citizen. 
How much, and what sort of individual ability is requisite to productive citizenship? How 
ought those who have more and less expertise be ranked in the political hierarchy? Such 
questions illustrate the tension between expertise that is deemed valuable to the public 
and that which is considered peripheral or expendable. Hardly surprising is that this 
political dilemma has a long history in Western democracies, a history that directs 
attention to a nexus of democratic rights and political expertise. In the Republic and other 
dialogues, Plato insists that only the elite class, by virtue of its moral and intellectual 
superiority, is fit to govern.9 Pellizzoni summarizes his exclusive view: “[S]ince political 
competence, which comprises moral capacities (determining the common good and 
favouring it over one’s own interests) and technical capacities (determining the most 
suitable means to reach the target), is not equally distributed among all citizens, it is 
therefore appropriate to rely on the competence of a minority.”10 In the Greek polis, the 
minority included free men of the aristocracy; their expertise was necessary and sufficient 
to govern. 
                                                 
9 Plato, Republic, trans. T. Griffin, ed. G. R. F. Ferrari (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
10 Luigi Pellizzoni, “Reflexive Modernization and Beyond: Knowledge and Value in the Politics of 
Environment and Technology,” Theory, Culture & Society 16 (1999): 99-125. 
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Political participation has remained a crucial issue. The minority that Pellizzoni 
refers to is now less delineated by class than by specialized expertise. Nevertheless, the 
determining factor continues to be access. In the past, ordinary citizens’ access to politics 
was restricted by socioeconomic status. Today, the same group is excluded from many of 
the most important political issues because of information barriers. The problems that our 
society faces are often so complex as to prevent mass popular participation.11 As 
Pellizzoni notes: “No one has enough time, money or capacity to acquire acceptable 
competence in every subject.”12 Friedson echoes this sentiment: “Apart from the time it 
would take to be trained in every specialty, there is not the time in a single person’s life 
to perform or otherwise be pre-occupied with each specialty often enough to sustain 
competence.”13 The increasing difficulty of being well-versed in all subject matters has 
complicated the classical notion of civic competence. It has made it harder to sustain 
expertise as an individual quality. 
From a political standpoint, being an expert depends both on having a particular 
kind of knowledge and on other people’s recognition of it. This realization moves us 
toward the other end of the autonomy/attribution continuum. It also begs the question: If 
expertise is an attributed state, what qualities does this assume? On what does the public 
base its attribution of expertise? A recurring concern for political scholars is the criteria 
                                                 
11 Kevin M. Esterling, The Political Economy of Expertise: Information and Efficiency in American 
National Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004). 
12 Pellizzoni, 109. 
13 Elliot Friedson, “Are Professions Necessary?” in The Authority of Experts, ed. T.  L. Haskell, 3-27 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 15. 
 10
that citizens use to identify expertise.14 Are citizens’ attributions of expertise valid? Can 
the public tell the expert from the imposter? Huckfeldt writes: “The ability of citizens to 
make discriminating judgments regarding the political expertise of other individuals is 
centrally related to the potential for deliberative democracy.”15 The health of a 
deliberative democracy depends fundamentally on citizens obtaining political information 
from other citizens who are relatively more knowledgeable. 
Attributions of expertise are a concern for political scientists not just in terms of 
individual citizens, but also with respect to political officials who rely on professional 
experts.16 Politicians can no more maintain expert knowledge in all matters than their 
constituents. When making decisions, they too must defer to the content-specific 
expertise of political interest groups and other research agencies. Esterling optimistically 
notes:  
All other things being equal, society should prefer to be governed by 
expert-informed rather than ill-informed policies because the former are 
more often more effective and efficient in reaching social goals. To this 
end, academic researchers and professional analysts endeavor to apply the 
current state of research-based knowledge to solve the vast array of public 
                                                 
14 Robert Huckfeldt, “The Social Communication of Political Expertise,” American Journal of Political 
Science 45 (2001): 425-438 
15 Huckfeldt, 425. 
16 Andrew Rich, “The Politics of Expertise in Congress and the News Media,” Social Science Quarterly 82 
(2001): 583-601. 
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problems, developing expertise-informed proposals with the intent of 
advancing the public interest.17 
Note that, in this discourse of experts as political advisers, expertise emerges as a 
product or service. A person who owns the product can provide it for those who do not. 
There exists, in other words, an unstated economy in which expertise is a personal asset. 
While political scientists treat civic competence as an individual quality, they also 
acknowledge that some citizens seem to possess more of it than others. Those citizens 
profit from this competence by selling their expertise to the citizenry and political 
leadership. However, as long as the attribution of expertise is made (whether 
substantiated or not), business is good for political professionals. Their expertise operates 
gainfully in the midst of the autonomy/attribution dialectic. 
Reified or Problematized? 
Another way to organize the literature on expertise is to determine whether 
scholars problematize the concept or buy it wholesale. By “buying wholesale” I mean the 
use of the concept of expertise as a reified operational variable. Some scholars take it for 
granted without questioning its historical “baggage.” To illustrate: In 2005, Applied 
Cognitive Psychology published a special issue on “Recent Advances in Expertise 
Research” comprised of papers presented at a symposium of the American Educational 
Research Association. The introductory essay previews the objectives of cognitive 
expertise research: turning novices into experts.18 As Ericsson obligates: “Our growing 
                                                 
17 Esterling, 1. 
18 Rikers and Paas, 146. 
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understanding of what aspects distinguish experts from novices should translate into 
more effective training.”19 Thus, not only do the authors leave expertise unquestioned, 
they implicitly affirm it with their intent to create new experts. 
This normative approach to expertise recurs in political science, particularly in the 
reification of political knowledge. Being politically competent is discursively moralized 
as a civic virtue. A high score of political knowledgeability, according to some, is 
necessary for being a productive citizen. Political scholars may therefore be said to have 
a conflicted view of expertise. On one hand, they ask that citizens keep themselves well 
informed in order to participate and be productive members of society. This is the 
definition’s normative aspect. The relationship between knowledge and civic 
participation mandates educators to train good citizens.20 At the same time, the scholars 
are anxiously aware of a powerful democratic myth, viz., that politics should be run by 
the people. Implicit in such a myth is the idea that ordinary citizens’ knowledge and 
experience are sufficient – not despite limitations but partly as a function of them. In 
other words, it is the people who know what is best for the people. Experts have in some 
sense set themselves apart from the citizenry at large. With their expertise comes an 
altered perspective on public interest.  
This dialectical tension is highlighted by those scholars who problematize 
expertise. “Problematizing” expertise refers to the systematic interrogation of the 
assumptions inherent in the concept. For example, while political scientists investigate 
                                                 
19 K. Anders Ericsson, “Recent Advances in Expertise Research: A Commentary on the Contributions to 
the Special Issue,” Applied Cognitive Psychology 19 (2005): 238. 
20 Michael McDevitt, “Civic Autonomy in Journalism Education: Applying Expertise to Political Action,” 
Journalism and Mass Communication Educator 57 (2002): 152-160. 
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how experts supply citizens and officials with information, and what level of civic 
competence is necessary for participation, Chafetz and other more critical scholars go one 
step further and question the mere presence of experts in public dialogue.21 Turner states 
the issue succinctly: “In the face of expertise, something has to give: either the idea of 
government by generally intelligible discussion, or the idea that there is a genuine 
knowledge that is known to a few, but not generally intelligible.”22 If the expert is 
somehow different from other citizens, should her opinion count as part of popular 
discourse? Put another way, if an expert recommends something, under what 
circumstances is adherence to her advice compatible with the (liberal) democratic ideal of 
individual autonomy and self-governance? 
D’Agnostino responds: “Expertise is compatible with self-government when, and 
only when, it ‘tracks’ hypothetical courses of reasoning that ‘we, the people’ could have 
performed for ourselves, whether individually or collectively, as the case may be.”23 
Following an expert’s advice is not in conflict with democratic ideals if you yourself 
would have arrived at the same conclusion, given time and resources. The problem, of 
course, is that experts differ on what conclusion the people would draw. Many issues are 
so complex as to generate a multitude of preferences, all of which may be legitimate.24 
As D’Agnostino points out “there may be multiple, equally legitimate courses of 
                                                 
21 Morris E. Chafetz, The Tyranny of Experts: Blowing the Whistle on the Cult of Expertise (Lanham, MD: 
Madison Books, 1996), xvi. 
22 Stephen P. Turner, Liberal Democracy 3.0: Civil Society in an Age of Experts (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 
2003), 5. 
23 Fred D’Agnostino, “Expertise, Democracy, and Applied Ethics,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 
(1998): 50. 
24 D’Agnostino, 51. 
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reasoning on the matter at issue. If expert advice prevails in these circumstances, then it 
may well be at the expense of contrary (or anyway incompatible) opinions that 
‘principals’ would have arrived at if__.”25 
Nussbaum posits a similar argument with respect to the role of philosophers in 
public matters of justice and ethics. She writes: “Philosophers have a duty to serve the 
public good, and they perform this service in fruitful ways. But they should refuse a 
public role that appears incompatible with equal respect for the committed ethical 
searching of their fellow citizens.”26 According to Nussbaum, ethics fall outside the realm 
of “epistemic deference.”27 In a pluralistic society, she argues, citizens must not be asked 
to defer their own judgment in favor of expert authority; if they are, democracy is 
undermined. Therefore, experts should strive to consider a presumed popular view in 
ethical matters. “[T]he expert philosopher can offer some important benefits to the public 
culture of a democratic society, even though there is an important sense in which the 
philosopher is simply extending and systematizing belief that citizens already have in 
some form.”28  
                                                 
25 D’Agnostino, 50. 
26 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Moral Expertise? Constitutional Narratives and Philosophical Argument,” 
Metaphilosophy 33 (2002): 502. 
27 Nussbaum, 513. On “deference” see also J. G. A. Pocock, “The Classical Theory of Deference,” The 
American Historical Review 81 (1976): 516-523. Michael Schudson, The Good Citizen: A History of 
American Public Life (New York: Free Press, 1998). 
28 Nussbaum, 511. Worth noting is that these scholars seem to go so far in problematizing the concept of 
expertise that they sometimes endorse its opposite. By insisting that “the same deep structures underlie the 
expanding role of experts and the drastic impoverishment of political life,” they may moralize non-
expertise. See Magali Sarafatti Larson, “The Production of Expertise and the Constitution of Expert 
Power,” in The Authority of Experts, ed. T. L. Haskell, 28-83 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1984), 30. This scholarship on non-expertise suggests that the concept is not an absolute good, an idea that 
the discussion of ethos will revisit. 
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Scholars who deconstruct expertise often do so by tracing its precedents in 
Western intellectual history. They argue that cultures have always privileged certain ways 
of knowing over others. Certain epistemologies have been deemed more expert than 
others. By associating themselves with such privileged epistemologies, experts strive to 
be more credible than their competition. In ancient Greece, Socrates’ and Plato’s 
characterization of philosophy, or dialectic, as the only means of discovering truth was 
established against its then-opponent: sophistry. As Sassower claims: “[S]ophistry was 
aligned with poetry that was thought expressive and imaginative worthy of those 
interested in twisting arguments to suit their purpose, with no regard to the standards of 
truth established by philosophy or the methods of inquiry deemed appropriate for the 
pursuit of wisdom and truth.”29 Nowadays, the argument goes, we still suffer the 
aftermath of this opposition. Those who associate themselves with a dispreferred 
epistemology struggle for credibility. Alternative forms of expertise continue to be 
suspect.30 
In the process of historicizing knowledge and expertise, some critical scholars 
take on science. They remind us, for example, of the authority that the title “scientist” has 
wielded under the rule of objectivist epistemology. In the popular mind, science is a fact-
driven, value-free enterprise wherein data is collected and compiled. While the outcome 
                                                 
29 Raphael Sassower, Knowledge without Expertise: On the Status of Scientists (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1993), 54. 
30 Dominic Boyer, “The Corporeality of Expertise,” Ethnos 70 (2005): 243-266. Boyer’s discussion of 
expertise and the Cartesian mind/body dualism that academic research perpetuates is compelling. He asks: 
“Why is it that intellectuals experience (and are encouraged to experience) their mental activities 
rationalistically and to consider as genuine knowledge only that which originated in pure cognitive 
process?” 247.  
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of this process may be manipulated for any number of agendas, the scientist remains the 
unimpeachable expert. Haskell writes: “If the university provided the institutional 
keystone for the great expansion and elaboration of expert authority […], it was the 
scientist who possessed in fullest measure the authority to which every expert aspires.”31 
When one’s intention is to analyze and critique the power of experts, therefore, one does 
well to start with empirical scientists. Sassower attempts to debunk what she calls “the 
myth of expertise”: 
Those who say that experts can make certainty claims regarding their 
fields are inadvertently perpetuating a myth about expertise – a myth, to 
be precise, about the certainty claims of experts and not about the obvious 
fact that there are people who are rightly perceived as experts or who may 
know more about a certain area than others. It is a myth because the view 
that epistemological certainty exists – one that ignores inherent margins of 
error – is untenable.32  
Seeking Expertise 
A third theme emerging from the literature concerns our culture’s motives for 
seeking expertise. What benefits does expertise procure? What good do we desire that 
experts claim to possess? Some scholars argue that it is the illusion of certainty we 
want.33 In a culture that has lost many of the institutions (churches, synagogues, bowling 
                                                 
31 Thomas L. Haskell, “Introduction,” in The Authority of Experts, ed. T. Haskell, ix-xxxix (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1984), xxvi-xxvii. 
32 Sassower, 64-65. 
33 Chafetz. See also Donald N. McCloskey, “The Limits of Expertise,” American Scholar 57 (1988): 393-
406. 
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leagues) that once provided answers, certainty is a rare commodity. Most of the time, 
scholars argue, we struggle with a general sense of ambiguity. If this strikes the reader as 
an overstatement, consider the staggering evidence in popular culture. Experts who sell 
neat and tidy, easily digestible tidbits of truth get primetime talk shows. Experts who 
speak in slogans get to run political campaigns. This, according to Chafetz, is the 
“tyranny of experts.” 
Chafetz argues that we worship expertise for the safe assurance that it promises to 
provide. The less certain we are about our own lives, the more we want to believe that 
there are those who have all the answers. Therefore, we are “fair game for anyone who 
offers […] comforting certainties, unambiguous rules of conduct, and ways to identify 
themselves within the complex, fast-moving society we live in.”34 The fear of death and 
mystery drives us to seek desperately the comforts of expertise. The experts, in turn, 
perpetuate this state of affairs as long as it guarantees them economic and political 
benefits.  
As this section demonstrated, the notion of expertise is widely studied. It is 
important to take note of such research. To understand common attitudes toward 
expertise, it is furthermore important to understand its recurring themes. Certain 
questions continually vex scholars of expertise: Is it an individual competence or an 
attributed status? Is it an obvious measure of ability or a charged way of organizing 
people hierarchically? Is it something we should strive to increase or an embarrassing 
cultural legacy? Is it real or delusional? The research surveyed here provides some 
                                                 
34 Chafetz, xiii. 
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answers. However, it leaves important dimensions of expertise unaddressed. The next 
section of my chapter demonstrates how a rhetorical perspective complements existing 
scholarship. It delineates a set of propositions indicating how a rhetorical approach to 
expertise fills in significant theoretical gaps.  
Expertise as a Rhetorical Strategy 
In contrast to the scholarship just reviewed, my dissertation argues that expertise 
is constructed rhetorically. It is rhetorical because it depends on the relationships between 
speaker, audience, and context. A speaker is only able to exercise expertise and enjoy 
expert status to the extent that she can persuade an audience to grant such things. This 
does not necessarily render the concept of expertise entirely symbolic. Expertise is not 
the label I use to designate only those superficial signs by which an expert might be 
identified. Rather, a person uses both her “real” knowledge and experience in a specific 
field and her rhetorical prowess to win over an audience. Reliance on substantive material 
“evidence” does not make expertise any less rhetorical. The effective rhetor relies on 
many different tropes; the more tropes (a title, a position, the ability to establish 
consubstantiality with the audience, etc.) she has at her disposal, the more likely she will 
be viewed as an expert. What follows is a series of propositions about the benefits of a 
rhetorical approach to expertise. 
Artistic and Inartistic Means of Persuasion 
A rhetorical perspective on expertise incorporates both artistic and inartistic 
means of persuasion. Consider three basic dimensions of expertise: a title, a subject 
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matter, and a performance.35 Each can be adapted to fit specific examples. For instance, a 
professor of mathematics has all three dimensions at his disposal. His title: professor and 
doctor; his subject matter: mathematics; his performance: a dry wit, a penchant for 
jargon, a tweed jacket, and a wall of books. Moreover, the triad can be used to examine 
unconventional experts as well. Consider the activist from previous examples. Her title is 
likely linked to a position (president, chair, etc.) in a given organization. Her subject 
matter is her knowledge and first-hand experience of social agitation and mobilization. 
Her performance incorporates both appeals to this experience and the donning of a 
certain aesthetic. In order to distinguish the rhetorical powers of these three dimensions, I 
invoke Aristotle’s vocabulary of artistic and inartistic means of persuasion.36 The artistic 
dimension, which is fundamentally context- and audience contingent, requires more 
adaptation to an audience than does the inartistic dimensions of expertise – the title and 
the subject matter. 
In Book 1 of the Rhetoric, Aristotle explains that inartistic means of persuasion 
are those not supplied by the speaker.37 His examples are witnesses, evidence given under 
                                                 
35 James Fleck, “Expertise: Knowledge, Power and Tradeability,” in Exploring Expertise: Issues and 
Perspectives, eds. R. Williams, W. Faulkner, & J. Fleck, 143-172 (Basingstoke, England: Macmillan, 
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mediated and reproduced,” 147. Tradeability, finally, is Fleck’s efficiency measurement for a particular sort 
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36 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, trans. and ed. G. A. Kennedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
37 Aristotle, Book 1, chapter 2. 
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torture, and written contracts. They precede the moment of rhetorical invention. The two 
inartistic aspects of expertise, I propose, are the title and the subject matter. Because they 
exist beyond the expert’s interaction with other people – at least in so far as she must 
convince them of her knowledge, skill, and status – they do not require rhetorical savvy. 
A person who has a degree in law or economics has some claim to expertise beyond 
social attribution. Behaving un-expert-like will not undo the license or (in most cases) 
make the institution revoke the degree. The same person, furthermore, has a subject 
matter in which she is an expert. She has mastery of a specially designated area of 
knowledge. She understands the intricacies of this particular content whether or not the 
neighbors know it.  
The artistic aspect of expertise is that which is invented by the expert. Herein lies 
the importance of her performance. Performance is not a matter of theatrics or artifice. 
Rather, it is a vital part of being rhetorically successful. The expert is required to become 
her position, her knowledge, and her experience in a public manner while considering 
audience and context. This means that “knowing your stuff” simply isn’t enough. We can 
all think of people whose brilliance goes unappreciated because they could not 
communicate it. They falter when it comes to persuading everyone else that they know 
things. Drawing on an Aristotelian vocabulary, a rhetorical perspective on expertise 
incorporates both artistic and inartistic means of persuasion. 
Invention and Performance 
A rhetorical perspective on expertise integrates invention and performance. The 
Western mind traditionally prefers to reserve the term expertise for cold, hard rationality. 
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It is deeply disconcerted by the idea that performance matters as much as substance. We 
are skeptical of appearances and the possibility that they may compete with other, more 
prized qualities like reason and logic. This distinction between form and content, or 
surface and essence, means that the appearance of something can either represent, distort, 
or disguise its reality. We find ourselves conflicted. On one hand, our culture is 
thoroughly preoccupied with aesthetics.38 In a flurry of imagery and style, we use 
aesthetic standards to make judgments about experiences, objects and people. We 
frequently rely on affect over rationality. On the other hand, we have a long history of 
shunning aesthetics. Plato’s scorn of mimicry resounds in our cultural heritage.39 
 The position of my dissertation is that it is both impossible and undesirable to 
separate the substance of expertise from its performance. Certainly, deception is possible. 
It is not difficult to feign or imitate the performance of an expert without the underlying 
substantive knowledge. For example, watching enough episodes of ER or Grey’s 
Anatomy might teach you to perform medical expertise aesthetically. You could 
impersonate a surgeon. However, the performance would likely come to a screeching halt 
when the time came to execute that expertise which you actually lack.  This distinction 
between expert knowledge and expert performance does not take away from the point: 
Anyone who wants to be believed has to behave in a persuasive way. Expert knowledge 
requires expert performance. The kicker for the Platonist is this: even if a person purports 
                                                 
38 David Birch and Michael O’Toole, The Functions of Style (New York: Pinter, 1988). Mike Featherstone, 
Consumer Culture and Postmodernism (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 1991). Anne Norton, Republic of Signs 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993). Virginia Postrel, The Substance of Style (New York: 
Harper Collins, 2003). 
39 Plato, Republic. 
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to offer nothing but the “nuts and bolts” of knowledge, that is in itself a particular kind of 
performance. Minimalism is a style; being understated about your superior skill is a 
rhetorical choice.  
 Furthermore, invention – one of the canons in rhetorical theory – undergirds both 
the substance and style of expertise. Both require a productive effort on the part of the 
rhetor. Put differently, rhetoric is the art that integrates the expert’s knowledge and 
effective communication. Rhetoric is more than oratorical flourish, more than the 
seductive packaging in which ideas are transported from mind to mind. In addition to its 
managerial function, in other words, rhetoric is a way of discovering and inventing. It is 
indeed epistemic.40 It is as integral to scientific knowledge as it is to the humanities. Data 
and observations do not float about unanchored in language; they are gathered and 
managed in language. 
 The theories of expertise presented by cognitive, political and critical-cultural 
scholars do not deny this. Yet they do not devote much time to investigating the 
relationship between language and knowledge. For example, several cognitive scientists 
note that those research participants who have more sophisticated systems of 
representation for their expertise are better able to retrieve and communicate it (see 8).41 
For expert participants, new information is semantically processed in terms of stored 
knowledge.42 As Ericsson states: “The development of high levels of skill requires the 
                                                 
40 Richard Cherwitz and James Hikins, Communication and Knowledge: An Investigation in Rhetorical 
Epistemology (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1986). Robert L. Scott, “On 
Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic,” Central States Speech Journal 18 (1967): 9-17. 
41 Gobet. See also Moss, Kotovsky, & Cagan. 
42 Brandt, Cooper, & Dewhurst. 
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acquisition of representations that allow efficient control and execution of performance as 
well as mechanisms that support planning, reasoning and evaluation that mediate further 
improvement and maintenance of high levels of performance.”43 Language is part of 
knowledge, even to those researchers who do not typically emphasize it or give it much 
credence.  
 To be clear: I do not conflate knowledge with expertise. Being highly 
knowledgeable is not necessarily the same as being received as an expert, which requires 
a rhetorical effort. However, the success of that rhetorical effort is more likely if the 
expert makes credible references to knowledge. A rhetorical view of expertise thus 
accounts for a wide spectrum of inventive functions. It posits language as the 
representational system that cognitive researchers identify. At the same time, it explains 
the way that great oratory seems to sell expertise, as critiqued by some scholars. The term 
“rhetoric of expertise” can apply to both discovery itself and the language in which 
discovery is communicated to an audience. The invention of knowledge and the invention 
of a style through which to convey it are both just that: rhetorical inventions. The point, 
once again, is that a rhetorical perspective of expertise allows for both functions. 
 The Expert 
 A rhetorical perspective on expertise accounts for the complex nature of the 
expert. From classical times to the present, source credibility has been the focus of not 
only rhetorical studies but of persuasion and communication research. As McCroskey and 
Teven explain, “messages are interpreted and evaluated through the filter of the 
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receiver’s perceptions of the message’s source. No message is received independently 
from its source or presumed source.”44 Source credibility is profoundly important to the 
analysis of expertise. Faulkner et al. note: “[T]he role of the expert remains socially 
contingent: what is judged is not so much the content of the evidence or advice, as the 
credibility and/or legitimacy of the person giving that evidence or advice; if we trust the 
expert, we trust their expertise.”45 Because source credibility is so central, a productive 
theory of expertise must be able to account for the expert. 
 One of the contributions of a rhetorical perspective is that it lets us transcend the 
autonomy/attribution dialectic addressed above. The question of whether expertise is an 
individual quality or an attribution made by others becomes moot as soon as the 
rhetorical perspective reveals that it is necessarily and simultaneously a function of both. 
Specifically, source credibility, or ethos, is a concept that combines the expert’s 
knowledge or competence with her trustworthiness and perceived goodwill.  
 An expert’s ethos is a complex product of her reputation and her performance in a 
single rhetorical moment. Aristotle insists, however, that ethos must be constructed and 
presented publicly.46 It should rely more on a speaker’s “artistic accomplishments” in a 
speech than on the audience’s awareness of a “well-lived existence.”47 Certainly, the 
                                                 
44 James C. McCroskey and Jason J. Teven, “Goodwill: A Reexamination of the Construct and Its 
Measurements,” Communication Monographs 66 (1999): 90. 
45 Wendy Faulkner, James Fleck, and Robin Williams, “Exploring Expertise: Issues and Perspectives,” in 
Exploring Expertise: Issues and Perspectives, eds. R. Williams, W. Faulkner, & J. Fleck, 1-28 
(Basingstoke, England: Macmillan, 1998), 4. 
46 Brad McAdon, “Two Irreconcilable Conceptions of Rhetorical Proofs in Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” Rhetorica 
22 (2004): 307-325. Jacob Wisse, Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero (Amsterdam: Adolf M. 
Hakkert, 1989), 35-36. 
47 Michael J. Hyde, “Introduction: Rhetorically, We Dwell,” in The Ethos of Rhetoric, ed. M. J. Hyde, xiii-
xxviii (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), xvi. 
 25
audience’s perception is to some extent based on preexisting knowledge of the rhetor, but 
“those qualities are crafted anew in the texture of the discourse.”48 For example, a 
politician’s expertise depends on her knowledge and experience as well as her rhetorical 
ability to display competence. Theories of ethos likewise suggest that the rhetor must 
both possess a certain praiseworthy character and be able to present that character 
rhetorically in a credible manner. 
 Aristotle equips rhetoricians with a theoretical triad. He states: “There are three 
reasons why speakers themselves are persuasive; for there are three things we trust other 
than logical demonstrations. These are practical wisdom [phronēsis] and virtue [aretē] 
and good will [eunoia].”49 As with the artistic and inartistic means of persuasion, these 
concepts are not definitively distinct. For example, displaying goodwill toward the 
audience depends in part on the rhetor’s ability to perform a moral character. Likewise, as 
Noel argues, “moral character cannot be exhibited in practical situations without the use 
of phronēsis. Similarly, phronēsis cannot be undertaken without the existence of moral 
character.”50 An investigation of ethos is facilitated by a close examination of scholars’ 
treatment of goodwill, good sense, and moral excellence respectively. 
 Phronēsis is the dimension of ethos that comprises the rhetor’s knowledge. It has 
been translated differently to include such characteristics as good sense, practical 
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wisdom, sagacity, expertise, and intelligence.51 Aristotle explains that “prudence 
[phronēsis] is a virtue of intelligence whereby people are able to plan well for happiness 
in regard to the good and bad things that have been mentioned earlier.”52 Phronēsis is not 
conceptually identical to theoretical knowledge – sophia in Greek – or knowledge of 
scientific and technical principles – techne – or even knowledge of connections and 
associations – dianoia. Rather, it is a level of competence that incorporates multiple 
skills. It is “a capacity for discerning in the sphere of action the intermediate point where 
right conduct lies in any given situation. It is a capacity for applying a rational principle 
to practical situations that call for choice about action.”53 Note the importance that 
Aristotle places on kairotic sensitivity – a sense of fittingness for occasion. A 
performance of knowledgeability, intelligence, and good sense requires the rhetor’s keen 
awareness of situational constraints. 
 The second component in Aristotle’s theory of ethos is eunoia, or goodwill. 
Depending on the scholar’s interpretation, eunoia can denote either the goodwill that the 
audience experiences toward the speaker or the goodwill that the speaker exhibits toward 
the audience. Ultimately, it is the extent to which the speaker is understanding, 
empathetic, and responsive in the audience’s perception.54 Aristotle compares eunoia to 
friendliness, primarily as the performance of friendly gestures generates credibility.55 For 
Aristotle, goodwill and friendliness are defined as wanting for someone what is good for 
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him rather than wanting what will benefit oneself. As he states: “[A]ll in all, [people like 
those] who are very fond of their friends and not inclined to leave them in the lurch; for 
among the good they most like those who are good at being friends.”56  
 Recall, once again, that this desire for another’s welfare pertains to ethos only in 
so far as it is performed before an audience. The rhetor must display goodwill in the 
rhetorical moment.  In the construction of expertise, eunoia (along with phronēsis and 
aretē) allows the expert to be perceived as credible. For example, self-help gurus of all 
kinds build credibility by insisting that all their recommendations are in the follower’s 
best interest. Oprah Winfrey and Dr. Phil excel at this ethical appeal. When Oprah starts a 
book club, it is because she wants to share her passion and “get the country reading” for 
its own edification. Oprah is every woman’s friend. When Dr. Phil scolds bad parents on 
national television, it is for their own good; he only wants to help make families better. 
For both gurus, goodwill is “a meaningful predictor of believability and likableness.”57 
Without those ethically-grounded qualities, experts cannot function.  
 Finally, virtue, or aretē, is the third of Aristotle’s components of ethos. Compared 
to phronēsis and eunoia, it is the closest measure of a speaker’s identity. It means 
personal excellence in producing and preserving the ultimate good, which Aristotle 
associates with happiness and contentment.58 Aristotle states:  
Now virtue [aretē] is an ability [dynamis], as it seems, that is productive 
and preservative of goods, and an ability for doing good in many and great 
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ways, actually in all ways in all things. The parts [or subdivisions] of 
virtue are justice, manly courage, self-control, magnificence, 
magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, and wisdom.59  
Reading this definition, we must remember Aristotle’s emphasis on ethos as performative 
and artistic. The skilled rhetor not only possess such qualities as manly courage, self-
control, prudence, and the ability to do good, but he displays them in public speeches. 
 To translate aretē simply as “virtue,” however, is to misunderstand the concept’s 
implications. Classical Greek and Roman cultures did not distinguish, as we do, between 
private and public identity. Furthermore, they did not perceive virtue as a strictly moral 
concept.60 Aretē means “excellence,” specifically as it pertains to the active pursuit of a 
civic identity. To have aretē, in the classical sense, is to fulfill one’s responsibilities to 
the community. As Finkelberg explains, citizens of the archaic and classical periods 
considered aretē as fundamentally dependent on action, specifically purporting to benefit 
the common good in the accepted ways of war and politics.61 Thus, modern 
understandings of identity as private and stable across different contexts do not apply. We 
tend to think that personal identity remains unchanged, albeit hidden, when external 
circumstances prevent a person from acting on it. A rhetorical theory of expertise that 
accounts for the complex nature of the expert must also, it seems, address the expert’s 
identity and identification with a community. 
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Identity and Identification 
 A rhetorical perspective on expertise addresses identity and identification. This is 
only slightly distinct from the preceding one; ethos is fundamentally linked to identity. It 
establishes the rhetor’s public character via “the distinctive voice of an individual and the 
spirit of a[n intellectual] community.”62 As Burke explains, identity is about both 
individuality and sameness. “In being identified with B, A is ‘substantially one’ with a 
person other than himself [sic]. Yet at the same time he [sic] remains unique, an 
individual locus of motives. Thus he [sic] is both joined and separate, at once a distinct 
substance and consubstantial with another.”63 The more individualistic a culture is, the 
more importance can be expected to be placed on an expert’s personal construction and 
enactment of identity. At the same time, the expert is also obliged to ground these efforts 
in relation to an audience. On the subject of identity and expertise, I wish to advance two 
specific points. 
 First, a rhetorical perspective highlights the expert’s personal relationship to her 
subject matter. An expert, I submit, is personally invested in her field of expertise; she is 
committed to her questions, methods, and assumptions. When considered in terms of 
rhetorical invention, expertise is “the establishment by the speaker or writer of a proper 
relationship to his [sic] subject.”64 Nuutinen’s “Expert-Identity” construct illustrates 
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cognitive science’s most comparable version of this personal relationship.65 It comprises 
a sense of meaningfulness, self-confidence, and control in the context of high-stress work 
environments. It does not, however, account for the expert’s identity across public/private 
boundaries. It furthermore has no way of analyzing how identity changes through 
language. A rhetorical perspective on expertise and identity provides such analyses. 
Second, expertise is largely a collective phenomenon. It requires the expert to 
relate to a particular group. For example, an academic conference-attendee must persuade 
the audience of her panel presentation that she belongs. By playing the right language 
game, she may qualify as a member of the group. Likewise, a rhetor must be able to 
construct ethos as both a reflection of personal identity and an attachment to a social 
collective. The more a rhetor can draw on the culture in which she operates, the more 
successful will be her ethical appeals. Cicero states: 
[T]he whole art of oratory lies open to the view, and is concerned in some 
measure with the common practice, custom, and speech of mankind, so 
that, whereas in all other arts that is most excellent which is farthest 
removed from the understanding and mental capacity of the untrained, in 
oratory the very cardinal sin is to depart from the language of everyday 
life, and the usage approved by the sense of the community.66  
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 Haskins examines this “language of everyday life” as it emanates from cultural 
lore.67 She writes: “In an oral setting, epics and religious poetry served as chief vehicles 
of propagation of cultural beliefs and norms of conduct.”68 Thus, she argues, the 
philosopher and the orator alike necessarily rely on speech’s aesthetic appeals to activate 
listeners’ commonly held truths. “[T]he mythopoetic truth, alētheia, which has to do with 
remembrance through repetitive reenaction, is not opposed to the truth of the cosmic 
order contemplated and performed by the philosopher.”69 The philosopher and the orator 
both draw on familiarity with a community’s history, myths, rituals and traditions in 
order to be persuasive. In particular, they use these discourses to construct an insider’s 
ethos and credibility.  
 The same is true for an expert. In this sense, the expert’s ethos is only viable in 
the context of a community; by attending to the audience’s cultural identity, she adapts 
her own performance of character. Somewhere between the “mythopoetic truth” and the 
“truth of the cosmic order,” the expert finds appeals that link her identity to that of the 
community. The audience’s identification with the expert, her habits and values, in turn 
invites them to concede her ethical appeals. 
 The self-help experts favor this rhetorical strategy of identification. Their 
performances in various capacities go beyond goodwill to an appeal of consubstantiality. 
Dr. Phil once again provides a handy illustration. He does not give advice based solely on 
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noble intentions. Instead, by referencing his own marriage, parenthood, career choices, 
etc., he implies that personal experience provides a unique perspective. He assures the 
audience that he understands their troubles; after all, they have much in common. The 
expert’s identification trope is very persuasive: “I can help because I know what troubles 
you,” the appeal goes. Of course, this sort of appeal requires the audience’s 
acknowledgement and participation. 
The Role of the Audience 
 A rhetorical perspective on expertise emphasizes the role of the audience. 
Scholarship on expertise has largely ignored the role of those who consume it. The 
patrons or audiences of expertise are seemingly treated as a given variable, something to 
be implicitly assumed. A rhetorical perspective, in contrast, posits the audience as 
integral. The rhetor cannot succeed in her efforts to present herself as an expert without 
the audience’s active consent. As with ethos, which is co-constructed by the rhetor and 
audience, expertise falters when the latter chooses not to participate.  
 This perspective entails a major shift in the traditional power distribution. To 
claim that expertise is a rhetorical agreement between the expert and the audience is to 
turn the whole phenomenon on its head. It means that the audience has the power to 
subvert expertise. Consider for example the practice of representative democracy. It 
assumes that the public elects those individuals it deems most qualified to speak in 
political affairs. The public, in other words, acknowledges that some of its members have 
more political expertise than others, and designates those members “representatives.” But 
what if the public should wake up one day and decide that, in a democracy, there is no 
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such a thing as political expertise? They might insist that all citizens are equally qualified 
to make decisions, then refusing to participate in the election of some special individuals. 
Whether or not this trend is already underway, the point is clear: By not participating, not 
voting, not trusting, not obeying, the public has the power to thwart would-be experts. 
 It is this agreement between the expert and her audience that a rhetorical 
perspective foregrounds. Both parties acknowledge in some way that they willingly 
participate in the exchange of expertise for compensation. In some cases, the conditions 
of the exchange are written down. A consultant, for example, who comes into a corporate 
setting to evaluate and redirect the company’s practices works on a contractual basis. The 
contract specifies the amount to be paid for services rendered based on the expert’s 
qualifications. Elsewhere, the interaction is less formalized. A senior graduate student 
might help a junior prepare for a first conference presentation in exchange for beer. In 
both examples, importantly, there is a mutual understanding of an economy of expertise: 
I, the expert, have something that you, the layperson, want/need; if you compensate me, I 
will teach you how to obtain it. This exchange cannot take place without the agreement. 
A persuasive gesture, such as that when the expert persuades other that she knows 
something, requires the audience’s assent. Otherwise the expert’s persuasion fails. 
 Once the notion of an exchange has been introduced, the following questions 
become significant: What are the fruits of expertise? If expertise is indeed the function of 
a strategic rhetorical effort, what goods does such an effort procure? What benefits does 
the expert enjoy? The material payoffs of expertise may seem evident. A business person 
who can persuade the public that she is an expert in a totally new and absolutely 
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revolutionary area will make a fortune. More important in a rhetorical analysis, however, 
are the symbolic goods: acknowledgment, authenticity, credibility, status, legitimacy, etc. 
Being an expert means having the right to a certain chunk of human experience. It means 
that your version of that experience is recognized as the authentic one, that your 
perspective is acknowledged and believed, that your voice is heard. Ownership can be 
theorized in ways other than material property. To own an experience and thus call 
oneself an expert is to be validated. As my dissertation demonstrates, there is an array of 
rhetorical strategies that experts deploy to struggle with one another for such symbolic 
goods.  
 In light of these five propositions comprising a rhetorical approach to expertise, 
let me clarify my assumptions about the term “rhetoric.” As is evident in my discussion 
of invention, I consider rhetoric to be first and foremost epistemic. It is the way that we 
experience and come to know the world. More specifically, my dissertation relies on an 
Aristotelian and Burkean definition of rhetoric. First, Aristotle underscores the rhetor’s 
discerning and inventive capacity when he called it: “the faculty of discovering in any 
particular case all of the available means of persuasion.”70 To be successful as a rhetor 
and expert, one must be able to see the resources for persuasion, and do so even as they 
change with each new situation. Fuse this approach with Burke’s definition of rhetoric as 
“the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by 
nature respond to symbols."71 According to Burke, rhetoric is a means of deliberate 
                                                 
70 Aristotle, Book 1, chapter 1. 
71 Burke, 43.  
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manipulation. Rhetors choose particular symbolic means because they fit the text and 
purpose. In addition, rhetoric is frequently a contest; it is product of conflict—as well as 
the conflict’s site, means, and conditions. 
 My dissertation’s analysis of expertise investigates symbolic strategies in the 
context of contest. It draws on the literature just reviewed as well as the notion of 
expertise as a rhetorical construct. As demonstrated above, a rhetorical approach to 
expertise interlocks invention and performance. It accounts for the complex nature of 
“the expert.” It incorporates theories of identity and identification. And it emphasizes the 
role of the audience. Given this picture of expertise that the propositions paint, I ask: 
What do experts do rhetorically to induce cooperation and compete for authority and 
legitimacy? What rhetorical tactics do they employ in conflict with one another? What 
are the rhetorics of expertise? Pursuing these questions leads to a set of artifacts and a 
critical lens discussed in the following section. 
Texts and Methodology 
 An analysis of the rhetoric of expertise should begin with the places where 
expertise is most salient. It should investigate especially how and when experts wield the 
most power and influence over our lives. The four contexts of expertise featured in my 
dissertation comprise some of modern society’s most important endeavors: the political, 
the historical, the medical, and the informational. Many of the things we care about the 
most fall into one or more of these four categories. It is in these contexts that we become 
citizens and members of a community. We elect individuals to run our nation. We pay 
other individuals to heal our sick bodies. We acknowledge certain versions of the past 
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over others. We accept some people’s knowledge as more credible than others’. Almost 
everything Americans value is entrusted to some kind of expert – political, medical, 
historical, or informational. In these four contexts, expertise is a way of organizing 
relationships and exchanges. 
 These relationships and exchanges of expertise, I contend, are rhetorical. They are 
the results of persuasion. When a political leader seeks popular support, s/he has to 
persuade voters that s/he is more competent, experienced, or savvy than the opponent. 
Displays of experience and high-power, Washington connections are tantamount to 
political expertise for politicians and activists. The same is true for medical experts. The 
medical establishment does not spend all its time simply practicing a craft. It 
simultaneously makes the public believe that medical practices are founded on science, 
and, moreover, that science is reliable. Since every one of us is a potential patient, the 
cohort of medical experts has a big audience. Again, rhetorical displays of knowledge 
and experience, for the doctor, coalesce as medical expertise. Likewise, Chapter Three 
illustrates the rhetoricity of historical expertise. Historians, in the process of writing 
historical scholarship, put forth persuasive appeals to make readers believe. At times the 
claims are implicit, but they nevertheless determine how the scholarship is received. 
Historical experts’ claims about the past are filtered through a screen of credibility. Like 
other scholars, historians must acquire certain credentials by completing an academic 
degree, publishing in academic journals, etc. They are aware of competing forms of 
historical expertise. They understand that writing about, for example the Vietnam War, is 
not the same as being a veteran. The claims and warrants for this contested terrain of 
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expertise are different. Inherent in this awareness is the rhetorical task of making one 
interpretation of the past seem more credible, more expert-like, than its competition. 
These rhetorical struggles, and the strategies inherent therein, are the subject of my 
inquiry. 
 The structure of my dissertation is deductive. I began the process by staking out 
four contexts: the political, the medical, the historical, and the informational. Then, I 
organized each context according to an opposition; who, I asked, competes for expertise 
within these terrains? For example, who competes for the rights to medical expertise? 
Subsequently emerged a crucial choice: I could either find a text where the 
representatives’ “attitudes” were explicitly stated, or designate a specific topic or issue 
where those attitudes were manifested implicitly. Either approach would require a close 
rhetorical criticism to reveal underlying claims to expertise. The first alternative would in 
effect require a theoretical playbook for each type of expertise. For several of the groups, 
such a playbook would be a strange proposition. Many experts do not explicate their 
foundational assumptions in a manner that is separate from actually practicing their 
expertise. Therefore, I selected four current topics of controversy, one for each context. 
For the political context, I chose immigration reform; for the historical, history and 
memory of 9/11; for the medical context, the diagnosis and treatment of depression; and 
for the informational context, the publication of (alternative) reference resources like 
Wikipedia. This issues-based approach was appropriate for two reasons. 
 First, it incorporates a more naturally occurring rhetorical phenomenon. Generally 
speaking, attitudes toward identity and practice are more often implicit than not. The 
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experts from each chapter reveal more about themselves and their expertise when they 
put it to use than when they explicitly comment on it. Additionally, only certain groups of 
people habitually explicate their own practices. For example, professional historians and 
medical doctors readily offer an explicit account of how and why they know things. 
Articulating these assumptions is inherent in their expertise. Trauma survivors, on the 
other hand, may be aware of their experience, but may never have had to rationalize it 
theoretically.  
 Second, the four issues are places where the two sides actually engage one 
another. Analyzing texts that explicate methodologies would miss the rhetoric of 
expertise in confrontation. For example, most historical scholarship is published far away 
from the messy world of survivor experience. As a professional historian, you may 
present a perfectly elegant account of your research practices without ever having to face 
a witness’s disagreement. I wanted to seek this and other rhetorical frictions that bring 
expertise to a head. 
 Note that I am principally focused on the rhetorical strategies of expertise, and 
only secondarily concerned with each specific context. The objective of my dissertation 
is not to determine the validity of different epistemologies. I am not playing the part of 
moderator or judge in a fight between theoretical knowledge and lived experience. Both 
sides of each issue may be worth hearing. The question is not what these experts say 
about a given subject matter, but what their statements reveal about an attitude toward 
expertise itself. I am first and foremost compelled by the struggle for acknowledgement 
that those who compete for expertise wage. The following section overviews my 
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dissertation’s artifacts as well as the set of critical probes I use to respond to the primary 
question: What rhetorical strategies do different experts employ to compete for authority 
and legitimacy when they conflict with one another? 
The Political 
 In the spring of 2006 immigration reform became a major topic of political 
debate. Politicians on the left were trying to persuade the public that they prioritized both 
humanitarian concerns and matters of national security. Politicians on the right were 
performing a balancing act between retaining conservative support, primarily in the 
Latino community, and appearing to be tough on border control. Activist groups 
discovered new and surprising alliances; Catholic priests and left-wing protestors were 
shoulder to shoulder against a hard-line policy reform. Those who got involved in the 
controversy were making public appeals to being compassionate and patriotically prudent 
all at once. Everyone in the discussion was vying for attention and credibility. 
 Immigration reform is a matter of policy, which makes it ripe for rhetorical 
criticism. Moreover, analyzing arguments made in the context of immigration reform 
allows me to examine the rhetoric of political expertise. It reveals what both sides of a 
controversial issue claim regarding political leadership and its requisite qualifications. 
Simply put, arguments about immigration lead directly to assumptions about political 
expertise, because both are about popular presence in the civic sphere. The immigration 
debate focused largely on the right to be present – legally in the country and symbolically 
in political discourse. Conversely, political expertise is a question of whose voice should 
be recognized. How, then, did politicians and activists make arguments in reference to 
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knowledge and experience? How did they construct different claims to political 
expertise? 
 In Chapter Two, I analyze public statements made by professional politicians on 
one side and immigrants’ rights activists on the other. I single out the few most publicly 
present politicians and activist groups to represent them.72 By investigating arguments 
about immigration through a rhetorical lens, I ask: What do these claims reveal of an 
underlying attitude toward political expertise (civic competence, leadership, democratic 
power)? When is it argued that national politics should be run by a small political elite? 
Who would make such an argument and why? Under what circumstances is the public 
advised to defer political power to “the experts”? On the other hand, when is the 
argument made that national politics should be run by the citizens who, in their lack of 
specialized training, might actually ensure diversity and democracy? By contrasting these 
attitudes as they operate in a debate about immigration reform, I investigate how both 
sides rhetorically construct political expertise.  
The Historical 
 In 2006 America passed the five-year-mark of the September 11 traumas. On the 
date of the anniversary, commemorative ceremonies and events were held nationwide. 
There were speeches and honorific moments of silence, the intensity of which seemed to 
increase the closer one came to ground-zero. On that day, the entire country felt the 
                                                 
72 To collect these statements, I will use names (both of individuals and organizations) as search terms in 
databases such as Lexis Nexis and Academic Search Premier. I will limit the search to documents in which 
the names occur in the title field along with relevant subject phrases such as “immigration reform” and 
“immigration debate.” Additionally, the search will be constricted to publications between January and 
June of 2006, a six month time during which the issue was intensely and publicly debated. 
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significance of remembering. It recognized that the landscape of American culture and 
politics had changed. For many citizens it became a new milestone – our generation’s 
Pearl Harbor. While a national trauma like this one may have brought the country 
together, it also created conflict between disparate interpretations of what happened. 
Those who were there may not necessarily share the same experience as those who read 
about it. Interpretations reflect different ways of knowing and experiencing the past, 
which raises the issue of historical expertise. 
 In Chapter Three I examine the tension between history and memory as they are 
used strategically to make expert claims about the past. Specifically, I focus on expert 
claims regarding the history and memory of September 11, 2001. By juxtaposing 
historians and witnesses, I ask: In recording and commemorating the past, what is the 
difference between the rhetorics of scholarly and first-person expertise? What sort of 
expertise does a historian’s systematic methodology and predictable epistemology 
produce? In contrast, what sort is produced by seeking the embodied and affective roots 
of personal memory? Most historians assume that knowledge is ascertained through 
systematic methodology. These norms have been established by a discourse community 
of researchers. How might these attitudes emerge in claims to expertise? For the opposing 
side, how do memory and personal experience serve as a kind of expertise? How do they 
use them as means of challenging academic historical inquiry?  
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 Two essay collections claiming historical expertise are juxtaposed. The first is 
History and September 11th, a compilation of articles written by academic historians.73 
The second text is September 11: An Oral History, which offers personal narratives by 
survivors, rescue workers and close friends of 9/11 victims.74 In my analysis of these 
artifacts, I trace the arguments that both sides make about knowing the past. Specifically, 
I analyze the rhetorical strategies for claiming the legitimacy of historical expertise.  
The Medical 
 Medical expertise is a long-contested cultural phenomenon. Historically it has 
moved around to different social groups—healers, elders, witches, and wise men. The 
notion of medical expertise today highlights the tension between those whose knowledge 
is based on natural science and those who understand illness through personal, lived 
experience. The former treat disease as the malfunctioning of a biological system; their 
rhetoric of expertise draws heavily on their philosophical grounding in empiricism. The 
latter appeal to an entirely different set of cultural beliefs; they reference the body as a 
producer of medical expertise. One of the most poignant contexts in which to examine 
the rhetoric of medical expertise is depression. The diagnosis and treatment of depression 
is currently one of the more controversial and hotly debated issues in medicine. 
 Chapter Four contrasts two sides of a controversial medical issue analyzing how 
medical expertise is constructed rhetorically. The context of depression facilitates a 
multifaceted comparison of expert arguments. On one side of medical expertise are 
                                                 
73 History and September 11th, ed. J. Meyerowitz (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003). 
74 Dean E. Murphy, September 11: An Oral History (New York: Doubleday, 2002). 
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physicians. Of them I ask: How is the basic assumption that health care is an extension of 
the natural sciences presented as a warrant? What claims to medical expertise become 
available by grounding this science in discovery, empirical truth, and progress? How does 
referencing specific epistemological and methodological practices generate expertise? On 
the opposing side are those who have experienced depression personally. To examine 
their rhetorical strategies, I focus on embodied experience, narrative descriptions, and the 
rhetorical use of “everyday life.” I ask: Does a willingness to acknowledge that some 
human experiences cannot be verbalized separate depressives from the medical 
establishment? What claims to medical expertise come from rejecting the widely 
accepted practices of science? 
 To trace the rhetorical strategies of both sides, I analyze two sets of artifacts about 
depression. The first is Understanding Depression by Dr. J. Raymond DePaulo.75 
DePaulo is the Henry Phipps Professor and Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry 
and founder of the Affective Disorders Clinic at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine. 
His book is designed for the general public, particularly addressing patients suffering 
from depression and their families. The second artifact is Unholy Ghost, a collection of 
first-person narratives written by self-identified sufferers of depression.76 The editor is a 
mental health journalist and the sister of a long-time depressive. The contributing authors 
are  novelists, poets, literary and cultural critics. These two texts provide uniquely 
                                                 
75 Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2002. 
76 Ed. N. Casey (New York: Perennial, 2001). 
 44
instructive examples of the tension between different kinds of experience in the rhetorical 
construction of medical expertise. 
The Informational 
 Something that has recently received much attention from both scholars and 
journalists is Wikipedia, the online encyclopedia.77 In fact, the National Communication 
Association’s list serve CRTNET featured a brief dialogue in the fall of 2006 between 
Shannon Vanhorn of Valley City State University and Richard Olsen of the University of 
North Carolina Wilmington. The issue at stake was instructional and scholarly policies 
regarding the use of Wikipedia for research and course assignments. Should college 
instructors permit students to use Wikipedia as a reference? How ought we use it 
ourselves? Professor Vanhorn elicited advice from the list serve and Professor Olsen 
made a reference to teaching “critical evaluation and appropriateness of sources.” He also 
joked that “any discussion of the value of Wikipedia should be done only AFTER 
watching Stephen Colbert’s wonderful discussion of ‘wikiality’.” 
 Wikipedia is a rhetorician’s puzzle. Its “anyone can edit” policy is a radical 
departure from the traditional ways in which information is organized and disseminated. 
On Wikipedia, scholars and laypersons are indistinguishable; one edits the other’s work 
with no special designation for degrees or affiliation. Remarkably, Wikipedia has been 
well received by the American public. Some praise it for being a new kind of public 
sphere with great democratic and interactive potential. They see the challenge it poses to 
existing practices, such as publication. Others like Wikipedia because it makes 
                                                 
77 www.wikipedia.org  
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information easily accessible. For the purposes of my dissertation, Wikipedia offers a 
useful illustration of the complications surrounding expertise. It brings to the forefront all 
of our fears about privilege and the control of knowledge. The principal question is 
therefore about the rhetorical construction and disposition of information itself. Chapter 
Five investigates Wikipedia’s production of a new brand of expertise that may challenge 
that of more traditional reference publications. This comparative analysis turns attention 
to the possibility of knowledge that is popular. I take inventory of the strategic appeals 
that informational experts offer. I demonstrate how they go about persuading us to accept 
their dissemination practices over others. 
 The informational context explores the emergence of alternative reference sources 
and their innovative forms of publication. More specifically, it contrasts fundamental 
assumptions about expertise from Encyclopedia Britannica with the much-debated 
Wikipedia. By analyzing texts produced by and about these publications I examine how 
expertise is differently managed in each case. I rely on both primary and secondary 
sources, using, for example, both Wikipedia’s own texts and published commentary about 
it. I also compare the format of the entries in Wikipedia and Encyclopedia Britannica 
respectively. I examine differences between the two publications when they feature 
information on the same topic.  
Critical Probes 
 While analyzing these four contexts and the eight forms of experts that occupy 
them, I deploy a series of critical probes. The answer to each of them supplies one piece 
of this dissertation’s puzzle. The question that each probe poses often overlap, suggesting 
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that the rhetorical strategies for constructing expertise build on one another. In many 
ways, the probes reflect the benefits of a rhetorical approach to expertise described earlier 
in this chapter. For example, one of the probes inquires about the construction of ethos. 
Another focuses on the integral role of the audience. Examining different dimensions of 
each of the eight expert groups strengthens my understanding of their discursive 
strategies. It allows me to explain how these experts go about constructing expertise 
rhetorically. What follows is a description of each probe; I then explain how the probes 
generate the needed information to answer my dissertation’s larger question. 
Probe 1: How is the topos of expertise addressed? 
 This first probe comprises such questions as: Do experts refer to themselves 
and/or their work using the terms “expert” or “expertise”? If they do not, who and what 
do they subsume under this label? What is the purpose and outcome of placing this label 
on someone else? If they do call themselves experts, what other concepts cluster around 
this self-characterization (profit, leadership, service)? These questions examine which 
experts make explicit references to expertise and what they claim in doing so. Some 
experts theorize openly about what expertise is and how they themselves function within 
it. They lay their cards on the table, so to speak. Oftentimes, however, expertise is only 
present implicitly; experts do not always refer to themselves as such, even when they 
operate under that assumption. Considering that my dissertation is a first stab at the 
rhetoric of expertise, that its purpose is to describe, exploring what is said directly about 
expertise is critical.  
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Probe 2: How do experts address methodology and epistemology? 
 As explained earlier, my dissertation does not evaluate the soundness of expert 
epistemologies and methodologies. It cannot, however, separate itself entirely from those 
concerns. For while I do not compare one way of knowing or practicing expertise against 
another, I do explore how these are invoked as rhetorical strategies. For example, 
representatives of biomedicine may rely on the persuasiveness of scientific methods to 
establish themselves as medical experts. For them, referencing familiarity with 
predictable and replicable methods may be key to credibility. Likewise, political activists 
and historical witnesses both present lived experience as central to their expertise. They 
are experts by virtue of experience, which is rhetorically couched as an epistemology. 
Experts’ practices and ways of knowing the world may thus be present in its persuasive 
appeals for expertise.   
This probe includes questions such as: To what training or experience do experts 
attribute their expertise? Do they privilege theoretical education or first-hand experience? 
How do they organize hierarchically different orders of such experience (for example, the 
difference between apprentice-like training and “real world” experience)? Do they 
reference a methodology explicitly as in the case of the medical doctors? If so, how is 
that methodology presented? Is it something that can or should be taught? 
Probe 3: With which topoi do experts associate and disassociate? 
 All experts strive to associate itself with certain ideals and/or commonplace 
arguments/assumptions, while disassociating itself from others. This is how rhetors create 
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an argument by association.78 It is part of identifying the differences between these eight 
groups, their practices and personae. To again use medical expertise as an example, 
doctors associate themselves with such tropes as objectivity, empiricism, progress, 
discovery, and detachment. These ideas recur in their language. The professional 
historians similarly emphasize method and professional membership. Both groups 
simultaneously disassociate themselves from personal commitment, affect, and emotion. 
In contrast, these tropes are precisely what the witnesses in the historical chapter 
highlight. The question is: What is gained rhetorically by grounding claims to expertise in 
first-hand experiences?  In doing so, how would one rely on affect and emotion? What 
persuasive strategies are available to those who disavow detachment as a way to interpret 
the past? To discover these favored and disfavored tropes, I analyze the terminology in 
discourses produced by and about experts and their practices. 
Probe 4: What is the nature of experts’ ethos? 
 Personal credibility is one of the most important dimensions of persuasion. For 
this reason, a rhetorical analysis of expertise must carefully study how experts present 
their personal relationships to the audience and subject matter. For instance, I examine 
whether experts rely more on artistic or inartistic ethos. The latter, as discussed earlier, 
are those persuasive appeals not supplied by the expert. To political experts, for example, 
inartistic ethical proofs may be a degree from a reputable university (complete with 
framed diploma on office wall) and/or a rank within the party. In my analysis, I pay 
                                                 
78 For example, by repeatedly associating myself with the mind’s superiority over the body, I align myself 
with both Cartesian dualism and Christian spirituality. I may simultaneously disassociate myself from for 
example hedonism and any other belief that physical pleasure is desirable or even permissible. 
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particular attention to references to these inartistic ethical proofs as a possible strategy for 
establishing credibility. 
 Artistic appeals to ethos are more rhetorically complex. They require experts to 
feature knowledge/skill, goodwill and virtue. To discover how experts invoke ethos, I ask 
the following set of questions directed at phronēsis, eunoia, and aretē respectively: Do 
experts emphasize their knowledgeability and/or skill as the core of expertise? Is the 
knowledge/skill grounded in practical and applicable wisdom? Do experts strive to 
persuade the audience that their expertise serves the greater good? How is the 
relationship between experts and audiences fashioned such that the former might appear 
as productive citizens? In other words, how does the expert persuade the audience 
members that she is “one of them” and has their best interest in mind? Finally, how do 
experts present personal virtue as part of a persuasive gesture? What personal triumphs or 
achievements are featured in order to demonstrate service to a community? 
Probe 5: How do experts address a tension between teaching and persuasion? 
 Persuading someone that you have knowledge is not necessatily the same as 
teaching the person what you know. It is the difference between sharing and not sharing 
expertise. Some experts are profoundly concerned with conveying knowledgeability but 
not with extending it to others. Furthermore, not all experts agree that superior 
knowledge or skill can be taught. The ones who believe that it can tend to consider this 
teaching a mandate. It is the duty of those who have expertise to pass it on and multiply 
the total number of experts. This probe emphasizes the difference between striving to 
impart and striving to restrict expertise. Furthermore, it asks how experts convey 
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expertise – in effect demand expert status – while persuading an audience that the 
expertise cannot be shared. 
 The tension between instruction and persuasion is fundamentally rhetorical. 
Whatever the expert’s approach in the matter, she must make an argument that supports 
it. An expert who is more concerned with persuasion than instruction has to persuade the 
audience that instruction would have no merit. She of course also has to persuade us that 
she indeed possesses the relevant knowledge and experience in the first place. 
Conversely, an expert who is principally concerned with instruction has to persuade the 
audience that we can and should learn these skills. Moreover, she must persuade us that 
she is the one who can best impart these skills. 
 Consider, for example, the difference between professional politicians and 
political activists. The former have vested interest in preserving the idea that political 
expertise is highly exclusive, that it is limited to the few and especially qualified. What 
incentive, then, do they have to spread political expertise and “dilute” this exclusivity? 
What benefits would they reap from persuading people that political expertise is 
inaccessible and complicated? Activists, in contrast, ground their political expertise in 
popular democratic ideals such as mass participation. They use their expertise mobilizing 
the citizenry. The question is, how do they construct political expertise as something that 
everyone can pursue? To analyze this tension, I examine whether differebt kinds of 
experts produce an invitational rhetoric or one that discourages participation. Do experts 
encourage members of the audience to join, for example, in a political or online 
movement? Do they present their expertise as something that anyone could learn and to 
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which anyone could gain access? Do expert discourses make expertise seem so difficult 
and unattainable that deference is the only realistic option? 
Probe 6: What enthymematic appeals are made? 
 Rhetoric is co-constructed between speaker and audience. In this engagement, 
enthymemes play a central role by situating the parties in the same cultural context. This 
probe inquires when and how audiences are invited to participate in the rhetoric of 
expertise. Specifically, it focuses on participation that supplies certain unstated 
assumptions based on shared identity. 
 For example, Chapter Five features two groups that compete for informational 
expertise. When they reference one another, their arguments become enthymematically 
interdependent. When Wikipedia promotes itself as an expert by criticizing the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica’s antiquated informational disposition, it asks the audience to 
draw on familiarity with the cultural underpinnings of encyclopedic publishing. I ask 
therefore: How do informational experts dialogically reference each other to compete for 
expertise?  If they advertise certain strengths in their publishing methods, what 
shortcomings do they simultaneously criticize? To analyze enthymemes in the rhetoric of 
expertise, one might assume that the audiences of expertise share certain cultural 
experiences. For example, when reading scholarly expertise by a historian or a 
psychiatrist, the audience knows that personal, lived experience is beyond the scope of 
academic research. Thus it does not offer a comprehensive account of historical or 
medical phenomena. How, I ask, does this familiarity provide a basis for engaging in 
enthymematic appeals? This probe registers the specific places and contexts in which 
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experts requests audience’s involvement. It also inquires what cultural knowledge an 
audience would need in order to understand experts’ enthymematic gestures. 
Probe 7: Who is the implied audience? 
 This probe demonstrates, even more than the others, how rhetorically grounded 
expertise really is. It asks how an expert’s message is tailored to the audience and 
situation. To investigate rhetorical sensitivity, this probe focuses on differences in how 
experts speak to lay-persons, to other like-minded experts, and to competing experts 
respectively. For example, when are professional politicians speaking to other politicians 
and when are they addressing the American public? Are Wikipedians writing to the 
computer-literate public at large or to other contributors who share an interest in a very 
specific subject matter? Note the rhetorical choices that experts would make signaling 
these differences; speaking to an audience of experts and speaking to a lay-audience may 
be distinguishable by more than time and place. In order to discover the deliberate 
strategies that reveal an implied audience, I analyze word choice, jargon, tone, 
metaphors, etc. I furthermore stress the arguments that mark identification between 
expert and audience.  
Probe 8: What audience participation is elicited? 
 This final probe examines what experts request from an audience in response to 
message and performance. It incorporates insights from the other probes, primarily the 
last three, which focus on the collaborative relationship between the rhetor and audience. 
Some experts, for example political activists, invite the audience to get personally 
involved. What, then, is the desired response? Other experts may prefer that their 
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audience respond with deference. What arguments do they make in order to make 
deference the most sensible option?  
 This probe distinguishes between hortatory and distancing speech. It analyzes 
how the request for a certain response becomes part of a rhetorical strategy. Note that I 
do not measure effects to determine what response expert’s rhetoric receives. The 
question instead is: Do experts use language that puts the audience in motion or keeps it 
at bay? If experts feature more hortatory speech, it may seek to incite its audience. If 
more effort is put toward distancing or placating the audience, the strategy may not 
include the audience’s direct action. 
 Each of these eight critical probes focus on the rhetorical nature of expertise. 
They inquire about how experts persuade audiences of their own credibility, knowledge 
and experience. The probes ask a variety of questions: What is the rhetorical interaction 
between an expert and her audience? How does personal credibility, or ethos, serve 
experts? What different components of ethos serve different experts in different ways? 
How do experts use certain tropes like objectivity, replicability, methodology, 
experience, democracy, and popularity as commonplaces? With which tropes do different 
experts associate and dissociate themselves? Taken together, the probes allow me to 
answer the principal question of my dissertation, viz., what rhetorical strategies do 






 My dissertation provides a rhetorical theory and vocabulary for understanding one 
of the most important phenomena in contemporary American culture: the legitimacy and 
status rendered by expertise. In this chapter, I surveyed how expertise is theorized in the 
relevant scholarly literature. I also provided an introduction to a rhetorical perspective on 
expertise, demonstrating how it complements existing theories and extends what we 
know about expertise. Finally, I discussed my method of rhetorical criticism (including a 
series of probes) and previewed the following four chapters. In closing, let me emphasize 
that my dissertation is about what expertise does, rather than what it is. I investigate the 
rhetorical construction of expertise instead of pursuing a single definition. Identifying, 
mapping, describing, and analyzing rhetorical strategies is my objective.  
 For this reason, my dissertation begins with a broad exploration of the areas in 
which expertise matters the most. Then, it hones in on some of our time’s most 
controversial issues: immigration reform, 9/11 memory and commemoration, the 
diagnosis and treatment of depression, and the disposition of information in reference 
publications. Each chapter is designed to discover within specific contexts those rhetorics 
that generate power and credibility. Grounding the somewhat abstract notion of expertise 
in these very concrete contexts reveals the significance of my research. 
The sixth and concluding chapter offers a series of theoretical postulates 
responding to my dissertation’s central question: What rhetorical strategies do experts 
employ? The postulates are a way of framing my theory of rhetorical expertise; by 
drawing parallels between different experts from different chapters, I identify recurring 
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trends in the rhetoric of expertise. The postulates reveal that experts that are connected by 
the similarities of their rhetorical strategies. While many of the experts analyzed in my 
dissertation seem quite different on the surface, my analysis demonstrates that they have 
a great deal in common rhetorically. Indeed, the recurring use of the same rhetorical 
strategies through vastly different fields of specialization suggests that expertise 
constitutes a rhetorical genre. Only a focus on discourse allows us to discern these 
patterns. By devoting rigorous scholarly attention to patterns in the rhetoric of expertise, 
we learn valuable lessons about how the nation’s political world is run, why some forms 
of medical expertise are deemed credible while others are dismissed, what the differences 
is between historical scholarship and the memory of lived experience, and why new 
information producers are causing such a stir. By taking on the question of rhetorical 
strategies employed by competing experts, my dissertation theorizes how expertise 
functions through argument.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE 2005-2006 IMMIGRATION REFORM DEBATE: THE RHETORIC OF POLITICAL 
EXPERTISE 
 A democracy expects the general public to make political decisions. As the world 
grows increasingly complex, the United States government asks citizens to take prudent 
courses of action by electing wise and trustworthy representatives. So we listen to their 
speeches and consider their messages. We make ourselves symbolic citizens, subject to 
political persuasion. In so doing we must ask, What is at the heart of this political 
structure? What foundation of wisdom and experience ought we to rely on when 
performing these civic duties? How do leaders assume and exercise the powers given to 
them? What is the nature of expertise in democratic politics? 
 In part, political expertise measures a citizen’s capacity to participate productively 
in the national polis. It involves knowledge, experience and engagement. To a greater 
extent, however, political expertise is a discursive and relational concept. It is a 
comparative logic organizing citizens as leaders and followers. Because the United States 
is a representative democracy, we designate certain individuals to make political 
decisions. We defer to their expertise by voting for them. Importantly, the power that 
these political experts wield is fundamentally contingent on persuasion. A politician must 
persuade the electorate that s/he is more capable, more informed and more concerned 
with the common good than his/her opponent. Such a persuasive gesture is prerequisite 
for the delegation of political influence. Thus, the layperson/expert relationship between 
citizens and political leaders is ultimately a rhetorical relationship. 
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 My dissertation posits expertise as a rhetorical construct. It investigates how 
expertise is constituted and negotiated as a function of the rhetorical situation, its 
participants and constraints. Specifically, I ask: What rhetorical strategies do different 
groups employ to compete for expert authority and legitimacy when they conflict with 
one another? In this chapter, I focus on the rhetorical strategies of political expertise, 
drawing upon the immigration reform debate of 2005-2006. I use this topic as a 
contextual foil, and analyze the rhetorical strategies used by professional politicians and 
political activists respectively. As noted in Chapter One, my primary concern is the 
rhetorical strategies of expertise. Put differently, my question is not about what these 
individuals say about immigration but what their statements reveal about an attitude 
toward political expertise itself. 
 For this analysis, I examine public statements made by professional politicians on 
one side and immigrants’ rights activists on the other (see appendix). In the process of 
selecting appropriate representatives, there were two relevant axes: 1) whether the 
individual would best be categorized as a professional politician or as an activist, and 2) 
whether the individual expressed primarily pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant views.79 
                                                 
79 A few notes on vocabulary: The public debate in 2006 used the phrase “immigration reform” to mean a 
revamping of the nation’s immigration policies. Theoretically, that could mean a revamping in any 
direction. Reform could be drastically restrictive or inclusive. Thus, being “pro-reform” is an ambiguous 
term that creates confusion about the person’s views. S/he could be in favor of a reform that improves 
immigrants’ conditions in the U.S. or one that tightens the already strict regulations for entry and 
participation. Typically, those individuals who are described in the media as “pro-reform” hold relatively 
conservative opinions. To minimize the ambiguity, I use the terms “anti-immigration” and “pro-
immigration” in my dissertation. Moreover, I use the term “immigrant” rather than “alien,” “guest worker,” 
“illegal immigrant,” or “undocumented worker.” This is because my primary interest is not legal status, but 
rather the impact that this group of people has on American culture and politics. Visa status and eligibility 
for work, while they matter to the individual immigrant, are not determining factors in a public discourse 
about political expertise.  
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This selection process produced a two-by-two grid. In the activist column are the 
National Council of La Raza and The Minuteman Project; in the professional politician 
column are Senator Edward (Ted) Kennedy and former Senate Majority Leader Bill 
Frist.80 
 Activist Professional Politician 
Pro-Immigration 
National Council of La 
Raza 
Sen. Edward Kennedy (D. MA) 
Anti-
Immigration 
The Minuteman Project Sen. Bill Frist (R. TN) 
 
 The four categories represented in the figure above are uniquely instructive in the 
immigration reform debate. In addition, they provide excellent illustrations of political 
expertise. On one side, the two activist organizations are important opinion makers and 
agitators for social change. NCLR is the largest Latino advocacy organization in the 
United States; the Minutemen and their founder Jim Gilchrist have received much media 
attention during times when immigration reform has been particularly salient. For the 
                                                 
80 To collect Frist’s and Kennedy’s public statements, I used the LexisNexis database of political transcripts. 
I limited the search using the term “immigration” and each senator’s name. Additionally, I restricted the 
time frame to December 2005 to December 2006 when several Congressional bills were debated and the 
issue received much media attention. This search resulted in a collection of statements from interviews, 
press conferences and public commentary. To collect public statements from the National Council of La 
Raza, I used the organization’s website: http://www.nclr.com. The website has a searchable virtual library; 
limiting the search by topic to immigration issues and by time to December 2005-December 2006 I 
collected thirteen articles. In addition, I collected approximately fifteen textual excerpts from the rest of the 
website: news releases, policy statements and other miscellaneous publications. To collect text representing 
the Minuteman Project, I relied primarily on founder Jim Gilchrist’s book Minutemen: The Battle to Secure 
America’s Borders (Los Angeles: World Ahead Publishing, 2006). I also analyzed the Minuteman Project’s 
website: http://www.minutemanproject.com. 
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politicians’ side, Bill Frist is the former Senate Majority Leader. In mid-March 2006, he 
announced publicly that he was committed to addressing immigration legislation and 
introduced an “enforcement-only” immigration bill (S2454). One year prior (spring 2005) 
Ted Kennedy and John McCain introduced The Secure American and Orderly 
Immigration Act, which was partly responsibly for reenergizing the public debate.81  
 To unpack the statements made by each of the four representatives, I deploy a 
series of critical probes—all outlined in Chapter One. As I explained there, the probes 
underscore the distinctiveness of a rhetorical approach to studying expertise. For 
example, one of the probes inquires about the construction of ethos. Another focuses on 
the integral role of the audience. The eight probes are: 
1. How is the topos of expertise addressed (implicitly or explicitly)? 
2. How do experts address methodology and epistemology 
3. With which topoi do experts associate/disassociate? (objectivity, 
detachment, connectivity) 
4. What is the nature of experts’ ethos? 
5. How do experts address a tension between teaching and persuasion? 
6. What enthymematic appeals are made? 
7. Who is the implied audience? 
8. What audience response is elicited (participation or deference)? 
                                                 
81 Note that “professional politician” and “activist” are a shorthand terminology. It does not imply that 
activists are not political agents or that politicians do not agitate for their agendas. Both groups work for 
political causes. Therein lies the point of the comparative justification, viz. to examine the rhetorical 
strategies used by different types of political experts. In the category “professional politician,” I include 
individuals who are popularly elected and cast a vote in the United States Congress. 
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I use these probes as a means of accessing a text and organizing my research findings, not 
as a mechanistic checklist of questions. In short, I consider the probes as a methodology 
for interpreting the rhetorical techniques featured in the texts. They are heuristically 
valuable tools revealing the strategies of political expertise.  
 I begin this chapter with an overview of immigration in the United States. I 
demonstrate how the debate surrounding immigrants’ contributions and costs to the 
nation has a long and contested history. Then I explain the purpose of using this 
particular site of struggle to study the rhetoric of political expertise. The analysis section 
that follows is divided into two parts: the politicians’ rhetorical strategies and those of the 
activists. Each section is subdivided according to emerging themes in the discourse of the 
politicians and the activists respectively. Finally, I conclude by explicating several 
similarities and differences between the activists and the professional politicians 
regarding political expertise.  
American Immigration: History and Context 
 The history of American immigration is globally unique. Not at any other time in 
history, nor in any other place, have immigrants played a bigger role in nation building. I 
say this not to be naively celebratory—a violent past must not be over-sanitized by 
nationalism—but to illustrate how important immigration is to America’s myth of origin. 
It is a great equalizer; millions of American families have a personal narrative about their 
immigrant ancestry. We treasure the collective memory of being a nation of immigrants. 
At the same time, Americans have a conflicted relationship with strangers and 
newcomers. We sometimes struggle to align a glorious and mythic past with complicated 
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present realities. And we worry that times have changed, that there are not enough 
resources to go around. Associating a personal immigrant heritage with immigration as a 
political debate is difficult. 
 The historical timeline of U.S. immigration policy reflects our fluctuating 
attitudes. It illustrates how this issue has been subject to social, political and economic 
developments: recessions, industrial expansion, technological advancement, etc. The 
early Naturalization Act of 1790 states that “any alien, being a free white person, may be 
admitted to become a citizen of the United States.”82 Later, when immigration was 
restricted through labor laws and exclusion quotas, legal language illustrated the 
suspicion with which foreigners were regarded. For example, in the 1880s Congress 
enacted a fifty-cent head tax on all immigrants while banning entry for “idiots, lunatics, 
convicts, and persons likely to become public charges.”83 In prosperous times, a culture 
needs workers and entrepreneurs; it can afford to be hospitable. In times of downturn, 
such inclusive thinking is rare.84 
 Since the late 1980s, immigration has been the topic of heated debate. A quick 
survey reveals that it resurfaces about every ten years. Every decade, politicians make 
strikingly similar arguments about employment, enforcement, and social benefits. In 
1986, President Ronald Reagan signed the Immigration Reform and Control Act. Its 
controversial legacy is attributed to the sanctions that could be brought against those who 
                                                 
82 Carolyn Lochhead, “The Evolution of Immigration Standards,” Reason 38, 4 (Aug 2006): 44.  
83 Lochhead, 44. 
84 For an insightful analysis of the correlation between labor and immigration politics, see Susan Martin, 
“The Politics of US Immigration Reform,” Political Quarterly 74, 1 (Oct 2003): 132-149. 
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employed illegal workers as well as to the provisions of amnesty.85 In 1996, these asylum 
policies were voided by President Bill Clinton’s Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act. Clinton’s act featured stronger border enforcement, 
regulations against alien smuggling and document fraud, deportation clauses, employer 
sanctions and welfare provisions.86  
 The most recent round of immigration reform debates occurred in 2005, when 
Senators John McCain and Ted Kennedy introduced the Secure America and Orderly 
Immigration Act. While this initiative received some support, the House of 
Representatives nevertheless passed the much more restrictive Border Protection, 
Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act (HR 4437) on December 16, 2005. 
This bill, authored by James Sensenbrenner (R WI) and Peter King (R NY), was 
criticized for being too reliant on border enforcement and not being adequately 
comprehensive. It triggered the surge of protest from immigrant communities across the 
country.87 Then in late May of 2006, the Senate passed the more moderate 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (S2611). This bill included measures for 
increased border security and employer verification provisions, but also a strategy for 
funneling illegal immigrants into visa programs and guest worker initiatives. As recent 
history suggests, in sum, immigration is a staggeringly complex issue in American 
                                                 
85 Norman Binder, J.L. Polinard and Robert D. Wrinkle, “Mexican American and Anglo Attitudes Toward 
Immigration Reform: A View from the Border,” Social Science Quarterly 78, 2 (June 1997): 324-337. 
86 Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., “The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996: 
An Overview,” International Migration Review 31, 2 (Summer, 1997): 438. 
87 Fetzer writes, “City after city across the United States witnessed near-record number of immigrants and 
their supporters marching in protest against the bill [HR 4437] in the spring of 2006. Around 300,000 
people demonstrated in Chicago, 500,000 took to the streets in Los Angeles, and another 500,000 protested 
in Dallas.” Joel Fetzer, “Why Did House Members Vote for H.R. 4437?” IMR 4, 3 (Fall 2006): 699. 
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politics; it goes to the heart of our national identity, and it throws into sharp relief 
questions central to our political system, including the right to be represented in the polis. 
 So why analyze immigration reform to understand political expertise? What does 
one have to do with the other? The emotive and occasionally irrational tone of the 
immigration reform debate may make the connection difficult to discern. Where is the 
level of expertise in hurling invectives and racial slurs? The answer is in the establishing 
of political legitimacy. Both immigration reform and the notion of political expertise are 
ultimately about the rights, responsibilities and qualifications requisite for participating in 
America’s public space. Democratic politics always returns to the issue of participation. 
Because a democracy requires popular decisions, and every person is equal to one vote, 
we continuously must ask, Who is able to participate? Who should be allowed to 
participate? And who, by participating more than most, gets to lead the polis?  
 In addition, the rhetoric of immigration reform—the discussions that politicians, 
opinion makers, journalists and private citizens have on the subject—is highly instructive 
in itself. By analyzing a portion of it, I can identify the rhetorical strategies that 
individuals use to establish not only what political expertise is but why they possess it. 
The debate—beyond the subject matter of immigration—essentially amounts to a battle 
for political expertise. In short, a perennial (and peculiarly American) political debate is a 
perfect foil for studying rhetorical strategies used by different groups vying for the 




Analysis: Professional Politicians Ted Kennedy and Bill Frist 
 The immigration reform debate of 2005-2006 involved some of the most 
prominent politicians in the United States Congress, including Senators Bill Frist, a 
Republican from Tennessee, and Ted Kennedy, a Democrat from Massachusetts. As 
politicians, the two senators have quite different backgrounds and perspectives. Frist, a 
cardiovascular surgeon-turned-politician, left his medical practice to run for the Senate in 
1994. Having served two terms in Congress (one as the Senate Majority Leader), he now 
has returned to practicing medicine. Ted Kennedy, by contrast, was first elected to the 
Senate in 1962. The brother of a former president, Senator Kennedy’s family is widely 
associated with American politics. He is an icon for the democratic party. In this section, 
I analyze Senators Frist’s and Kennedy’s public statements regarding immigration 
reform. In their rhetorical construction of political expertise, I examine three specific 
themes: the political process, the American public, and several recurring tropes with 
which the two politicians associate and dissociate. 
The Political Process 
 One of my first critical probes focuses on methodology and epistemology. These 
are crucial because expertise is so intimately connected to the practice and underlying 
assumptions of a particular craft. In the case of professional politics, methodology 
translates into the dynamics of a political structure. The professional politicians’ 
methodology is their knowledge of and active participation in U.S. politics. For example, 
Ted Kennedy and Bill Frist both reference the internal processes of the American 
political system. They explain how Congress has responded to a particular initiative; they 
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discuss the phases of a debate and the ongoing conversations in various committees. This 
discourse is a way for both politicians to demonstrate their familiarity with a particular 
area in which they seek to establish themselves as experts. It allows them to explicate 
their methods as politicians. Consider two typical examples: 
Frist: After consulting our various caucuses and the people who are 
interested, […] in the very near future we will bring that bill back to the 
floor of the United States Senate, […] we will have appropriate procedure 
with debate and amendment, and then we will pass a bill that will be 
comprehensive.88  
 
Kennedy: This may be the most important vote that we cast here in the 
United States Senate, probably tomorrow, maybe late tonight, for national 
security and for our humanity. […] And it is the way that the Senate 
should work and has worked at the times that we dealt with the great civil 
rights issues and Medicare and education issues.89  
 Quite often, the explication of methodology comes in the form of a reference to 
expert-to-expert relationships. Kennedy and Frist both speak about their productive 
collaborations with other politicians, including the president. This rhetorical strategy is an 
                                                 
88 “U.S. Senators Bill Frist and Harry Reid Hold a Media Availability After Meeting with the President,” 
April 25, 2006, Transcript, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., available through the University of Texas at 
Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007). For clarity and consistency, all excerpts 
in this analysis are indented.  
89 “Members of the Senate Hold a News Conference on Immigration Bill Cloture Vote,” May 24, 2006, 
Transcript, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at 
http://web.lexis-nexis.com. (accessed February 27, 2007). 
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argument by association. Be demonstrating how closely associated the expert is with 
other experts, he is able to “borrow” legitimacy. This is particularly true when the 
personal, friendly aspects of the relationship are emphasized. Flattery and fraternity are 
part of this rhetorical move: 90 
Kennedy: We had a very strong bipartisan participation. These are 
individuals who know this issue, and they are taking it very seriously. And 
I think with the kind of assurances that Senator McCain just talked about 
in terms of maintaining the basic integrity of this proposal in a 
comprehensive form and in the shape we have, I think the prospects of 
getting something very important in terms of finally signed into law.91 
 
Frist: Let me just say that at the outset that he [Sen Harry Reid] and I have 
had a start-and-stop relationship and a start-and-go relationship on this, 
but for the last two weeks have been hand in hand as we agreed in a 
                                                 
90 The gendered dimension of these relationships is significant. When the senators reference collaborations 
that transcend party interests, they often characterize themselves and their colleagues as a collective with 
internal diversity. Frist states, “We, as a bipartisan, motley crew, a delegation of leadership, interested 
parties, people who have spent a lot of time studying the issue, challenging immigration reform, have just 
met with the president for the past hour and had a very frank and open discussion.” See “U.S. Senators Bill 
Frist and Harry Reid Hold a Media Availability After Meeting with the President.” However, the 
collective’s common agenda is served by a cohesion that is noticeably male. For example, during the press 
conference that followed the Senate’s vote on S. 2611, Kennedy refers to his fellow members of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee as a “band of brothers, Republican and Democrat alike, who saw the importance of 
the passage of this legislation, saw that American […] needed to relight the golden lamp.” See “News 
Conference Following Senate Passage of Immigration Legislation,” May 25, 2006, Transcript, The Federal 
News Service, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com 
(accessed February 27, 2007). 
91 “Members of the Senate Hold a News Conference on Immigration,” April 6, 2006, Transcript, 
Congressional Quarterly, Inc. available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-
nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007). 
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bipartisan way to produce a bill that not only the Senate could be proud of 
but America could be proud of.92  
 The trope of bipartisan collaboration in these excerpts complements the 
politicians’ expert-like magnanimity. Because bipartisanship is most significant during 
times of crisis, the trope also affords the issue a sense of national urgency. Using the term 
bipartisan indicates unity working toward the greater good. It is an ethos-building 
strategy for crediting oneself with the ability to put aside differences in the public’s 
interest. Recall from my discussion of ethos in Chapter One that eunoia, or goodwill, is 
vital to a rhetor’s relationship with an audience. Frist and Kennedy use the bipartisanship 
trope to construct a society of political experts that convenes around an important issue 
instead of along party lines.  
Frist: And it is a time for us to show contrast in terms of the president’s 
leadership and Republican leadership. It’s a time for us to work together 
across the aisle on issues like immigration reform.93 
 
Kennedy: We had a strong bipartisan outcome yesterday in the Senate 
Judiciary Committee that showed that there was overwhelming support 
                                                 
92 “News Conference Following Senate Passage of Immigration Legislation.” 
93 “U.S. Senator Bill Frist Holds a Media Availability After Closed Policy Luncheon,” May 16, 2006, 
Transcript, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at 
http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007). 
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among Republicans and Democrats alike for a comprehensive approach 
toward the problems of immigration and immigration reform.94 
Subverting the usual Democratic and Republican agendas creates the impression of an 
expert in professional politics writ large rather than merely an advocate of an ideological 
agenda. 
 Of course these rhetors go beyond simply demonstrating political proficiency. 
Accurately referencing Congressional procedures and hierarchies would accomplish this. 
Frist and Kennedy, however, speak specifically about their own contributions and 
successes as political experts—as members of the political expertise establishment. They 
list their respective accomplishments: 
Kennedy: That’s the bill that Senator McCain and myself [introduced]. 
And we have a broad coalition of Republicans and—president isn’t quite 
where we are, but it’s a great opportunity for the president to just to push 
this legislation over the goal line95 
 
                                                 
94 “U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy Holds A Media Availability Following A Meeting With President 
Bush,” March 28, 2006, Transcript, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., available through the University of 
Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007). 
95 Senator Edward Kennedy, Interview by Larry King, May 7, 2006, CNN Larry King Live, Transcript, 
Cable News Network, available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com 
(accessed February 27, 2007). 
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Frist: As our legislative branch of government, we are responsible for 
oversight. We have been conducting that oversight. It’ll be extended even 
further today with a briefing at the Senate Intelligence Committee.96 
 
Kennedy: I believe, one, we’re so much further than anyone ever thought 
that we’d be on immigration reform, so much further. Very few people 
ever thought we’d be able to get it out of the Judiciary Committee and get 
it through the Senate and by getting it through the Senate by the strong 
vote that we did.97 
 
Frist: We have demonstrated what is the very best about this body. The 
deliberation, the amendment—the debate and amendment; the having a 
committee, the Judiciary Committee, generate a base bill that had as its 
foundation the work of many of my colleagues, a bipartisan effort.98 
 
Kennedy: This legislation is a major, major, major improvement over the 
current conditions in terms of the exploitation of workers. […] And we 
worked very, very hard to get these provisions in and they are part of the 
                                                 
96 Senator Bill Frist, Interview by Rene Syler, May 17, 2006, CBS Early Show, Transcript, The Federal 
News Service, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com 
(accessed February 27, 2007). 
97 “Conference Call with Senator Edward Kennedy,” July 5, 2006, Transcript, The Federal News Service, 
Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 
27, 2007). 
98 “News Conference Following Senate Passage of Immigration Legislation.”  
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comprehensive approach, and it will make a very significant, important 
difference.99 
When Kennedy and Frist explicate their successful efforts in this manner, it 
affords them the ethos of a political expert in two ways. First, demonstrating competence 
in political matters generates phronesis, or the impression of practical wisdom. It 
persuades the audience that the expert can prudently determine a course of action based 
on his assessment of a given situation. The reader will recall the importance of phronesis 
to the classical theories of ethos discussed in Chapter One. Second, listing one’s 
accomplishments in public affairs evokes arête, or an image of civic virtue. Arête is a 
measure of personal excellence, particularly when it serves the common good. For Frist 
and Kennedy, the status of political expertise is bolstered by a rhetorical construction of 
the politician’s ethos. Note, however, that while ethos is part of the rhetorical 
construction of expertise, the two are not synonymous. Expertise is broader, requiring a 
more complex rhetorical effort. For example, it depends on how the expert defines and 
delineates her/his subject matter, and what response s/he elicits from laypersons. 
 In addition, Kennedy’s and Frist’s referencing political procedures and discussing 
their own accomplishments offer a record. They report to the audience what has recently 
happened in Congress and how they themselves have contributed. This reporting format 
resonates with the mindset of a representative democracy, particularly the place of 
political experts. The expert participates on behalf of the lay public, then returning to 
                                                 
99 “Conference Call with Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Silvestre Reyes,” August 29, 2006, 
Transcript, The Federal News Service, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at 
http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007). 
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describe and document his/her actions. Reporting is a particular type of expert discourse. 
It informs the public, but it does not necessarily instruct. Put differently, reporting lets the 
public understand what political expertise comprises, but without sharing it. It does not 
impart expertise to others. Recall that another critical probe focuses on the tension 
between teaching and persuasion for experts. The two politicians analyzed here are 
representative experts. They report and inform the public. They do not to any significant 
extent equip the public with the means to replicate the expertise. Citizens do not 
themselves become politicians by hearing Frist’s or Kennedy’s reports. 
 The essence of a representative political expert, reporting to a constituency, is 
evident in the way that both Frist and Kennedy characterize themselves. Both identify the 
duty of professional politicians as completing a task on someone else’s behalf: 
Kennedy: We’ve tried to make a difference. We tried to work with 
Republicans in the Senate. I’m old fashioned in the sense that I think we 
were elected to get things done.100 
 
Frist: I don’t know where I’ll be, after doing 20 years in medicine and now 
12 years. I’m just a citizen legislator. I said I’m going to Washington to 
serve in the Senate for 12 years, and I’m doing just that.101 
                                                 
100  Senator Edward Kennedy, Interview by Sean Hannity and Alan Colmes, May 12, 2006, Fox Hannity & 
Co. Transcript, Fox News Network, LLC, available through the University of Texas at Austin at 
http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 27, 2007). 
101 Senator Bill Frist., Interview by Amy Robach, Sept 28, 2006, MSNBC, Transcript, The Federal News 
Service, Inc., available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed 
February 27, 2007). 
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Frist’s notion of the “citizen legislator” implies a representative mandate. It humbles him 
before the political process and citizenry. He chooses to serve the public as one of its 
members. Doing so, he insists elsewhere, is the only way to get something done. 
Kennedy suggests that the very purpose of a politician is to “get something done” on the 
electorate’s behalf. Frist’s statement emphasizes the relationship of the expert to his 
audience; by being a part of it, he represents its interests. Kennedy’s statement, 
conversely, foregrounds the duty of the political expert. By virtue of being an expert, his 
responsibility is to fulfill the American public’s expectations and needs. 
The American Public 
 Frist and Kennedy construct a relationship to the American public that blends 
expert-novice and politician-citizenry dynamics. Much of both discourses are devoted to 
what the public thinks, expects and desires. By identifying these attitudes, Frist and 
Kennedy not only affirm, but determine the relationship between themselves and the 
public, as well as the identity of both. The non-expert public becomes those who wait for 
action and results. The political expert becomes he who has an answer for the non-
experts’ problems.  
Frist: The American people want us to secure the border. We can’t have 
hundreds of thousands of people running across that lower border of the 
United States of America, and we’ve got to get control of it.102 
 
                                                 
102 “Conference with Senate Republicans,” Sept 20, 2006, Transcript, The Federal News Service, 
Inc.,available through the University of Texas at Austin at http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed February 
27, 2007). 
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Kennedy: That’s what the American people want. They want us to have a 
comprehensive approach that’s going to be in the interest of our national 
security, understand the importance of this legislation in terms of our 
economy, and most of all, be true to our values about who has the 
opportunity of becoming a member of the American community and 
citizenship.103 
The prescriptive tone of these statements is significant. It posits the audience in a 
way that legitimizes the expert’s response. The expert justifies, even necessitates, his own 
role and actions by identifying a set of expectations. The politician institutes a rhetorical 
situation in which his intervention as expert is critical: 
Kennedy: On the 9th or 10th [of April, 2006] you’re going to have close to 
a million people demonstrating in 10 cities across this country, basically in 
favor of this legislation. […] This issue has struck a chord in the country 
among people that reaches the whole essence of what they are about and 
what they perceive this nation to be about and what they want to be a part 
of in terms of this country. And that is a deep, burning feeling which 
people feel very, very strongly about.104 
 
Frist: We’ve got a responsibility, first and foremost, to govern, and to 
govern with the challenges that are out there today in a 21st century world 
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where terror does threaten our homeland, where we’ve got leaky borders 
to the tune of several million people hemorrhaging across those borders 
every day.105 
Kennedy aligns April’s mass demonstrations with the Senate bill, while Frist offers his 
own governing as the answer to the threat of terror. Through this strategy, both project 
themselves as political experts. 
 How, then, is the public to react to these prescriptive statements of attitudes and 
expectations? One of my critical probes asks what response experts invite with their 
rhetorical strategies. In the context of political expertise, this is typically a question of 
deference versus active participation. Frist and Kennedy do not associate themselves 
explicitly with either one; instead, they use their own declarations of the public’s stance 
enthymematically. Statements of what the American people think become an invitation 
along the lines of “isn’t this how you feel?” If the answer is yes, the audience must 
assume that deferring to professional politicians is appropriate. Consider two of Frist’s 
quotations: 
Whether it’s on the Republican or Democrat side, we all need to come 
together. It’s what the American people want, what they expect, and what 
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they deserve. […] I think the United States Congress—the American 
people expect us to have fixed immigration problems today.106 
 
The American people don’t want us to tolerate 2 million people crossing 
the Southern border every year and coming here illegally. It’s our 
responsibility to act.107 
Frist implies that if his interpretation—or prescription—of Americans’ expectations is 
accurate, his role and responsibility as political expert is clear. According to this logic, 
deference to the expert becomes the appropriate response. 
Tropes and Enthymemes 
 In order to be persuasive, rhetors associate or dissociate themselves with certain 
tropes and values. Often, this functions enthymematically, which means that the audience 
participates by granting that all tropes come with different implications. For example, 
both Frist and Kennedy associate themselves with the characteristic tropes of American 
mythology. They demonstrate a familiarity with the audience’s culture as a persuasive 
strategy. By linking themselves and their respective political agenda with certain firmly 
established American tropes, they enable consubstantiality with the public: 
Kennedy: Americans have always had an ambivalence about immigration 
issues and immigration policy. We are a nation of immigrants. And when 
we’re really at our best, we recognize the extraordinary contribution that 
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immigrants have added to our culture, to our enterprise, to our initiatives, 
to our ideas. It has been profound.108 
Whenever a phrase like “nation of immigrants” is used, it evokes a large discourse of 
mythic American history. This is something that political experts strive to attach 
themselves to in the interest of being persuasive. It means that the expert understands his 
audience and is a part of it. For obvious reasons, Kennedy does this more frequently than 
Frist; he has been in politics much longer and is widely recognized for it (see above). To 
illustrate Kennedy’s use of this strategy, a lengthy excerpt is warranted: 
In Boston, Massachusetts, I can look out of my window in the JFK 
Building and I can look out and see the pier where, in 1848, eight of my 
great-great-grandparents arrived. I can see the pier. […] And I know that, 
in 1848, they walked up those golden stairs and they walked into East 
Boston. And their sons, one of them, the Fitzgeralds, went on to be elected 
as the first Irish Catholic Democrat to serve in the Congress of the United 
States. And he went on later to be the first son of immigrants to be mayor 
of a major city, the city of Boston. He was inaugurated in 1906, 100 years 
ago. And he threw out the first pitch in Fenway Park in 1912, which is not 
unimportant because in 1912, the Red Sox won the world series.109 
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Kennedy associates himself with thoroughly American tropes to present himself as a 
trustworthy political expert. Surpassing credibility simply by virtue of his actions, he 
invokes a mythological discourse that ties his expertise to core American values. In this 
country, a person cannot be elected to political office without knowing something about 
baseball. Put another way, s/he cannot function as a political expert without a firm 
grounding in cultural lore. 
 It is important to note that while both of these political experts use the tropes that 
one would expect from a Democrat and a Republican respectively, they also belabor the 
tropes’ opposites. They go to great lengths to assure the audience that their grasp of the 
issue is sufficiently nuanced. This again is a strategy of transcendence; it generates the 
impression that political expertise encompasses more than partisan ideals. For example, 
Frist predictably emphasizes those tropes which belong to his Republican position—
border enforcement, national security, etc. He also carefully incorporates the idea of 
compassion and humanitarianism. Kennedy likewise associates himself with the idea that 
immigrants make significant contributions; at the same time, he nods dutifully to more 
right-wing staples like law enforcement. These strategies allow politicians to appear 
objective, more expert-like than ideologically motivated. 
Kennedy: We welcome all of those that are going to contribute and help 
and build this nation and continue it. We need your strength. We need 
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your idealism. We need your contributions and the difference that you can 
make for our country.110  
 
Kennedy: We are strongly committed to making sure that the border 
patrols are going to give focus and attention to the smugglers, to the 
criminals, and to those that would do damage to Americans, whether they 
be terrorists, or whether they be drug runners, smugglers, or criminals.111 
 
Frist: We’re out properly securing our borders. We remain vulnerable to 
those who may enter our country undetected. It could be criminals, it 
could be terrorists, it could be other individuals who may mean to do us 
harm.112 
 
Frist: I think this is an issue or should be an issue with an economic issue, 
a humanitarian issue, a national security issue […]113 
As a rhetorical strategy to buttress their political expertise, both Frist and Kennedy raise 
arguments that traditionally belong to their party opponents. However defensive this 
tactic may seem, its primary purpose is to raise the speakers above petty discord. It 
suggests that an expert who is sophisticated enough to recognize and acknowledge 
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different views is unbiased. His/her judgment is unclouded by entrenchment. It is beyond 
dogma. Such an expert transcends mere opinion into a seemingly higher level truth. 
Analysis: National Council of La Raza and The Minuteman Project 
 The National Council of La Raza (NCLR) is this country’s largest and most 
recognized Hispanic advocacy organization. Its top attorneys and political operatives 
exert considerable influence in Washington. The Minuteman Project (MMP), by contrast, 
is a rather marginal group. Most Congressional politicians distance themselves from its 
rather extreme views and practices. At first blush, juxtaposing these activist organizations 
seems paradoxical; they seem to have nothing in common. When taken together, 
however, they illustrate a pattern in the rhetoric of political expertise. 
 Upon examination, it is evident that what these activist groups have in common is 
the deliberate use of powerful rhetorical tactics. They exert influence because of the 
carefully crafted impressions that they make on the American audience. For instance, the 
fact that the American mainstream thinks of the NCLR as a Washington power player 
and the MMP as fringe vigilantes is a rhetorical strategy. The organizations’ public 
personas are the result of their deliberate persuasive efforts. It behooves the NCLR to 
persuade the public that it collaborates and negotiates with ranking politicians. Doing so 
puts Hispanic interests at the forefront of national politics. Conversely, it serves the 
Minuteman Project’s purpose to seem like mavericks. Nonconformity and a sort of wild 
west, anti-establishment rebellion are persuasive to their primary audience. Generating 
this popular impression benefits the organization. So while the NCLR and the Minuteman 
Project create different impressions, both are rhetorical artifacts with a target audience 
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and specific goal. Both organizations create their personae as part of a rhetoric of 
political expertise. In this section, I trace several recurring themes in the public 
discourses of NCLR and the Minuteman Project: the trope of urgency, the stark criticism 
against established political actors, identification with the American public, and the 
invitation to join the cause. 
Trope of Urgency 
 For both the NCLR and MMP, creating a sense of urgency surrounding their 
cause is critical. It generates legitimacy to both the issue itself and to an expert 
organization devoted to it. It shows the public how serious the issue really is. In order to 
achieve this, the NCLR repeatedly underscores the dire consequences of poor political 
decision-making. They use phrases like “playing with people’s lives” to warn the 
audience about bad legislation. The MMP likewise spends considerable effort creating 
the impression of urgency. They construct immigration as an imminent threat by 
comparing it to a flood and a military invasion: 
NCRL: The House Republicans have overreached and are playing with 
people’s lives for political gain.114 
 
MMP: At the current rate of illegal immigration, which is increasing by 10 
to 20 percent per year, within twenty years our nation will drown under 
the weight of the needs, wants, and demands of illegal aliens.115 
                                                 
114 National Council of La Raza, “NCLR Terms Sensenbrenner Bill ‘Appalling,’” News Release, Dec 8, 
2005, available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/news/detail/35482/ (accessed March 5, 2007). 
115 Gilchrist, xx. 
 81
 
NCLR: Poll after poll shows that the American people want action, not 
grandstanding, on immigration. And poll after poll also shows that Latinos 
view the scapegoating of immigrants as a personal attack. These ads are 
not only inflammatory, they are counter productive.116 
 
MMP: Our current estimates put the number of illegal aliens entering the 
United States at over ten thousand per day along the entire 1,989-mile 
U.S. border with Mexico. That rate amounts to about seventy-five 
thousand illegal immigrants entering the U.S. per week—the equivalent of 
four army divisions.117 
These excerpts identify an urgency that creates an immediate need for action. They 
suggest that serious problems require serious solutions. Or, more specifically, serious 
problems require serious experts on the job. Such a notion of the wrong-headed nation is 
a perfect warrant in the rhetoric of political expertise. In order to supply the implicit 
premise, the audience might wonder about a possible solution. Highlighting a crisis—of 
immigrant “invasion” or legislative consciousness—begs the question of who will be the 
nation’s leader. Something must be done, but by whom?  
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Criticism of Professional Politics/Politicians 
 Before answering this question, both the NCLR and the MMP painstakingly 
discredit the expert efforts already underway. They reference past failures of immigration 
reform in order to criticize professional politicians. According to activists, politicians are 
ineffective and/or simply incompetent. A rigid political bureaucracy prevents them from 
achieving necessary and much-needed results. This argument is a refutation; specifically, 
it refutes the validity of politicians’ methodology. Again, my critical probe regarding the 
nature of expert methodology reveals something important about expertise. By discarding 
the practices in which the government already engages, the NCRL and the MMP reject 
the political expertise of the establishment. 
MMP: If simple enforcement of U.S. law becomes too heavy a burden or 
too great a nuisance for elected and appointed members of government, 
then it is up to average citizens to fulfill the destiny envisioned by our 
Founding Fathers and to accept the challenge of exercising the right to 
self-governance.118 
 
MMP: This is a problem that our elected political officials, from the White 
House down to state governorships and local city councils, have 
ignored.119 
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MMP: The United States of America is ripe for a powerful third party that 
could threaten the Republicans and the Democrats by putting the mission 
of the sovereignty of the country ahead of their greedy agenda to maintain 
party control over everything and everyone.120 
 
NCLR: The [Sensenbrenner] bill is a laundry list of mean-spirited and 
intrusive provisions concocted by the most radical immigrant 
restrictionists in Congress.121 
The type of political expertise that the government represents is dismissed in these 
excerpts as thoroughly ineffective. 
 It should be noted that the MMP’s discourse contains much more of this criticism, 
using much stronger language. The excerpts above are but a few of the illustrations. 
When scorning the enemies of the cause—including the American Civil Liberties Union, 
the Southern Poverty Law Center, The Anti-Defamation League, Senators McCain and 
Kennedy, and La Raza itself—the MMP does not mince words. Comparatively, the 
NCRL is much more diplomatic. Its tactful style manages to criticize the government 
while not alienating key allies. This is consistent with my earlier observation about the 
NCLR’s relationships with major political institutions. So while the MMP’s criticism 
posits itself as diametrically opposed to Washington bureaucrats, the NCLR repeatedly 
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references its collaboration with the government. The rhetoric of political expertise 
frequently hinges on association and dissociation with other experts. The NCLR states, 
We are a strong nonpartisan, bipartisan institution which realizes that 
enacting legislation to improve the lives of this nation’s 41 million Latinos 
cannot be done without the help and support of members of Congress from 
both sides of the aisle.122 
 
We will hold both parties accountable. […] If immigration reform is going 
to become a reality, it will require a bipartisan effort. We call on our 
leaders on both sides of the aisle to work together to get the job done.123 
 
We intend to work with members of both parties and the White House to 
produce positive results for our community, and our country.124 
In short, while the NCRL does criticize electoral politics and demand stricter 
accountability, it also belabors its own close relationship with those politics. It is as 
though formal politics is a necessary evil in the struggle for political influence; it is 
therefore employed as a handy reference in the rhetorical strategy for constructing 
expertise. 
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Activities and Contributions 
 The trope of urgency discussed above begs the question “Who?” If something has 
to be done about immigration, who should do it? If professional politics continually fall 
short, who are the experts best suited to solve a problem of this magnitude? In answer to 
this question both the NCRL and the MMP offer an extensive account of their own 
successes. Moreover, they describe and identify themselves as organizations of political 
experts by doing so. They are the alternative to politicians. They construct alternative 
political expertise using their organizational record of achievement.  
MMP: The president and most members of the U.S. Senate are wrong and, 
frankly, criminally incompetent on this issue. When it takes some average 
Joe Citizen like me, who comes out of some remote suburb like Aliso 
Viejo, California, to bring national awareness to this crisis, there is 
something incompetent or corrupt within your government.125 
 
NCLR: NCLR conducts immigration policy analyses and advocacy 
activities in its role as a civil rights organization. The primary focus of 
these activities is to encourage immigration policies that are fair and 
nondiscriminatory, to encourage family reunification, and to enact 
necessary reforms to the current immigration system.126 
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MMP: The Minuteman Project was created to raise national awareness of 
the immigration crisis and to call on American citizens to act. […] 
Residents of all fifty states have been called upon to aid their country once 
again under the name of The Minuteman Project. These volunteers share 
the same patriotic mentality as those Minutemen who defended our 
original thirteen colonies.127 
 
NCLR: NCLR advocates on behalf of the entire Latino population 
regardless of immigration status. We believe that all persons deserve 
dignity and respect, and that the human rights and civil rights of all 
persons must be upheld.128 
In these excerpts, differences between the organizations’ relationship to professional 
politics are again conspicuous. Both are ways of explicating a particular expert 
methodology. As I argued earlier when analyzing Frist and Kennedy, a discussion of 
political practices and achievements is tantamount to a consideration of method and 
epistemology. 
 When the MMP and the NCRL explain their expert practices, they do more than 
simply lay their cards on the table. For both organizations, a powerful legitimacy 
argument can be made that connects today’s activities with an historical precedent. This 
argument draws a trajectory from an event or group in America’s past into the present, 
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generating in effect a mythic authority. Both organizations grant themselves an historical 
mandate. The NCLR does so by citing the “nation of immigrants” and the “American 
dream” tropes; the MMP naturally does so by celebrating their 18th century founders, the 
“original” Minutemen: 
NCLR: I am confident that our community will continue to be mobilized 
and focused on this important policy debate. Like many other Americans, 
we will demand a resolution—not just any result—but a real solution 
which honors our tradition as a nation of immigrants and reforms the laws 
with effectiveness, fairness, and respect.129 
 
MMP: The original Minutemen were unselfishly inspired citizens from the 
original thirteen British colonies who came to the aid of any colony facing 
trouble or invasion—even from Britain itself. Now, more than two 
centuries later, the fifty United States must defend California, Arizona, 
New Mexico, and Texas from invasion, this time by illegal immigrants. 
With America’s first citizen-soldiers as its inspiration, The Minuteman 
Project was born.130 
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NCLR: The work of NCLR and its affiliates on behalf of immigrants 
builds on America’s identity as a nation of immigrants by promoting 
fairness in the law and advancing a number of ways to help immigrants 
fully enter the mainstream of American life. NCLR and its affiliates are on 
the front lines of carrying out the work that has always been essential to 
America’s success as a nation, ensuring full respect for the contributions 
of immigrants and full access to the American Dream.131 
As a rhetorical strategy vying for political expertise, this historical claim generates ethos, 
facilitates identification with the audience and establishes authenticity to method.  
 As mentioned in the section on Frist and Kennedy, explaining one’s participation 
in political processes can serve different functions. It can be a form of reporting or a form 
of instruction. An expert might give an account of his/her actions either to report to an 
audience or to instruct them in his/her expertise. For the MMP and the NCLR—unlike 
the professional politicians—the purpose is dual. They seek both to report and to instruct, 
except that the reporting is designed more to impress the audience than to fulfill a 
mandate. The MMP and the NCLR impress by listing a series of accomplishments and 
contributions, particularly where others have failed. Building the impression that political 
experts represent the public’s interests, the MMP and the NCLR expound upon their 
activities. More importantly, however, they take a pedagogical approach to their political 
expertise. To understand how these activist organizations instruct their audiences and 
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encourage participation, we must examine their discursive relationship with the American 
public.  
The American Public: Culture, Participation and Invitation 
 In the process of constructing themselves as political experts, the MMP and the 
NCLR appeal to a sense of identification with the American public. This is slightly 
different from the representative relationship that I described in the analysis of the 
professional politicians. The activists seek a much more egalitarian identification. Rather 
than the political expert who leads from the helm, these activists present themselves as 
experts who lead from the crowd. They seem to suggest that their expertise stems from 
communal agency. And, in order to construct this argument, they connect the experiences 
of their own group with that of the general public. For example: 
MMP: The grassroots Americans, the so-called ‘silent majority,’ would 
stand up and demand action from the federal government if they knew of 
the dangers posed by illegal immigration and understood how it affected 
the entire nation, not just the border states.132 
 
NCLR: Among its many provisions, H.R. 4437 would […] disrupt 
American communities and put all Americans at risk.133 
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MMP: When foreign nationals assemble on U.S. soil and march in the 
streets under a foreign flag, that demonstration appears to many middle-
class Americans to be an open defiance of the rule of U.S. law, virtually a 
declaration of dominion over the United States. The message that many 
middle-class Americans hear is that these foreigners are not in the United 
States to assimilate, they are here to take over.134 
 
NCLR: It is very important not only to the Latino community but to the 
country that the Senate take up this issue.135 
The Minutemen attempt to persuade Americans that the frustration we feel is their 
organization’s driving force. They understand our resentment and they also feel it. La 
Raza persuades the public to realize that what hurts the Hispanic population hurts the 
country; what is important to the Latino community is important to every American. 
Inherent in these arguments is the suasory power of identification.  
 A closely related expert strategy that recurs in the rhetoric of both organizations is 
linking the American public’s political wants and expectations with their own. Having 
established a sort of identification via cultural experience, the MMP and the NCLR 
proceed to identification through political interest. They demonstrate that they understand 
the public by explicating—almost assigning—its expectations: 
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NCLR: Member of our community, like all Americans, want their elected 
leaders to work in a bipartisan manner on issues such as education, health 
care, the economy, and civic empowerment.136 
 
MMP: In the opinion of millions of Middle Americans, the ‘guest worker’ 
program proposed by President George W. Bush is a de facto amnesty.137 
 
NCLR: At the end of the day, the Latino community and the rest of the 
country want effective immigration reform that brings order and fairness 
to our system.138 
 
MMP: Ranchers and homeowners along the border are fed up with the 
inability of any presidential administration, Republican or Democrat, to 
control our borders since the Eisenhower administration.139 
This argument suggests that, not only do the Latino community and the Minuteman 
experience the same fears and frustrations as the American public, they have the same 
expectations from their elected politicians, the official political experts. And, as observed 
earlier, these expectations are not being met. A void is created where, when one form of 
political expertise proves inadequate, another form emerges. Activists project themselves 
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as the alternative experts, arguing that they have a superior method for meeting 
expectations. 
 The activists’ method explicitly involves the public. One of the things that most 
distinguishes the activists’ rhetoric from that of the professional politicians is the extent 
to which the former encourages the American public to participate in political affairs. 
Both the MMP and the NCRL, unlike Frist and Kennedy, invite America to join their 
ongoing efforts. For example, the NCLR speaks extensively about the mass protest that 
took place across the country in April of 2006. They praise this popular mobilization. 
Below is one brief example: 
The National Council of La Raza (NCLR), the largest national Hispanic 
civil rights and advocacy organization in the U.S., today applauds the 
Hispanic community’s participation in the more than 136 rallies that took 
place in 39 states and the nation’s capital. […] The rallies, which were 
part of the ‘National Day of Action for Immigrant Justice,’ represent the 
largest mobilization of immigrants in U.S. history. Following the county’s 
great tradition of civic involvement, marchers participated peacefully in a 
family-oriented and positive environment.140 
In this excerpt, the NCLR applauds popular participation and aligns it with the nation’s 
democratic tradition. Note how this move popularizes political expertise. It demystifies 
politics by offering an open invitation.  
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 The activists’ rhetoric of political expertise includes a call to action. It 
encompasses popular engagement in all political matters. Moreover, both the MMP and 
the NCLR specifically instruct their audiences on how to become involved. Their 
explanations of the political process and celebrations of popular participation lead up to 
explicit information on ways of being politically active. These activists do not teach their 
expertise simply by explaining it; their instructions are hortative. They call the public to 
join and give them the tools to do so. The MMP’s website includes links to an initiative 
called “Operation Fax Blast.” By filling out an online form and paying a fee, anybody 
can “order” a faxed message to Congress. In addition, by following a set of specific 
instructions, anyone can start a new charter of Minutemen. Yet another example includes 
the appendices of Gilchrist’s book: The Minuteman Project Code and Standard 
Operating Procedures and The Minuteman Project Media Guidelines. The MMP is a 
proselytizing organization; their activist type of political expertise grows stronger the 
more people it involves: 
We welcome to our ranks all who share our dedication to secure our 
borders and to preserve the United States of America, the nation we 
ourselves respect and love, for future generations.141 
The Minutemen’s invitation is a profound indicator of the nature of activist expertise. It 
demonstrates the difference between political expertise as a zero-sum game and political 
expertise as a strength-in-numbers tactic. 
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 The NCLR excels at this instructional discourse as well, particularly on the 
organization’s website. The website publishes a virtual library of continuous updates, 
articles and fact sheets.  In an update on the Senate’s immigration debate from May 2006, 
the NCLR outlines and explains the numerous amendments that were considered. The 
amendments and responses are put into accessible language and placed on a timeline. 
Additionally, among the articles are several lists of talking points that summarize the 
NCLR’s position on immigration reform. These talking points are attached to the 
following words of encouragement:  
The voices of immigrants and their supporters are being heard; however, 
anti-immigrant groups are also injecting their voice into the debate. You 
must continue to be involved. Call and write your senators today! They 
need to hear from their constituents about the importance of 
comprehensive immigration reform and what is means to your families, 
neighbors, and communities.142 
On the NCLR’s website the need for the public to become engaged is established 
thoroughly. And the concrete tools for becoming an expert activist are there in the form 
of downloadable PDFs.  
 Two documents in particular illustrate the website’s strategy for equipping the 
population for political action: The NCLR Voter Guide and the Toolkit for Advocates.  
The Voter Guide’s user-friendly format is divided into seven sections, each focusing on a 
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major topic such as education, criminal justice and economic opportunity. In each 
section, specific concerns are raised that the NCLR considers especially important to 
Latinos. Finally, each section includes a way of evaluating political candidates by their 
positions. In the section on economic opportunity the guide states that “A pro Hispanic 
candidate or incumbent supports tax and other incentives to help facilitate connecting 
low-income Latinos to high-quality financial advisors.”143 Moreover, this candidate or 
incumbent “opposes tax cuts for wealthy taxpayers but supports expanding tax credits, 
preferably those that are refundable as a more effective way of reaching Hispanic 
working poor families.”144 In short, the Voter Guide is a playbook on being an informed 
citizen. It both encourages electoral participation and equips the reader for it. As the 
NCLR states, “The best way to change the political and policy environment is to show 
our concern at the ballot box in a way which will make both political parties take 
notice.”145 
 The Toolkit for Advocates is a much more localized manual. Unlike the Voter 
Guide, it emphasizes collaboration with community organizations over national elections. 
The toolkits are a series of issue-oriented instruction pamphlets, one of which focuses on 
immigrants’ access to driver’s licenses. The website explains:  
This toolkit provides immigrant advocates with tools needed to advocate 
effectively on behalf of immigrant communities and smart driver’s license 
                                                 
143 National Council of La Raza, NCLR Voter Guide (Washington, DC: NCLR, 2006), 10, available at: 
http://www.nclr.org/content/publications/detail/37082/ (accessed April 1, 2007). 
144 National Council of La Raza, NCLR Voter Guide. 
145 National Council of La Raza, NCLR Voter Guide. 
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policies. It contains talking points, information about building successful 
coalitions, model press materials, and much more.146 
The point of the toolkit is to package political expertise in a manageable format. As 
activist experts, the NCRL invites, instructs and equips the public. Their expertise, like 
that of the Minutemen, grows the more it is proliferated and shared. 
 The fervor with which the activist experts invite the public’s participation is 
remarkable. Having created a sense of urgency and need for concrete action, having 
scorned any ongoing efforts on the part of professional politicians, and having reported 
on their own success, the NCLR and MMP ask their audience to join. They encourage the 
public to become part of their political expertise. And they tell us what do to:  
MMP: Minutemen and women, stand your ground! By the power vested in 
us by our Founding fathers, we have an irrevocable right to peaceful 
assembly on U.S. territory. If it’s a war our political governors want, then 
we will fight them with the First Amendment and within the rule of law.147 
 
NCLR: The key message for the community is that it is important [to] 
keep informed and stay in contact with trusted community organizations. 
Above all, the Latino community should continue its extraordinary 
activism on this issue. Every time we rally peacefully, carrying American 
flags and demonstrating the intensity of the desire for comprehensive 
                                                 
146 National Council of La Raza, Immigrant Access to Driver's Licenses: A Tool Kit for Advocates 
(Washington, DC: NCLR, 2006), available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/publications/detail/36305/ 
(accessed April 1, 2007). 
147 Gilchrist, 17. 
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immigration reform, we make progress in the legislative debate. We need 
to keep marching, keep contacting our legislators, and keep making 
progress. The April 10 events are a wonderful opportunity to ensure that 
our voices are heard in opposition to punitive measures and in support of 
comprehensive reform.148 
Conclusions for the Rhetoric of Political Expertise 
 My dissertation posits expertise as a rhetorical construct. It examines how this 
notion is a function of the strategies that different groups of experts use to compete with 
each other for status and legitimacy. This chapter focused on the rhetoric of political 
expertise. It juxtaposed two types of political experts: politicians Bill Frist and Ted 
Kennedy and the activists of the National Council of La Raza and the Minuteman Project. 
By analyzing the politicians’ and activists’ public statements about a given topic, viz., the 
immigration reform debate of 2005-2006, I demonstrated certain patterns in the rhetoric 
of political expertise. By comparing their characteristic strategies I identified several 
commonalities as well as differences between the two groups. 
 Remarkably, many of the rhetorical tactics that activists and politicians use to 
construct themselves as experts are very similar. They coincide in significant ways to 
reveal a recurring form. And this form—the rhetoric of expertise—is the heart of my 
dissertation. It may seem unlikely that a U.S. Senator like Ted Kennedy, who has over 
half a century of political experience, uses the same rhetorical strategies as those activists 
                                                 
148 National Council of La Raza, “Update #2 for NCLR Affiliates, Latino Advocates on the Immigration 
Compromise,” April 7, 2006, available at: http://www.nclr.org/content/publications/detail/38228/ (accessed 
April 1, 2007). 
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who do political work “on the side.” What could seem more different than an aging 
senator and a raging activist? It may seem equally unlikely that Kennedy, one of the most 
liberal senators in Congress, has so much in common with Frist. Nonetheless, the means 
of persuasion that are available to them as politicians trump their ideological differences. 
Even though the two disagree on almost every political issue, constructing the expertise 
of a politician unites them. Equally significant are the rhetorical similarities between the 
National Council of La Raza and the Minuteman Project. They oppose each other 
ardently, yet resonate profoundly in their construction of political expertise. They seek 
different end results, but their appeals before the American public draw on the same 
persuasive resources. 
 Three major characteristics in the rhetoric of political expertise unite activists and 
politicians. First, both groups demonstrate knowledge of and active involvement in the 
American political system. By discussing the institutions and procedures that comprise 
this system, experts prove their familiarity with it. Even the activists supply evidence that 
they are familiar with U.S. politics. By enumerating their own achievements, both expert 
groups establish a sense of competence. They generate credibility for their expertise by 
explicating a specific methodology. The activists’ methodology is of course not the same 
as the politicians’; the progress that the NCLR proudly reports in terms of immigrants 
rights is not the same as the senators’ press-conferences after a vote. The point, however, 
is that being an expert entails persuading the audience that you have a way of doing 
things, a set of practices that are well rationalized. Political expertise requires a 
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rhetorically-performed awareness of national politics as a system, as well as a record of 
participation that the expert can reference.  
 Second, both the activists and the professional politicians oscillate between 
opposing tropes. The rhetoric of political expertise does a sort of dialectical two-step. 
Both groups shift back and forth between the trope of their own ideology and the trope 
that represents a predictable accusation. This observation draws on my critical probe 
about experts associating and dissociating themselves with different tropes. For example, 
in the immigration debate Frist associates himself with the trope of enforcement. At the 
same time, he negotiates a balance between this trope and its logical opposite: 
compassion. Kennedy is faced with the same dialectic. He predictably links himself with 
a liberal and inclusive immigration policy; he also acknowledges the importance of law 
enforcement and national security. The Minutemen’s trope of choice is patriotism and an 
historical mandate to preserve U.S. borders. But in a dialectical fashion, they effusively 
praise the nation’s as well as their own immigrant heritage. Finally, the NCLR privilege 
tropes having to do with minority rights. On the other hand, they avow an Americanism 
that centers on the interests of the entire citizenry. These dialectics permeate the rhetoric 
of political expertise in all four discursive categories analyzed in this chapter. 
 The third characteristic that the activists and the politicians share is the continual 
referencing of the American public. Both types of experts constantly incorporate their 
respective relationships with the audience in their rhetorical strategy. They do this by 
demonstrating just how attuned to the public’s needs and expectations they are. For 
example, both activists and politicians speak extensively about what the American people 
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want from its political leaders. They claim that Americans feel this way or the other in 
order to warrant a particular agenda. They insist that their experience with American 
culture—past and present—provides a unique perspective. For Kennedy and the 
Minutemen, the claim to such cultural familiarity is historical; they base their argument 
for legitimate expertise on precedents—a family legacy and a heroic posse. Frist’s and 
the NCLR’s are more grounded in the vernacular; they understand the American people 
by being a part of it. This identification strategy between the experts and the audience is 
prescriptive. It determines how the public should relate itself to political experts. While 
rhetorically enacting their sensitivity to the American audience, the experts chart what an 
appropriate response might be. 
 Beyond the abovementioned similarities, there are at least two important 
differences in the rhetorical strategies of activists and politicians. First, activists 
encourage political participation while professional politicians emphasize deference as a 
natural part of a representative democracy. Activists invite Americans to join them in 
their efforts. As political experts, part of their approach is imparting expertise. They 
explain, demystify, instruct, encourage and equip their audience. They tell us how to 
practice political expertise, whether by starting a chapter of the Minuteman Project or 
collaborating with community-based Latino organizations. For activists, political 
expertise is not scarce; it is an active way of being in the polis, one that everyone should 
embrace.  
Politicians of course never state explicitly that the public should be uninvolved. 
They do, however, spend a great deal of time explaining why a complex issue like 
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immigration should be addressed by elected leaders, the political experts. When a bill is 
passed, they praise the political system’s way of solving the public’s problems. Once it is 
established how complex political problems are, and how apt Congress is at addressing 
them, the appropriate response is deference. We are implicitly encouraged to entrust 
politics to those who know best. Conversely, it is these elected individuals’ duty to 
govern and assume responsibly for their constituents. The expert-novice relationship is 
deferential in the politicians’ rhetoric and inclusive/instructive in the rhetoric of activism. 
 A second distinction between the activists’ and the politicians’ rhetorical 
strategies is the approach to established U.S. politics. I explained earlier in the conclusion 
that a similarity between the two groups is the continual referencing of the political 
structure. Let me now provide some nuance to that observation. While both groups do 
discuss their participation in American politics, they do so with quite different tenors. 
Activists focus significantly on criticizing it. They reject ongoing efforts as ineffectual 
and scorn politicians for their incompetence. Doing so generates a sense of urgency to 
their cause; it gives the audience the impression that nothing is being done about a 
serious issue. Politicians, on the other hand, couch their references to American politics 
in a conversation about personal relationships. Rather than criticizing the system, they 
spend considerable time discussing their extensive collaborations with other politicians, 
including the president. Both strategies do rhetorical work for the two groups; they 
function as a persuasive means of constructing political expertise. For activists, criticism 
is a way of creating a need for action and legitimizing alternative political leadership. For 
politicians, belaboring interpersonal relationships within the political structure establishes 
 102
the impression of general acceptance; Frist and Kennedy are acceptable political experts 
within a class of peers. Criticism and praise provide powerful strategies for different 
types of experts. 
 This chapter investigated political expertise and its rhetorical nature. The context 
of immigration itself, in addition, warrants rigorous scholarly attention. In the coming 
decades, immigration will be one of the most important challenges to U.S. politics. 
Immigration policy will shape the nature of the American polis. That is, each new 
regulation will determine who our political system recognizes as a productive member, 
and who it excludes. The immigration debate is not a theoretical exercise. It is the 
discursive field upon which those claiming political expertise struggle over critical 
issues: human rights, civic participation, social and economic infrastructure, etc. Political 
experts have the decision-making powers that will identify immigrants’ place and identity 
in American culture. If the Unites States is to achieve a sound immigration policy, 
citizens will need to hear arguments from politicians as well as activists. In the process of 
evaluating alternative claims of political expertise, this analysis will provide a useful 
vocabulary and tool of interpretation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
HISTORY AND MEMORY OF 9/11: THE RHETORIC OF HISTORICAL EXPERTISE 
Shortly before nine in the morning on September 11, 2001, an American Airlines 
passenger jet flew into the north tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. A 
few minutes later, a second plane hit the south tower and exploded. There was fire and 
chaos. Pedestrians around the crash site were frozen in shock or running away. People in 
the Trade Center tried to make their way down the narrow stairwells. Getting in touch 
with friends and family was difficult as cell phone networks quickly became overloaded. 
An hour and forty-five minutes after the first plane hit, the north tower collapsed sending 
a massive cloud of dust and debris through Manhattan. Over twenty-five hundred people 
died, including the one hundred twenty-seven passengers and twenty crew members 
onboard the two planes.  
These are the basic facts of what happened on 9/11. They are verifiable and 
relatively undisputed. They are also rather inept at conveying the impact that this event 
had on the United States. The number of people who died does not convey the grief 
experienced by every family that lost someone. The exact time of the north tower’s 
collapse does not tell us very much about the deafening sound reverberating through the 
island or the suffocating smoke billowing from what came to be called “Ground Zero.” In 
short, facts are a small part of an historic event. Yet moving beyond them even a little is 
fraught with complicated choices. For example, once we have determined the number of 
deaths, we need a word to designate them. Are they casualties of war? Are they victims 
of a terrorist attack? Are they martyrs for the American way of life? Any decision 
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regarding the telling of a story is an interpretation of what happened. Any interpretation 
is a lens on history. Any lens is a form of historiographical expertise. 
Historical expertise is owning the past by being persuasive. It means receiving 
general acceptance and acknowledgment of your version of what happened. It is a matter 
of interpreting the past in a certain way and persuading others of the validity of that 
interpretation. The process of such interpretation and the product of the process are 
inextricably linked; both are incorporated into a persuasive effort. And both are the 
subject of analysis in this chapter. For example, an historian may claim that Napoleon’s 
surrender at Waterloo was a fatal blow to the commander’s confidence, thus ultimately 
dooming his military campaigns. She may produce documentary evidence and explain in 
detail her method of historical research. Persuading you both of her conclusion and of her 
method is integral to historical expertise. More specifically, it is tantamount to academic 
historical expertise. There are other kinds of historical expertise. If you discovered a 
diary written by one of Napoleon’s foot soldiers, you may accept his interpretation for 
different reasons. He may have an entirely different story to tell. 
My dissertation posits expertise as a rhetorical construct. It investigates how 
expertise is instituted and negotiated as a function of the rhetorical situation, its 
participants and constraints. I ask: What rhetorical strategies do different groups employ 
to compete for expert authority and legitimacy when they conflict with one another? In 
this chapter, I examine the rhetorical strategies of historical expertise, particularly as they 
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operate in the tension between memory  and academic history. Specifically, I focus on 
expert claims regarding the history and memory of September 11, 2001.149  
In the following pages, two rhetorics of historical expertise are juxtapositioned; 
the texts that I analyze come from two essay collections. The first is a compilation of 
articles written by academic historians. The essays originally appeared in a special issue 
of the Journal of American History in September 2002, and were published in book 
format a year later under the title History and September 11th.150 The other text is 
September 11: An Oral History, which contains eyewitness accounts gathered and edited 
by The New York Times journalist Dean E. Murphy.151 It includes personal narratives 
from a variety of sources including survivors as well as rescue workers and close friends 
of the victims. 
These texts provide uniquely instructive examples of the tension between 
academic history and memory in the rhetorical construction of expertise. They illustrate 
the strategies that scholars and witnesses respectively use in order to be persuasive.152 For 
                                                 
149 As noted in the introductory chapter I am principally focused on the rhetorical strategies of expertise, 
and only secondarily concerned with the history and memory of 9/11. The question is not what these 
individuals say about the event, but what their statements reveal about historical expertise itself. 
150 Joanne Meyerowitz, ed., History and September 11th (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003). In 
order to focus my comparative analysis specifically on academic historians, I exclude those essays that are 
written by scholars from other fields. For example, I do not include the contributions by Bruce Lawrence, 
professor of Islamic Studies at Duke University, Melani McAlister, associate professor of American 
Studies at George Washington University, or John Prados, senior analyst with the National Security 
Archive. Instead, I include for example R. Scott Appleby, professor of history at the University of Notre 
Dame, Nick Cullather, associate professor of history at Indiana University, Emily Rosenberg, professor of 
history at Macalester College, and several others. For the same reason, I specifically select those narratives 
from Murphy’s book that represent eyewitness accounts. I include the sections devoted to survivors from 
the north and south tower and those labeled “On the Outside” and “To the Rescue.” 
151 Dean E. Murphy, September 11: An Oral History (New York: Doubleday, 2002). 
152 To designate these two groups I use the terms “academic historian” and “witness.” The former indicates 
that I am principally concerned with historiography as it is practiced within universities. Related terms such 
as “professional historian” are less specific, since this category includes for example museum curators and 
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example, each book is presented and marketed as the very best of its kind. In her 
introduction to the edited collection, Joanne Meyerowitz explains the selection of 
contributing authors,  
We chose scholars with noted expertise on issues pertaining to terrorism, 
anti-Americanism, the Middle East, fundamentalist religious movements, 
and foreign relations, and we asked them for deliberative essays, scholarly 
pieces with deeper research and greater intellectual engagement than 
typically found in newspapers and magazines.153  
On the very first page, Meyerowitz begins articulating the nature of academic history. 
Conversely, the jacket of Murphy’s book states that it is “the first and only oral history of 
September 11 that presents people from all walks of life.” With this characterization, the 
book begins its persuasive appeal to expertise. Indeed, its cover boasts “real stories from 
real people.” Like in Meyerowitz’s text, the construction of historical expertise begins 
immediately.  
To examine these artifacts, I deploy a series of critical probes. My probes 
correspond to the advantages of a rhetorical approach to expertise presented in Chapter 
                                                                                                                                                 
archivists.  I use the term witness for two reasons: first, it avoids the connotative complications inherent in 
labels like “survivor,” “victim,” etc. Second, it imports certain philosophical implications that I find useful 
for the purpose of my analysis. For example, to be a witness, especially of trauma, is to produce an account 
of the traumatic event just as much as it is to report it. As trauma theorists argue, witnesses “beget” the 
truth of a trauma in the process of testifying, see Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, 
and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) and Shoshana Felman, “Education and 
Crisis: Or the Vicissitude of Teaching,” in Trauma: Explorations in Memory, ed. C. Caruth (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 24. There is a dual meaning to the notion of witnessing, 
encompassing both seeing and subsequently reporting. To be a witness, in short, is often to fulfill a duty; 
something is protected from being forgotten. The historical witnesses that I examine in this chapter 
repeatedly express several of these concerns as part of their argument. 
153 Meyerowitz, 1. 
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One. For example, one of the probes inquires about the construction of ethos. Another 
focuses on the integral role of the audience. The eight probes are: 
1. How is the topos of expertise addressed (implicitly or explicitly)? 
2. How do experts address methodology and epistemology? 
3. With which topoi do experts associate/disassociate?  
4. What is the nature of experts’ ethos? 
5. How do experts address a tension between teaching and persuasion? 
6. What enthymematic appeals are made? 
7. Who is the implied audience? 
8. What audience response is elicited? 
I do not follow these critical probes point-by-point; that would be too mechanical for this 
complex issue. Instead, I consider the probes as a methodology for unpacking the 
rhetorical techniques featured in the texts. They are heuristic tools revealing the strategies 
of historical expertise.  
 This chapter begins by contextualizing the tension between different methods of 
interpreting the past. The following section introduces the reader to a history of memory, 
a history of history, and a history of their interaction.154 Understanding the long 
relationship between these discursive practices has significant implications. It would be 
inappropriate to study the rhetorical construction of either one without acknowledging a 
                                                 
154 The body of scholarship surrounding historiography, historical epistemology, and history-memory 
dialectics is immense. This section is not an exhaustive literature review or a comprehensive survey of the 
conceptual landscape. Instead, I wish to provide the reader with an introduction to some fundamental 
questions: What is history/historiography? What is memory? What is their relationship to each other? What 
discursive forms do they assume to be most persuasive, and to what audience is this persuasion directed? 
What, again, are the available means of persuasion for historical experts? 
 108
considerable tradition of historiographical research.155 Next, I examine the rhetorics of 
the historian-experts and the witness-experts respectively. I identify and analyze how 
they talk about 9/11 in such a way as to make their interpretations persuasive. By doing 
so, I trace certain recurring themes in the rhetoric of historical expertise.  
History and Memory: Tension in Context 
People have always been concerned with the past. History is a repository of 
individual and collective experiences, stories and events. It is a resume of successes and 
defeats, injustices and lucky breaks, funny intermezzos and unbelievable coincidences. 
More than anything, the past is a producer of identity. Just as all the memories of my life 
make me who I am, the collective memories of my culture create a communal bond.  
The relationship between individual and collective memory is both theoretically 
and practically complicated. Conceptually, the two are distinct in the simple sense that 
collective memory is common to a group of individuals and individual memory is 
singular. Individual memory, simply put, is “a group of psychic functions that allow us to 
actualize past impressions or information that we represent to ourselves as past.”156 It is 
the cognitive faculty studied by neurologists and psychologists. Beyond this definition, 
however, the distinction between individual and collective memory is much more 
muddled. Our memories, like all our cognitive and emotional processes, exist in a social 
context. We do not think or feel in isolation. 
                                                 
155 According to Johnson et al., historiography is an intellectual practice, distinct from the “movement of 
history itself.” It is concerned not with the past but with the relationship between the past and the present, 
see Richard Johnson et al., eds., Making Histories: Studies in History-Writing and Politics (London: 
Hutchinson, 1982), 8-10. 
156 Jacques Le Goff, History and Memory, trans. Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Claman (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1992), 51.  
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All memory is to some extent intersubjective. Even the most private recollections 
are grounded in an interpersonal environment, because our mental ability to form those 
recollections is socially nurtured. As Halbwachs famously explains,  
Individual memory is nevertheless a part or an aspect of group memory, 
since each impression and each fact, even if it apparently concerns a 
particular person exclusively, leaves a lasting memory only to the extent 
that one has thought it over—to the extent that it is connected with the 
thoughts that come to us from the social milieu.157  
Consider for a moment that the artifact I use to represent memory in my analysis is a 
series of personal narratives. To what extent, one might ask, do these narratives form a 
collective whole revealing something about historical expertise? The reason that they do 
work together is both cognitive and representational. It is a function both of the formation 
of cognitive capacities and the ways in which memory is symbolic. Private memories are 
formed in social cognition. And whether they remain private or become a collection, as 
with Murphy’s text, private memories are shaped by public representations. They cannot 
be separated from dominant historical discourses or the representations of the past that 
circulate in the public sphere. In other words, when one individual tells her story about 
what happened on September 11, she necessarily reflects on that experience in light of 
news media, commemorative ceremonies, and current political trends. Memories—even 
                                                 
157 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, trans. and ed. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 53. 
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individual memories—are continuously filtered through symbolic screens and adapted 
accordingly. 
Collective memory, as the phrase suggests, is the discursive activity of 
interpreting the past that people do in a group.158 I use the term “activity” because it 
preempts the misconception that we “have” memory; memory is something that we “do.” 
It exists in rituals and ceremonies like the Christian communion, the presidential 
inauguration, even romance and dating.159 It is directly visible in monuments and 
memorials.160 And it is something that we live with always, something that shapes our 
experience of daily life. Family legends are the products of collective memory, as are 
Halloween and college graduations. The functions of collective memory are multiple. For 
example, collective memory uses stories from the past to legitimate a present social 
order.161 It generates shared identity. It provides communal cohesion and a sense of 
meaning and purpose. Halbwachs’s definition of collective memory as “landmarks that 
                                                 
158 It is easy to be confused by the circulation of different terms for a group’s remembering: social memory, 
popular memory, oral history/narrative, public memory, vernacular memory, and so on. Scholars use these 
vocabularies to distinguish different kinds of activities but also to delineate different research agendas. 
Indeed, these disciplinary practices constitute their own rhetoric of expertise. For an informative and 
interdisciplinary overview of this literature, see Olick, Jeffrey K., and Joyce Robbins, “Social Memory 
Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to the Historical Sociology and Mnemonic Practices,” Annual Review 
of Sociology 24 (1998): 105-40. I prefer the term collective memory because of its inclusivity. It 
encompasses the public and private, the popular as well as the official. In addition, collective memory is 
transmitted in oral, written and visual forms (including photographs as well as three-dimensional artifacts 
like monuments).  
159 John Bodnar, Remaking America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Joseph Campbell, 
Myths to Live By (New York: The Viking Press, 1972); Lauri Honko, “The Problem of Defining Myth,” in 
Sacred Narrative, ed. A. Dundes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 
160 Barbara Biesecker, “Remembering World War II: The Rhetoric and Politics of National 
Commemoration at the Turn of the 21st Century,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 88 (2002): 393-409; Carole 
Blair, Marsha S. Jeppeson, and Enrico Pucci, Jr., “Public Memorializing in Postmodernity: The Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial as Prototype,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 77 (1991): 263-288; Carole Blair and Neil 
Michel, “Reproducing Civil Rights Tactics: The Rhetorical Performances of the Civil Rights Memorial,” 
Rhetoric Society Quarterly 30 (2000): 31-55; Marita Sturken, Tangled Memories (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997).  
161 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 3. 
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we always carry within ourselves” is particularly compelling for this reason.162 It 
bespeaks the constant presence of imagined pasts. These “landmarks” are the 
magnificent, earth-shattering disasters and triumphs as well as the mundane happenings 
that punctuate life.163 September 11, 2001 is a landmark in American collective 
memory.164 
The body of scholarship analyzing the differences between (collective) memory 
and (academic) history is extensive. In the interest of briefly synthesizing the relevant 
research, I rely on Pierre Nora’s much-cited theory: 
Memory and history, far from being synonymous, appear now to be in 
fundamental opposition. Memory is life, borne by living societies founded 
in its name. It remains in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of 
remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformation, 
vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being long 
                                                 
162 Halbwachs, 175. 
163 Not all historians share my enthusiasm for Halbwachs’s work. Noa Gedi and Elam Yigal criticize his 
concept of collective memory for its lack of a concrete theory. They claim that it causes the deterioration of 
historical science: “Collective memory is actually a fabricated version of that same personal memory 
adjusted to what the individual mind considers, rightly or not, as suitable in a social environment. There is 
no mystery here; the mechanism of collective memory and the mechanism of personal memory are one and 
the same and located in the same individual mind. ‘Collective memory’ is but a misleading new name for 
the old familiar ‘myth’ which can be identified, in its turn, with ‘collective’ or ‘social’ stereotypes. Indeed, 
collective memory is but a myth.” See Noa Gedi and Elam Yigal, “Collective Memory – What Is It?” 
History and Memory 8, 2 (1996): 47. While I agree that collective memory is closely related to myth, I do 
not concede that this leads to the conclusion that Halbwachs’s theory is misleading. 
164 There is a considerable body of scholarship on the impact of trauma on national collective memory. See 
Kai Erikson, “Notes on Trauma and Community,” in Trauma: Explorations in memory, ed. C. Caruth 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 183-199; Ruth Leys, Trauma: A Genealogy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000); Nancy K. Miller and Jason Tougaw, Extremities: Trauma, Testimony, 
and Community (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000); Arthur G. Neal, National Trauma and 
Collective Memory (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998). Some might argue that the collective memory of an 
event like 9/11 is different from the kinds of collective memory that a culture is constantly preserving, 
enacting and accumulating. I propose that it crystallizes the aspects of memory that I analyze regarding the 
construction of expertise. A trauma highlights the rhetorical differences between academic expertise of the 
past and that of a trauma victim.   
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dormant and periodically revived. History, on the other hand, is the 
reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer. 
Memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the 
eternal present; history is a representation of the past. Memory, insofar as 
it is affective and magical, only accommodates those facts that suit it; it 
nourishes recollections that may be out of focus or telescopic, global or 
detached, particular or symbolic—responsive to each avenue of 
conveyance or phenomenal screen, to every censorship or projection. 
History, because it is an intellectual and secular production, calls for 
analysis and criticism. Memory installs remembrances within the sacred; 
history, always prosaic, releases it again.165 
Nora eloquently explains how memory and history are different ways of responding to 
the human need for understanding the past.  
 A few components of Nora’s definition warrant attention; they are marked with 
italics in the excerpt above. I have already discussed the first, viz., that memory exists in 
“living societies.” Second, memory is a dialectic of “remembering and forgetting,” of 
“manipulation and appropriation.” In order to serve various purposes, collective memory 
must be selective. It must choose among triumphs and defeats the things that are 
preserved for posterity. No culture relishes its sins. Instead, cultures use their 
accomplishments as a guiding light for future action. The good days are stretched out to 
represent an entire history; myth is strategically integrated with historical record. For 
                                                 
165 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” Representations 26 (1989): 8-9. 
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example, there is an historical myth of social activism on American college campuses. 
For those who fancy themselves heirs to the 1960s hippie legacy, that myth is “eternally 
present,” as Nora writes. The memory of these mythic figures is “affective” to the point 
of being “magical.” Finally, Nora characterizes history as an intellectual, secular, and 
critical enterprise. He calls it a “reconstruction” and a “representation” of things that are 
no longer physically present. For Nora, history as critical analysis carries a mandate to be 
truthful. It cannot take the liberty of censoring or sanctifying. So, while the memory of 
student activism tells one story, historians may offer a different version. If their analyses 
refrain from censoring or sanctifying, that version may be quite disparate from the 
collective memory. 
 Having noted Nora’s understanding of history and memory, it is important to 
recognize that there were historians long before there were academic departments of 
history. Put differently, historical expertise preceded the existence and certification of 
history professors. People were narrating and interpreting the past long before they had 
special licenses to do so. There have always been individuals who were uniquely 
knowledgeable about the past. We might think of them as proto-historians or memory-
experts. In every community and tribe some persons are living records of the past. They 
may be the elders or the wise ones, telling stories and keeping track of significant events, 
places, objects, etc.166 To some extent, these historical experts did have a methodology, a 
sense of praxis for knowing and teaching history. And, as George Iggers argues, this 
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methodology has long been grounded in the ideal of truth.167 The notion that history 
should correspond to an external reality is ancient. 
 It is fair to say, then, that the developmental phases of historiography as an 
academic profession have little to do with memory—individual or collective. For this 
reason, outlining the history of historiography does not necessarily correspond to 
understanding memory practices. Different practices of knowing history, indeed different 
forms of expertise, exist simultaneously. It is possible, however, to create a tidy timeline 
of the historical discipline, while the same cannot be said for memory. One might begin 
for example in the late nineteenth century, chronicle a few significant scholars, then mark 
the inception of the American Historical Association and its flagship journal American 
Historical Review. Certainly, one would note the discipline’s classical Thycydidean roots 
and identify how it was shaped by the emergence of science and two world wars. But 
such a disciplinary record is separate from the organic ways in which most people 
remember the past and engage with that memory in discursive ways. What historians do 
at work is something other than what people do when they remember and commemorate. 
Historians trace, examine and write about history; people remember.168 
It is highly significant that the professionalization of history corresponds to the 
conceptualization of it as a science. Put differently, academic historians became experts 
when they could theorize and systematize their knowledge in scientific terms. In the mid-
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nineteenth century, science and industrialization reshaped the Western mind. Historians, 
like other scholars, were pressured to adopt scientific practices by transferring “views and 
methods from the inquiry into nature to the inquiry into human phenomena.”169 They  
shared the optimism of the professionalized sciences generally that 
methodologically controlled research makes objective knowledge 
possible. For them as for other scientists truth consisted in the 
correspondence of knowledge to an objective reality that, for the historian, 
constituted the past “as it has actually occurred.”170  
There was an exigency for a positivist historiography, one that could provide answers to 
the “seemingly illogicality of life.”171 
 As historiography became primarily defined by method, it transformed into a 
science of documents.172 Preserved documents, or “sources” were long considered a 
historian’s only reliable means of accessing the past. They are the lingering evidence. “In 
no case is what historians call an event grasped directly and fully; it is always grasped 
incompletely and laterally, through documents or statements, let us say through tekmeria, 
traces, impressions”173 This approach was formalized in 1898, when French historians 
Charles Langlois and Charles Seignobos published a methodological handbook called An 
Introduction to the Study of History. It insisted that only documents embody past fact, 
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since they are the only things that remain. And of course the documents that history 
preserves are typically those that represent an elite culture. Le Goff explains,  
For a long time, historians thought that the true historical documents were 
those that illuminated that part of human history which was worthy of 
being preserved, reported, and studied, the history of great events (the 
lives of great men, military and diplomatic events: battles and treatises), 
political and institutional history.174  
In essence, this emphasis on documentary evidence relegated historians to textual 
criticism.  
 There is a circular logic of academic historical expertise at work here. The 
formulation of a historical science called for a methodology, because methods are 
replicable. An empirical methodology turned historians’ attention to documents, because 
documents are present and observable. Documentary criticism enabled claims to 
objectivity. And objectivity is central to a science. As the Popular Memory Group states, 
historical research is “seen as a dialogue between the historian and ‘his evidence’ [sic]. 
[…] It is the ‘source’, the product of a now unchangeable past, that provides the 
possibility of a knowledge that is objective if it is honestly and critically interrogated.”175 
The emphasis on documents and the formation of an objective methodology for studying 
them are key to historical professionalization. What is more, they are central to the 
rhetoric of historical expertise, specifically for academics. In the analysis section, I 
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demonstrate how strategic references to sources and methods become part of this 
rhetoric. For now, let me simply note that the history of history and the history of 
memory have unfolded together but not in sync. Memory has always been and continues 
to be integral to any culture. Historiography as an academic discipline is only a few 
hundred years old. Nevertheless, it is powerfully persuasive.  
 There are two rhetorics of historical expertise in my analysis: memory and 
academic historiography. As this section demonstrated, they have a complex and much-
theorized relationship. What I am concerned with are their ongoing arguments 
constructing expertise. I trace the claims that historians and witnesses rely on to stake 
their claims for expert status. History and memory are responses to our fundamental need 
for dealing with the past. What is most important for my analysis is that those responses 
contain different persuasive strategies. They use the available means of persuasion to 
make us believe.  
Analysis: Academic Historians 
Historical scholars are generally regarded as elite experts simply by virtue of their 
academic status. That is, being a history professor typically makes one an expert on 
history in the public’s mind. The collection of essays analyzed here relies heavily on this 
perception. Part of the rhetorical strategy of academic historians, as I demonstrate, is to 
adhere to the practices of academic invention. The essays examined here were originally 
published as a special issue in the Journal of American History in 2002—one year after 
9/11. The editor of the book Joanne Meyerowitz was the journal’s editor-in-chief at the 
time. The other contributors are faculty members at prestigious research universities.  
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Having a modus operandi is vital to an expert community, especially for scholars. 
It binds the members to a consensus of practices and beliefs. Historians, like many other 
scholars, form this sort of expert collective through epistemology and methodology. They 
are defined and recognizable by the practices they follow in the pursuit of discovery and 
invention. It is like a professional code of conduct. More often than not, however, this 
code is implicit. The expert practices of historical scholarship are obeyed but 
unspoken.176 Let me begin by focusing on the structure of Meyerowitz’s book, whose 
very format illustrates academic standards. For example, the editor is the author of the 
introductory and concluding chapters; in the former, she discusses the history and 
conception of the project, previews each of the essays, and rationalizes the inquiry by 
situating it in an academic and sociopolitical exigency. She identifies the need for this 
particular text at this particular time. Furthermore, the book includes a table of contents 
and an acknowledgment to the editorial and publishing staff; the back-matter features a 
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list of the contributing authors with brief biographical information as well as an index of 
terms.177 
These are things that a reader may not notice, since they are not the book’s 
primary content. However, they are profoundly important strategies in the rhetoric of 
expertise, particularly for scholars. Adhering to these formal practices is a way of 
performing scholarly identity. It is equivalent to how fluency in a particular language 
signals membership to that nationality. Being able to speak the community’s language, or 
follow its epistemological practices essentially proves legitimacy both to the in-group 
members and to outside audiences. When Meyerowitz produces a scholarly artifact like 
this one, she demonstrates her expert identity both to peer historical experts and to a lay 
audience. 
Just as the book’s overall structure follows academic standards, so too do the 
chapters. Most of them are written according to the same pattern. Michael Hunt’s essay 
on the clash of civilizations illustrates this discourse well.178 He begins with a reader 
invitation—something “juicy” like tensions between the U.S. and the Middle East. This is 
rapidly followed by a thesis statement: “The argument advanced here is that the nature of 
the conflict sparked by the horrors of September 11 and represented by the ‘war on 
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terrorism’ has been ill defined historically by those who have declared that war.”179 The 
thesis is subdivided into two categories. Hunt discusses two types of myth surrounding 
the clash of civilization, and provides specific examples from American history. These 
examples are supported with dates, places and names of prominent individuals. He cites 
other scholarly works as well as his own, creating the type of scientific intertextuality that 
is characteristic of academic discourse.180 He furthermore uses a writing style that is 
germane to scholarship in the humanities: it is dry and jargoned but occasionally flavored 
with the writer’s creative indulgences. Hunt favors alliteration: “the brink of barbarism,” 
“trapped in tradition” and “economy of explanation.”181 My point is that Hunt’s essay is 
formulaic, and appropriately so. All of the abovementioned practices belong in traditional 
historiography. Like many of the other essayists, Hunt’s obedience to them is integral to 
his rhetoric of expertise.  
Academic Tropes 
One of the tropes that historian-experts favor is dialectics. Dialectics is 
characteristic of scholarship writ large, and illustrates the manner in which academic 
arguments unfold. I mention above how Hunt organizes his essay according to two myths 
based on the clash of civilizations notion. Another author, Ussama Makdisi, does the 
same thing by parsing his object of analysis—Arabs’ ambivalence toward the United 
States—into two categories.182 Arabs, he argues, have a profoundly ambivalent view of 
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American culture. For the most part, they admire “its affluence, its films, its technology 
(and for some its secularism, its law, its order).”183 What they do “hate” is U.S. foreign 
policy, particularly in the Middle East. He states,  
Whatever good Americans and the United States as a nation do in the 
region—from food aid to technological assistance to educational outreach 
to efforts at bilateral Arab-Israeli peacemaking—has been constantly 
overshadowed and tainted in Arab eyes by the continuation of the Arab-
Israeli conflict, in which Arabs do not see the United States as 
evenhanded.184 
Finally, Emily Rosenberg proceeds in a similar dialectical fashion by dividing her 
analysis of gender and foreign policy into two arguments: a nation-state idea and a 
transnational network idea.185 She posits two different “social imaginaries” in wartime 
discourses that link gender and politics.  
This dialectical method is an expert strategy partly because it actually lets the 
analyst disassemble a complex object into smaller components, and also because it is 
persuasive. It is persuasive because it performs systematicity in an elegant and 
parsimonious way. Even the most complex argument becomes manageable when it is 
broken down at its natural joints and examined from several angles. Grasping Arab-
American relations is easier for the lay audience if those relations are organized and 
deconstructed. Once a thesis has been subdivided, the scholar dialectician can let the two 
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parts play out against each other. Thus the dialectical trope is integral to an historian’s 
rhetoric in two ways: it is a matter of methodology as well as a part of the relationship 
between expert and layperson. If the historian can handle her subject matter dialectically, 
that proficiency qualifies her for a community of scholarly experts. Moreover, it makes 
her expertise itself more accessible to a lay audience. 
Refutation is another trope used by several of the authors. Like dialectics, it is a 
fundamental tactic in traditional argumentation. It allows the arguer to respond to the 
opposition by presenting counter-claims and evidence. Appleby, for example, uses 
refutation as an inoculating means of persuasion. By prefacing his argument with phrases 
like, “While some would object to my reasoning” and “Some might argue in contrast” 
Appleby constructs a refutational strategy as part of his rhetoric of expertise. 
Furthermore, the refutation almost implies a sense of respect. Recall that Appleby’s essay 
analyzes the historiography of religious fundamentalism. He studies interpretations of the 
past that are extremely biased by most academic standards. Thus, the use of 
argumentative refutation is a sign that he takes these historiographers’ work seriously, 
almost as potential colleagues. This historian responds to the fundamentalists’ position 
the same way he would to a fellow member of the American Historical Association. He 
writes,  
The moral and political critiques that emerge from a historiography and 
historical method fundamentally different from that constructed and 
practices by professional historians are hardly incoherent or even 
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unpersuasive. Rather, they shed a revealing light on what many historians 
consider “the real stuff of history.”186  
By taking such pains to critique fundamentalist historiography, Appleby ostensibly 
credits its practitioners. He extends a professional invitation from one expert to another. 
In order to recognize the significance of refutation to the rhetoric of academic 
historians’ expertise, consider its uniqueness. In what other context would one be 
expected to make the opposition’s argument? Imagine for instance that I am describing a 
recent vacation with the intent to persuade someone to visit the same destination. Now 
imagine how odd it would be for me to explicate why my vacation was not as wonderful 
as I thought. In personal narratives or informal conversations, articulating the 
opposition’s position is not appropriate or required. It does not make one more 
persuasive. On the contrary. Only experts within the academy, like historians, become 
more believable when they are able to speak to their adversaries’ points of view. 
Makdisi also illustrates how refutation works in the rhetoric of expertise; his 
agenda is corrective. He writes in order to correct what he considers a common 
misconception about the Arab mentality. Makdisi argues that the reason for Arab anti-
Americanism is political rather than philosophical or “civilizational.”187 “Anti-
Americanism is a recent phenomenon fueled by American foreign policy, not an epochal 
confrontation of civilizations.”188 Makdisi, in other words, is not refuting another expert’s 
argument, but a popular belief. Nevertheless, he uses the trope as part of his rhetorical 
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strategy. Correcting the public’s ignorance is by definition a function of experts. From 
the vantage point of historical expertise, Makdisi challenges—or refutes—the “clash of 
civilizations” thesis by historically contextualizing Arab-American relations. 
Placing current events in an historical context is part of the historian’s expertise. 
As Meyerowitz notes in her introduction, “Historians devote entire careers to placing the 
seemingly new in historical contexts.”189 In part, this performance amounts to a 
demonstration of knowledge: a historian can contextualize things that happen because she 
knows when, where, and why similar things have happened in the past. Hunts’ essay 
contextualizes the 9/11 attacks by referencing World War I, the Cold War, and “half a 
century of U.S. intervention in the Middle East.”190 By drawing parallels between his 
object of analysis and other historical objects that he posits as analogous, Hunt exercises 
and demonstrates historical expertise. He writes, “The new patriotic consensus expressed 
itself in a wide variety of ways familiar from previous national trials.”191 He continues, 
“The post-September 11 nationalist upsurge in the United States with its impressive 
capacity to blank out an inconvenient past has sturdy antecedents.”192 Hunt presents this 
contextualizing gesture as a service, presumably to his readers, that brings historical 
precedents to light. It is shocking to him that “policy makers and most pundits” are able 
to repress an history of international violence.193 “Well after September 11, most 
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Americans still do not have the foggiest notion of this pattern of U.S. entanglement.”194 
Hunt purportedly contributes to the nation’s welfare by being an historian, connecting 
new violences to old ones.  
Nick Cullather similarly aligns the calls following 9/11 for “fixing Afghanistan” 
with a long history of U.S. interventions.195 He describes a series of modernization 
initiatives—airports, schools, suburbs, hospitals, and a massive dam project—that the 
United States undertook in the same region in the 1950s and 60s.196 These initiatives, 
Cullather insists, sustained a Western myth of progress, capitalism, nationalism, and 
industrial expansion; the myth failed but the desire lingers. And the desire continues to be 
rationalized by the notion of spreading peace and global democracy. Cullather writes, 
“Proponents of a fresh nation-building venture in Afghanistan, unaware of the results of 
the last one, have resurrected its imaginings.”197 Notably, this ignorance coupled with a 
political exigence of international proportion justifies Cullather’s expertise. He is writing 
in the hopes of staving off another tragic experiment. By demonstrating how nation-
building has failed historically, he is attempting to prevent the United States from 
repeating past mistakes. 
Expert Exigency 
This contextualizing effort raises a number of issues regarding the rhetoric of 
expertise. Consider for example the notion of ethos, specifically eunoia, or goodwill. 
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Recall from Chapter One that rhetors strive to generate the ethical impression that they 
have the greater good in mind. It is hardly surprising that many of the essayists indicate 
that their scholarship’s rationale is a political or social exigency.198 Such an exigency 
may validate the scholarship. As Meyerowitz states, “Our authors comment on the 
dangers of forging or analyzing policy without keen awareness of history, and they tell 
cautionary tales involving critical moments in the past.”199 Because something that is 
happening now has historical precedents, and because understanding those precedents 
would lead to more informed decisions, historians’ expertise benefits everyone. Hunt 
summarizes this attitude,  
Acute problems attend the interpretive framing of an unfolding foreign 
policy crisis. Just when perspective is most valuable, it is also hardest for 
policy markers and commentators alike to find because of the pressure to 
act and the value of quick and simple ways of understanding. Historians 
have something important to say at such a moment.200 
A research rationale allows historians to demonstrate goodwill. It demonstrates that they 
serve a civic purpose. 
 Political exigency also allows the historical expert to appear as an advisor. This is 
a persona that carries multiple implications for expert ethos, incorporating both eunoia 
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and phronesis, goodwill and good sense. The historian performs this persona to prove 
virtue as well as knowledge. This notion of an advisor-historian means that the audience 
of historical scholarship could potentially include political decision-makers. Often, this 
puts the historian in a bind. How might she persuade politicians to follow the advice of a 
history professor while maintaining academic objectivity? To understand this expert 
persona, consider the notion of a “Cassandra historian.” She is a bringer of bad news 
whom no one believes. According to Greek mythology, Cassandra was given the gift of 
prophecy; however, she was also cursed with being unable to persuade anyone. As many 
of the essayists imply, historians have knowledge of the past that, by analogy, allows 
them to predict the future. Even in that pursuit, however, they seem worried about being 
discarded or ignored. They realize the slim likelihood that any prophecies will be 
believed. An example of this is Bruce Kuniholm’s essay. He illustrates the expert persona 
in a postscript: “The National Security Strategy of the United States, released by the Bush 
administration on September 17, 2002, resonates with many of the arguments and 
addresses many of the concerns that I attempted to articulate in this article when it was 
written in the spring of 2002.”201 Kuniholm suggests that history proved him right; his 
arguments, even predictions, turned out to be true. This research rationale is based on a 
duty to inform and advise, two purposes that are integral to expertise. 
 This research rationale, however, is a balancing act for academic historians. To be 
sure, there is a justification for the inquiry, but that justification must carefully avoid 
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subjectivity and bias. Appealing to informed decision-making is relatively safe; in other 
words, most historians can safely claim that the goal of their research and teaching is to 
create informed citizens. However, the idea that historical scholarship contains a moral 
lesson is potentially damaging to its scientific status. If historians have a motive, the 
argument goes, they are less scientific. Put simply, they are less objective. Peter Novick 
describes the “noble dream” of objectivity in historiography as:  
a commitment to the reality of the past, and to truth as correspondence to 
that reality; a sharp separation between knower and known, between fact 
and value, and, above all, between history and fiction. Historical facts are 
seen as prior to and independent of interpretation: the value of an 
interpretation is judged by how well it accounts for the facts; if 
contradicted by the facts, it must be abandoned. Truth is one, not 
perspectival. Whatever patterns exist in history are “found,” not 
“made.”202 
As explained in the previous section on historiography, the disciplinary development of 
history as a social science has been influenced profoundly by epistemological positivism. 
Historiographical Objectivity 
Let me use Appleby as an instructive example of historians’ approach to 
objectivity. In his essay there are at least two meanings of historical objectivity. The first 
is the focus on an object of study and the second is an attitude of detachment guiding the 
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study. Regarding the former: Appleby treats his object—historiography in/by religious 
fundamentalism—with impressive precision. In many ways this treatment of an object 
coincides with the use of dialectic (see above). Appleby begins by dividing his topic into 
two parts.203 The body of the essay then lets three major religions—Christianity, Judaism, 
and Islam—play out against one another. He also includes several qualifying statements 
about vocabulary, particularly the word “fundamentalist,” thus taking great pains to 
define his basic terms.204 He identifies the defining features of his object of analysis, 
stating for example that “apocalypticism is a defining feature of fundamentalism.”205 
The second meaning of historical objectivity is integral to scholarly practices. It is 
therefore significant to the construction of academic historical expertise. Objectivity 
dictates that a researcher pursue science with empirical instruments, replicable methods, 
and an unaffected stance. These are positivist ideals, designed to eliminate bias and 
ensure reliable discovery. Again, Appleby is representative of the historical profession 
because of the way he approaches his topic. By definition, fundamentalism is difficult to 
separate from passion and affect. Yet those overtones do not resonate in Appleby’s 
analysis. Granted, to the academic reader his essay is not especially “cold” or “dry.” It is 
not any more or less detached than the typical scholarly publication. Yet there is value in 
detecting what is notably absent. The question we must ask if we are to recognize 
Appleby’s expert style, his discursive performance of historiographical objectivity, is: 
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how might a member of these religious groups speak of themselves and their 
experiences? What language choices would they make? For instance, Appleby writes, 
“Apocalyptic or millenarian fervor takes on a decidedly therapeutic role in the lives and 
imagination of the modern antimodernists. The anticipated reversal of ordinary history is 
a source of great comfort for millions of believers.”206 Upon reading this, a rhetorical 
critic might wonder what affective language these “antimodernists” would use. Are 
Appleby’s words a plausible reflection of how the “objects of study” themselves might 
speak about eschatology? The fact that they are not does not render Appleby a poor 
historian. On the contrary, it indicates that the historian’s account of religious 
fundamentalism differs inevitably from the practitioners’. The difference is a function of 
objectivity, which permeates the rhetoric of academic expertise.  
The object of study itself is a matter of expertise because it raises the issue of 
pedagogy. One of this dissertation’s critical probes highlights the difference between 
teaching and persuasion in the rhetoric of expertise. Some experts are keenly interested in 
persuading the audience that they are experts, but less concerned about imparting the 
subject matter. To be sure, historical experts put great effort into persuasion; as I outline 
in this section, they adopt a number of strategies to persuade us that they are experts. The 
question is, how do academic historical experts approach instruction? Do they, like the 
activists analyzed in my chapter on political expertise, strive to share their expertise with 
the audience? Is it a proselytizing sort of expertise? 
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Historians teach the object of their expertise more than the process. Cullather 
teaches the audience about dam projects in Afghanistan and an history of American 
interventions. These are the objects of his expertise. The process of historical expertise, in 
contrast, is a matter of proving the ability to be a scholar. Cullather does not incorporate 
an effort to teach his scholarly practices. There is a “symbiotic” relationship between the 
practices of objectivity and the historical profession that makes the former an exclusive 
skill.207 Objectivity for historians is a professional consensus, a code of expertise. Novick 
offers a version of this code: “The producer of these wares has been rigorously trained, 
and we vouch for both his competence and his ethics; the goods themselves have been 
subjected to the most rigorous testing and criticism; you may therefore take them on 
faith.”208 Using the code rhetorically is a strategy for invoking that professional 
membership. Thus Cullather is more than willing to impart the object of his expertise, but 
the process of historical inquiry is exclusive. The practice of scholarly objectivity is not 
something that Cullather teaches. He performs objectivity to be persuasive as an expert 
but he does not instruct the audience on being an objective expert. 
There are a number of ways to perform objectivity, to prove that one adheres to 
scholarly guidelines. One that several of the essayists use is what I call the “silent 
historian.” It is a strategy for muting the source of an argument; silence is part of the 
historian’s objectivity. For example, Cullather’s essay never once reveals the author. This 
goes beyond avoiding first-person phrasing; he does not grant the reader any access to his 
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interpretive lens. As an expert, Cullather does not expose himself to scrutiny. Unlike 
some of the other writers, he does not begin by laying out first assumptions.209 Instead, he 
simply “tells the story.” This is to say, he illustrates a myth of traditional historiography 
whereby it is possible to recount historical events without hermeneutic intrusion. Veyne 
theorizes this attitude when he states that  
facts do not exist in isolation, but have objective connections; the choice 
of a subject in history is free but, within the chosen subject, the facts and 
their connections are what they are and nothing can change that; historical 
truth is neither relative nor inaccessible.210  
The silent historian is the expert who relies on Veyne’s position to be persuasive. 
Because it is silent, this strategy is a complex and powerfully persuasive gesture 
in the construction of historical expertise. It lets the historian present her arguments 
without revealing inevitable subjectivity. In part, this may be read as humility, a 
subservience to the study of history. Using such a self-effacing move generates ethos for 
the historian. It suggests also that the recounting of historical facts speaks for itself; the 
methodology is presumably so sound as to preempt interrogation. Cullather does not need 
to be present—his expertise is.211  
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211 Cullather breaks his silence at the very end of the chapter, in an “acknowledgment” hidden in the 
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“without expertise” arguably implies its own opposite. Cullather and his colleagues are in fact experts, 
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The silent historian and her performance of objectivity generate something that is 
rather unique to the rhetoric of academic expertise. It affords the expert the authority to 
be critical. This may seem like a paradox to anyone who is used to distinguishing critical 
scholarship from the notion of objectivity. However, it is precisely this perception that 
makes these historians’ critical agenda such a persuasive part of their expertise. 
Kuniholm, for example, is one of the book’s most critical authors. He is also one of the 
silent historians, ostensibly laying out the objective historical context for what he terms 
“the great game” metaphor. Because he is so explicitly critical of American politics and 
the Bush administration, Kuniholm’s essay oscillates between a historical narrative and a 
current events commentary. This harkens back to the issue of the historian as expert 
advisor and the question of when history becomes history.  
Most importantly, the objectivity that a silent author implies and performs lets the 
academic historian be critical. An expert can be critical of something that she can 
approach with detachment. Hunt can be critical of nationalism because he puts a certain 
distance between himself and the object of analysis. Nationalism is something that other 
people have and do; Hunt himself is above such folly. This gesture is part of his expert 
persuasiveness. He stands outside of his object of expertise. Hunt and the other historians 
do not critique their own experiences of nationalism; at no time in their essays do we read 
about the authors’ personal nationalist sentiments. The critical posture of the academic 
historians’ expertise prohibits such private disclosure. By contrast, the next section of my 
                                                                                                                                                 
otherwise they would be unable to place anything in a historical context. Such is the professional calling of 
this group of experts. The footnote reads like a final grasp at the rewards for being an expert, viz. being 
able to claim the correct and preferable version of something.  
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chapter analyzes the rhetoric of expertise that witnesses construct for legitimizing their 
own experiences. In that discourse, being critical is not an asset. The 9/11 witnesses do 
not take a critical approach to their expertise. Their expertise is synonymous with their 
experience of the trauma.  
Analysis: Witnesses 
Dean Murphy’s September 11: An Oral History is a collection of eyewitness 
accounts. The stories come from people who were inside the World Trade Center on 
September 11, 2001 as well as rescue workers and bystanders. They describe what they 
saw, what they felt, what they smelled and breathed on the day of the attacks. Murphy 
comments on his editorial method: “My approach to the narratives was not to worry 
about the manner in which the information was imparted. My task was to assemble an 
eyewitness history of that day, not determine its content or dictate its form.”212 In the 
preface, he also includes one of his own newspaper excerpts: “To be in New York last 
week was to know the pounding in your chest, the hole in your stomach, the aching at the 
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center of your being.”213 In this section, I demonstrate how this evocative quotation 
summarizes the rhetoric of historical expertise as constructed by eyewitnesses.  
It is important to explain what I mean by the notion of witness expertise, 
specifically historical expertise. After all, it seems unlikely that the firefighters and 
stockbrokers that Murphy interviews would call themselves historical experts.214 They 
understand that academic historians are the experts. Academic historians have 
accreditation and an established set of practices for knowing the past. Their expertise is 
culturally sanctioned via academe. Witness expertise, by contrast, exists in the persuasive 
nature of personal experience. The notion of witness expertise is not something in which 
one can earn a degree. It is not a title or a job. It is a matter of ownership. We own our 
experiences of the past like we own our feelings and bodies. Because our culture 
privileges personal experience as a way of knowing, we allow ownership of the past. As I 
shall demonstrate in this section of the chapter, such experiences are often located in the 
body. For instance, if I say that I have a stomach ache, my friends will believe me. They 
have no reason to think that I could not judge my own experience of pain. I own my 
stomach; I own the experience of a stomach pain. In that sense, I am an expert on my 
stomach and its ailments. I have first person expertise. I am not the same kind of expert 
as the gastroenterologist who treats my illness. However, the physician can never know 
exactly how the pain feels to me. The experience is exclusively mine.  
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214 See the first of my critical probes, which asks about explicit uses of the words “expert and “expertise.” 
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This privilege that our culture grants to personal experience is visible in a variety 
of contexts. When a hurricane strikes, the survivors are interviewed on television. They 
typically describe how the wind felt, how scared they were, how they saw rooftops flying 
around with their own eyes. In short, they explain how their five senses created a real, 
true experience of an event. This, I propose, is a powerfully persuasive rhetoric of 
expertise. It contains a number of strategies, all of which make an experience of the past 
believable. Moreover, there is an inherent contention in this rhetoric; it challenges the 
rhetorics of other forms of expertise. Hurricane refugees may try to argue with the 
meteorologists over the severity of a storm. The meteorological experts say it was a 
category three on the Saffir-Simpson scale; they have training and titles to substantiate a 
claim to being right. They have radar and scientific methods. But eyewitnesses are in a 
unique position to say, “But I saw it with my own eyes! It must have been at least a 
four!” Two rhetorics of expertise stand against each other. The question is: What do the 
9/11 witnesses do to make us believe? What are the rhetorics of expertise that frame their 
experience of an historic event? 
Lived Experience as Expertise 
The witnesses in Murphy’s book indicate that they subscribe to the primacy of 
personal experience. They know that they are privy to something exclusive, an 
experience that is gone now. It is history. One man says, “You have no idea what that 
scene was like. No picture or video can convey the pandemonium.”215 Another concurs, 
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“People don’t really understand what I’ve been through, which is probably better. I hate 
sitting down and telling people. […] What do you say when someone tells you a story 
like that?”216 A women who lived on the edge of New York’s financial district, and was 
confined to her apartment for four days, states,  
It was two cities; those who lived outside this zone were slow to grasp 
what we were faced with. While they were of good faith, the fact that they 
“didn’t get it” was frightening and frustrating to many of the people here 
who felt our situation was not understood.217  
These quotations speak to the idea that outsiders cannot possibly understand such a 
traumatic experience. Pictures cannot convey it; even telling the story seems to fall short.  
As with Meyerowitz’s book, the structure and layout reveal a lot about different 
types of expertise. Unlike historians’ essays, which offer different angles of scholarly 
analysis, each of Murphy’s chapters is dedicated to a specific individual who is identified 
by name. In the chapter introductions, a brief biographical note contextualizes the 
individual story. For example, the reader learns that Gerry Gaeta was an architect who 
worked for the Port Authority of New York on the 88th floor of the North Tower.218 
Teresa Veliz was a facilities manager for a software development company of the 47th 
floor.219 Recall that most of the historians’ essays began with a thesis statement, a 
literature review, and/or an explication of theoretical assumptions. This format is rather 
unthinkable as part of a personal narrative. No one begins a personal story with an 
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explication of theory. Instead of stating a thesis, witnesses become familiar to the reader 
on a personal level. They tell a story: “Once upon a time…Then this happened… I was so 
frightened… Then someone else came along…and finally I was safe.”220 Such narrative 
coherence would be foreign to historical scholarship, particularly critical historiography. 
In Murphy’s text, we are first introduced to the story’s main characters; we recognize 
their identities and lives as average and normal. We then are exposed to their non-normal 
experience. Within that contrast, the historical event becomes transposed into the lives of 
“ordinary people,” just as the book jacket promises. Whereas historians locate 9/11 in a 
long series of political decisions and international relations, witnesses frame their 
experiences in the context of life. The structure of the book turns the reader’s attention to 
the individual and her story. In doing so, it foregrounds those things as primary to the 
event. It lets them be the experts. 
There is a strong appeal to identification with the audience in the references to 
ordinary life. When witnesses describe that fateful Tuesday morning, they do so in the 
context of all the other things that were happening. This trope privileges personal 
experience as discussed earlier; specifically, it invites the audience to consider our own 
normalcy and our daily routines being interrupted by a trauma. For example, one man 
says, “I had taken off my shoes, like I do most every morning. This pair was new and in 
particular need of being broken in.”221 Another man says, “It was a very nice day, 
beautiful and clear. I had started a new book. I read a couple of books a month while 
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doing my workout. I was […] feeling this was going to be a very special day.”222 A 
woman says, “I went to the cafeteria every morning to get Ed’s breakfast. That was the 
routine. Everything for me that morning was like clockwork.”223 By representing 
everyday details like new shoes, a workout, and a cafeteria breakfast, witnesses invite the 
audience to imagine the experience. It is in a sense an enthymeme of historical 
experience and expertise. Communicating such first-hand experience completely is 
impossible. You couldn’t know unless you were there. But identification is the next best 
thing; witnesses let us know the context of their experience thereby allowing us to 
connect. 
By far the most common trope in the rhetoric of witnessing is bodily or visceral 
experience. Our sight, smell, taste, feel, and hearing are points of entry. They are the 
sensory producers of personal expertise. They are the core expert practices—
methodological and epistemological. Almost all of Murphy’s narrators make reference to 
the senses: “I can still hear that horrible noise in my ears.”224 “You could smell the jet 
fuel. Lots of smoke. Lots of confusion. Lots of sunlight from the windows illuminating 
both.”225 “I was getting hot and there was no air circulating. A lot of people were having 
difficulty breathing. It left a burning and scratching sensation in the throat.”226 “I was 
blown across the concourse but managed to stay on my feet. Eventually, I was thrown 
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against a wall.”227 “There were these firemen standing there with hoses spraying 
everybody. The water was ice cold.”228 “The scene on that plaza was so upsetting that 
when I first saw it my stomach turned, my legs became rubbery and I almost blacked 
out.”229 As a strategy for constructing expertise, citing bodily experience is effective in 
several ways. First, the audience has prior experiences of bodily reactions like being very 
hot or ice cold, having trouble breathing, slamming into something hard, and legs turning 
into rubber. We know what that feels like and we can recall possible causes of those 
experiences. Thus, we can confirm witnesses’ personal experience as a way of knowing. 
Second, because we trust our own bodies we must allow others the same privilege. If a 
witness tells me that she has “never seen fire like that. It was thick with dark red and 
black colors,” I trust her eyes.230  
Witness Ethos 
There is an urgency and vulnerability in the witness’s references to bodily 
experiences. For this reason, the references also serve as ethos-based expertise appeals. 
Because of the trauma that the witnesses endured, the audience is implicitly asked to 
suspend judgment. The idea is that no one would lie about this kind of tragedy. The 
witnesses become virtuous as experts by sharing what must have been a devastating 
experience. One woman says, “My hands were so sweaty that the phone kept slipping 
from my grip.”231 She later admits, “I stopped to look at my reflection in a window. It 
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was just my eyes—everything else was covered in white ash. I had urinated on 
myself.”232 The inference that the audience is asked to make is that no one would 
voluntarily share this information if it were not true. The only reason to tell the story is 
historical; many of the witnesses attest to the significance of having their ordeals 
preserved. They are sharing their expert perspectives—at the cost of personal 
humiliation—in the service of the greater good.233 
Ethos is a primary concern for witnesses. All three dimensions of it that were 
presented in Chapter One—arete, phronesis, and eunoia—emerge as significant. 
Witnesses draw on each to generate the impression of personal credibility. For example, 
many of the stories contain some sort of confessional. The narrators, like many trauma 
survivors, express a tremendous sense of guilt. They say, “I also have no idea how or 
why I made it out. That is what is most frightening now: Was I just lucky? I don’t think 
there is any special reason that I am here today, alive while so many others are not.”234 “I 
thought about my staff. I realized I had gotten out early, ahead of them […]. I started to 
think about everybody I knew who worked in the complex. The nightmares in my mind 
started to roll.”235 Several of the witnesses distance themselves from the event and their 
own behavior by claiming that they were acting uncharacteristically or out of ignorance: 
“There was a man having an epileptic seizure. I looked at him. I can’t help him, I said. 
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[…] I don’t know what came over me, but I wasn’t myself anymore.”236 “I’m fine,’ he 
said. And he was. There was no smoke on the 27th floor. Nothing was happening there, 
except for everybody leaving. I never knew that the building would fall on them. How 
could I have known?”237  
These confessionals are a strategic ethical trope because they alleviate guilt. They 
make witnesses appear virtuous and credible even in the face of less-than-heroic actions. 
To resolve the dissonance between an immoral act and a good person, the narrators 
suggest that they were not being themselves or that they could not have known what 
would happen. They “could only think of all the people who had been back there” but 
they “went crazy with fear.”238 Either way, the impression of an ethical person is intact, 
which is what allows her to remain persuasive. The part of ethos that depends on eunoia, 
or goodwill, is present insofar as witnesses demonstrate their concern with the welfare of 
others. 
Even more clearly noticeable are the appeals to phronesis or practical wisdom. 
Witnesses talk frequently about their mastery of the dire situation and attribute it to 
common sense. One man says, “My mind focused like a laser beam and I knew what we 
had to do.”239 Another says,  
We had fire drills every six months and we knew exactly what to do to get 
out. I was one of the volunteer fire wardens on the floor, so I had a 
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flashlight all ready to go. I was rounding up people when the strobe lights 
started to flash and the sirens sounded, just as they were supposed to.240  
A priest and a firefighter link their respective phroneses to a professional identity: “I 
could see little figures jumping to their death from the North Tower. I knew at that 
moment I had to get back there. I am a priest.”241 “In my profession you notice clothes 
because so often you have to cut them into pieces to save lives. That was the first thing 
that came to mind: This lady is well dressed.”242 Whether or not these ethos-appeals 
make witnesses more believe in terms of the trauma is debatable. It makes them 
personally credible, but that credibility may not transfer to their narratives of what 
happened on 9/11. More than likely, however, audiences do not distinguish between a 
person’s general ethos and his/her credibility in a specific context, such as the recounting 
of an historic event. Appeals to phronesis—argument for why a person has generally 
good sense—spill over into that person’s historical expertise. The audience likely grants 
that a person who knows fire protocol can speak with credibility about an incident 
involving a fire. 
There is a particular type of phronesis that suggests the intervention of a higher 
power. When witnesses describe their abilities to act wisely in the middle of chaos, it is 
not uncommon that they locate the source of this wisdom outside themselves. One 
witness says, “I sensed something immediately. Maybe there was a noise or a rumble I 
subconsciously detected. […] In any event, I knew even before the elevator doors slid 
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open.”243 Another says, “I will state clearly to you: There were some powerful things 
going on that Tuesday. […] I was living in a bubble of some sort. I was being protected 
in a miraculous way. […] I am not bragging. I am stating the facts.”244 Others are very 
explicit about their interpretations: “I feel I am lucky and I thank God for saving my life. 
I have responsibilities to my family and I have a lot of things I want to do with my life. I 
am glad God saved me.”245 While this reference to a higher power may seem like the 
witness is displacing credit, it nevertheless is a part of the rhetoric of expertise. It 
introduces another element of the experience that only a first-hand account could 
incorporate. 
There is a parallel here between the two rhetorics of expertise, the historians’ and 
the witnesses’. For the former, external influences are an important factor in historical 
analysis. Historians are concerned with the ways in which large social, political, and 
economic forces determine events and actions. In the case of Meyerowitz’s essayists, the 
emphasis is on the international relations that produced 9/11. This macro-perspective is to 
be expected from academic historical experts. They establish credibility by demonstrating 
knowledge of a large body of interconnected facts. Much more remarkable is the 
counterpart in the other rhetoric of historical expertise. Witnesses too use external forces 
to construct themselves as experts, specifically as experts on their own experience. By 
integrating divine intervention as a trope, they build persuasion on an experience that 
cannot be refuted. No one can refute the experience of smoke inhalation or blistering 
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heat, much less the religious experience of being saved. Who would argue that there were 
not guardian angels in the towers that day?246 
Along with a reference to divine intervention, many of the witnesses frame what 
they are doing as a moral obligation. They have a responsibility to tell their stories. In this 
sense, the first-hand experience that constitutes their expertise calls them to testify. This 
testimonial aspect of being a witness again raises the question of teaching and persuasion. 
One of my critical probes asks how experts negotiate persuading others that they are 
experts and imparting that expertise. For witnesses, this is a highly emotional issue. As 
explained earlier, teaching the epistemology of personal experience is impossible. 
Witnesses cannot teach us how they know what they know or recreate the experience for 
us. Such knowledge comes from the body, specifically from the body having been 
present in a particular circumstance. First person expertise can be taught only as an 
object, not as a process. A 9/11 survivor cannot explain how they know heat or fear. They 
can only state the thing that they know, and ask us to take their word for it.  
The witness-experts teach the product of their expertise. While they cannot teach 
us a visceral experience (i.e., they cannot produce it in or for an audience) they can 
describe what that experience produced. They can pass on the knowledge that the 
experience generated. Recall from a footnote to this chapter’s introduction that the 
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implication of the word “witness” is two-fold. First, it means to see something first-hand. 
Second, it means to report what one has seen, to bear witness. Bearing witness is an 
historical function; it frequently connotes a moral mandate. As one witness states, “I 
watched, helpless to do anything but that. I could have closed my eyes, but I didn’t. It 
was like she needed to be seen. Maybe it would keep her alive.” Just as this woman 
watched another person die out of inexplicable obligation, so do many of the other 
witnesses tell their stories out of duty. Murphy confirms this in his introduction when he 
mentions that some of the narrators  
appreciated the history of the moment and wanted it preserved for 
generations to come. “Thanks for taking the time to try and tell our part of 
the story,” another of those interviewed wrote. “I think it is an important 
job, and people in the future will be glad to you did.”247  
In this brief quotation, several of the themes I analyzed in this section emerge. The 
witness recognizes the moral significance of the oral narratives; she predicts that future 
generations will be grateful. Moreover, she confirms the power of personal experience; 
she positions it relative to alternative interpretations of the past. By calling attention to 
“our part of the story,” she builds the rhetoric of experience, an alternative rhetoric of 
historical expertise.  
Conclusions for the Rhetoric of Historical Expertise 
Expertise is rhetorically constructed. It is claimed by individuals and groups who 
compete with each other for credibility and authority. It is about being more persuasive 
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than the alternative; it is about whose version becomes acceptable to the public. My 
dissertation examines the rhetorical strategies that different experts rely on when they 
conflict. Specifically, this chapter focused on the rhetorical construction of historical 
expertise. I compared two types of historical experts: academic historians and witnesses. 
By analyzing how historians and witnesses discuss 9/11, I identified several tactics 
characterizing each group. These tactics constitute two different rhetorics. In this final 
section, I highlight a few recurring themes, and comment on how they unite and divide 
historians and witnesses. 
First, there are significant structural and stylistic differences in the ways that these 
groups present their messages. These are things that are easily overlooked because they 
are most often taken for granted. We rarely notice how differently an historic event is 
recorded and remembered by different groups. For example, historians operate 
deductively. Meyerowitz’s book, as well as each of the individual chapters, are written in 
accordance with academic standards: a thesis is followed by a theoretical position 
statement and a literature review; refutation and dialectic are common tropes; a critical 
tone and a research rationale are requisite for the piece’s credibility. All these practices 
apply to historians’ treatment of 9/11 as much as any other subject matter. They are a 
professional code of conduct, a way of rhetorically framing oneself as a credible expert. 
Indeed a demonstrated ability to follow these codes signify membership in the scholarly 
community. 
The structure and style of witness accounts are much different. Murphy’s book 
locates the individual narrators at the center. He introduces them by name and offers 
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biographical notations for each. The stories themselves emerge from individual 
experience. There are no claims to general principles or critical analysis; it’s just 
witnesses telling their stories. These rhetorical choices are as unstated as the historians’ 
methodology. It is implicitly “natural” that personal stories comprise an oral history of 
9/11. Thus, the same event is treated in radically different ways by two groups competing 
for expertise. Historians follow the practices that define their professional community; 
witnesses approach the event from the only vantage point available to them, viz., personal 
experience. 
Thus the notion of epistemology is central to both groups’ rhetorical strategies. 
Note that the difference I identified in my analysis does not lie in epistemology proper; of 
course historians have a different epistemology than ordinary people when it comes to 
interpreting the past. What I am concerned with is a rhetorical difference. It is a 
difference in the way that the groups talk about their historical discoveries. Both take 
great pains to demonstrate how they come to know what they know. Therein lie their 
persuasive powers. Historians incorporate a variety of references to objectivity. They 
perform objectivity by emphasizing method over scholar. This is how they prove to the 
audience that their ways of knowing and the product of those ways are sound. Witnesses 
offer their bodily experiences as epistemic. Their claim, in short, is that, because I 
experienced the event with my five senses, I have unique expert knowledge of it. Anyone 
who was not physically present could not know what I know. This argument is persuasive 
because our culture places a great deal of faith in lived experience. We do not require or 
invite people to doubt their eyes and ears. At the same time, historians are highly 
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persuasive because they are social scientists. They associate themselves rhetorically with 
other scientific experts, and take advantage of the overwhelming power of that 
connection. The audience is left to settle the discrepancy between two bodies of evidence, 
both of which we consider credible. 
Both historians and witnesses distinguish between their expert epistemologies and 
the products of those epistemologies. They teach the latter—the object of their 
expertise—but not the former. Both teach what they know but not how they know it. 
They strive to persuade us that they are credible experts, but the means of access remain 
exclusive. Witnesses, for example, share their narratives of personal experience but also 
imply that such experience is restricted. It cannot be obtained without being sensorily 
present. They cannot impart their epistemology, the bodily ways by which they arrive at 
expert knowledge. Similarly, historians teach what they know about history but not their 
methods of inquiry.  
Another theme in the rhetoric of historical expertise that both unites and divides 
historians and witnesses is motive. Both expert groups have an ostensibly noble reason 
for sharing their expertise with the public. This nobility, as I demonstrated earlier, is a 
powerful ethos, specifically in the creation of eunoia. For historians the motive is 
advisory. They present themselves as potential advisors to political decisions-makers—
possibly to the citizenry writ large. The idea is that knowledge of the past can be 
analogously transposed to predicting the future. If there is nothing new under the sun, if 
historical situations repeat themselves, then knowing those repetitions is extremely 
valuable. This in turn assigns historians a civic duty to prevent a society from repeating 
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its mistakes. Historical scholarship like Meyerowitz’s essay collection is offered as a 
means toward this end. Conversely, witnesses have a moral obligation to share their 
expertise. They argue that future generations will want to hear “another side of the story.” 
They will want to hear from the ones who were there. As stated earlier, lived experience 
guarantees a unique perspective. Therefore, any account of the past would be incomplete 
without witnesses’ input. Such is the nature of their claim to historical expertise. 
My analysis demonstrated that both groups are concerned with contextualizing 
their expertise. Witnesses and historians both position what they know in a larger plot, 
something continuously ongoing. Historians achieve this apophantically, by 
demonstrating that one object of analysis is like something else. Meyerowitz’s historians 
for example draw a parallel between a current event, 9/11, and other historical moments 
of crisis: World War I, the Cold War, 1950’s Afghanistan, etc. In addition, they trace the 
larger political and economic forces that caused such a volatile situation, such as U.S. 
intervention in the Middle East. Unlike historians structural emphasis on political forces, 
witnesses contextualize while inviting identification. They place 9/11 in the trajectory of 
an ordinary life and everyday routine; this is something to which the audience can relate. 
In most of the witnesses’ narratives, the trauma ruptured a day of normalcy—walking to 
work and picking up muffins. To the audience, this is at once frightening and reassuring 
because it means not only that the same thing could happen to us, but that we realize what 
the experience must have been like. We construct the witnesses as historical experts 
because we find their stories credible. 
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This sense of acknowledgment is at the heart of my argument. To be 
acknowledged and accepted for one’s interpretation of the past is tantamount to historical 
expertise. And this is the result of a rhetorical effort. Historians and witnesses create 
powerful discourses to compete with each other for the public’s recognition. Both want to 
be persuasive. Those who survived 9/11 share their stories, not calling themselves experts 
but deliberately constructing their version of the past. They want to be believed. 
Historians likewise offer interpretations of the event with a variety of rhetorical devices 
generating scholarly credibility. What is remarkable at the conclusion of my analysis is 
that two groups who are so different in many ways share such important features in their 
rhetorical strategies. On the surface, it is easier to find differences than similarities 
between a history professor at Notre Dame and a facilities manager at the World Trade 
Center. What they have in common are certain rhetorical themes; both use the available 
means of persuasion to construct a rhetoric of historical expertise. 
It has been suggested that we live in a post-historical time, that history as a single 
and continuous narrative is no longer possible. While the latter may be true, the former 
certainly is not. Modern Americans are just as concerned with the past as previous 
generations. We struggle to come to grips with it, particularly with those significant 
events that reshape our understandings of reality. September 11, 2001 was one of those 
events; it remains an indelible marker in history and memory. Each time we attempt to 
make sense of that trauma, we are faced with a choice between different credible sources 
and their rhetorics of historical expertise.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DEALING WITH DEPRESSION: THE RHETORIC OF MEDICAL EXPERTISE 
Few experts have as much direct influence over the general public as medical 
doctors. Few enjoy the same level of esteem and approbation. Indeed, few are as 
persuasive. Doctors are professionals. Doctors are experts. Doctors give orders that are 
obeyed. As George Carlin allegedly said, “I recently went to a new doctor and noticed he 
was located in something called the Professional Building. I felt better right away.” 
Americans attribute a remarkable amount of expertise to a person with a professional 
degree in medicine. With our decision to visit their offices, wear the backless robe, take a 
deep breath and hold, we grant doctors almost unrestricted access to our most private 
parts. Why? When my doctor tells me to wear sunscreen, to exercise and eat more 
spinach, I follow her advice. Why? When I tell my doctor what the pain in my chest feels 
like, or that my foot has been hurting, and she explains the cause of the discomfort, I 
believe her and accept her explanation. Why? And why do I believe Dr. Malik and not 
Dr. Jensen? On what grounds do I deem the former more competent, perhaps more 
doctor-like, than the latter? 
Consider a concrete example: I know a young man who suffers from chronic 
depression. Every day, he takes a concoction of prescription drugs to manage his 
condition. He is not sure about the purpose of each pill, but he takes them because they 
make him functional—because his psychiatrist said to do so. The expert prescribed a 
course of treatment and medications to go with it. She explained in detail that his brain 
needs a little help with certain chemical processes. She showed him charts and a plastic 
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model of a human brain; she wore a white coat and spoke patiently in words he could 
understand. Now he takes the medicine; he follows her instructions. The patient follows 
the medical expert’s advice to feel better, do his job, and be with his family and friends.  
Let us now transpose the doctor-patient relationship to a different level and 
consider the relationship between society at large and the medical establishment. The lay 
public is distinct from and simultaneously related to a specialized sub-group. These 
relationships between doctors and patients and between the medical establishment and 
society in general are profoundly rhetorical. They are constituted in an ongoing dialogue 
between doctors and patients and between the public and the community of medical 
experts. Moreover, this dialogue is a high priority because health and illness concern 
everyone. Medicine is an economic concern when companies regulate sick-leave and 
health insurance. Medicine is a political concern when Congress awards funding to 
medical research. And medicine is a social concern when, as a culture, we decide whether 
or not obesity, addiction and erectile dysfunction are diseases. The rhetoric of expertise 
shapes society’s relationship to the medical community in important ways. That is, 
society defers to medical experts much like individuals do. It is persuaded by the 
rhetorical strategies of medical expertise much like a patient in a doctor’s office. When 
Congress votes on funding for cancer research, for example, they hear expert testimony 
from the scientific community. When a person learns that she has cancer, she consults an 
oncologist. These interactions, dialogues, and relationships between medical experts and 
the lay public are fundamentally and powerfully rhetorical. 
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My dissertation posits expertise as a rhetorical construct. Specifically, it 
investigates how expertise is instituted and negotiated as a function of the rhetorical 
situation, its participants and constraints. I ask: What rhetorical strategies do different 
groups employ to compete for expert authority and legitimacy when they conflict with 
one another? In this chapter, I examine the rhetorical strategies of medical expertise. I 
focus on expert claims regarding depression—living with it as well as its diagnosis and 
treatment. By juxtaposing a psychiatrist’s rhetoric with the rhetoric of those who draw 
from personal experience, I ask: As a means of persuasion, how does personal suffering 
function differently than specialized training as kinds of expertise? How do different 
rhetorics of expertise define medical experience? What warrants do they offer as 
evidence of their claims to expertise? Drawing on Lawrence Prelli, I analyze of how 
medical experts of two different types employ “an identifiable, finite set of value-laden 
topics as they produce and evaluate claims and counterclaims.”248 
In this chapter, two rhetorics of medical expertise are juxtaposed. The first is 
Understanding Depression by Dr. J. Raymond DePaulo.249 DePaulo is the Henry Phipps 
Professor and Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry and founder of the Affective 
Disorders Clinic at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine. His book is designed for the 
general public, particularly addressing patients suffering from depression and their 
families.250 The second artifact is Unholy Ghost, a collection of first-person narratives 
                                                 
248 Lawrence J. Prelli, A Rhetoric of Science: Inventing Scientific Discourse (Columbia, SC: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1989), 5. 
249 J. Raymond DePaulo, Understanding Depression (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2002).  
250 When selecting this text, I searched for book reviews in the last five years in the American Journal of 
Psychiatry—one of the field’s most prestigious journals. The scope was limited to books with the word 
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written by self-identified sufferers of depression.251 The editor is a mental health 
journalist and the sister of a long-time depressive. The contributing authors are novelists, 
poets, literary and cultural critics.252 Their stories and metaphorical descriptions of living 
with depression constitute, I argue, a rhetoric of expertise, one that is distinct from the 
rhetoric of expertise employed by the medical establishment. 
These two texts provide uniquely instructive examples of the tension between 
different kinds of experience in the rhetorical construction of medical expertise. They 
illustrate the strategies that psychiatrists and depressives respectively use in order to be 
persuasive. Moreover, the texts illustrate how different strategies function for different 
rhetors addressing the same audience. It is significant, for example, that the psychiatrist’s 
book is written for a lay audience rather than an audience of peers. This format is 
relatively rare for someone in his position. As Wander notes, scientists mostly write for 
                                                                                                                                                 
“depression” in the title. The search produced eight hits, which I evaluated for general applicability and 
suitability for a lay audience. Based on these criteria I did not include, for example, the book on depression 
in children and adolescents. Nor did I include a book that was characterized as “of interest to clinicians,” or 
another that would be “best suited for a graduate-level course on depression.” The journal’s reviewers 
described the intended audience of DePaulo’s book as “people who suffer from depression and their 
families.”  
251 Nell Casey, ed., Unholy Ghost (New York: Perennial, 2001). 
252 This book is an edited collection of essays by authors who have either suffered depression personally or 
been in a close relationship with a depressive. In order to provide as much focus as possible to my analysis, 
I selected the essays by depressives as particularly relevant. These include Virginia Heffernan, Chase 
Twichell, Larry McMurtry, Lauren Slater, William Styron, Meri Nana-Ama Danquah, A. Alvarez, Lesley 
Dormen, and Maud Casey. I chose to exclude “secondary” experiences of depression, such as Rose 
Styron’s and Russell Banks’s essays about coping with their spouses’ illness. I also excluded those writers 
who would have access to a different rhetorical paradigm when talking about depression, for example Kay 
Redfield Jamieson, , a professor of psychiatry at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, Martha Mannig, 
who holds a Ph.D. in clinical psychology, and David Karp, a professor of sociology at Boston College. It is 
worth noting that the included authors are, in a sense, experts not only on the experience of depression, but 
also on the deliberate use of language. As I suggest later in the chapter, it is possible that a highly 
ambiguous topic like mental illness requires this kind of aptitude. Even in the absence of medical degrees 
or training, the writers’ experiences are highly persuasive because of strategically aesthetic language.  
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other scientists.253 “The archetypal speaking situation for the scientist occurs in 
addressing an audience of fellow scientists, and the archetypal form of discourse is the 
research report.”254 This audience selection is intentional; speaking almost exclusively to 
an internal audience of peers is key to the kind of rhetoric that doctors produce. A heavy 
emphasis on publishing for an expert audience in the form of a journal article or 
convention paper, is the discourse community’s rhetorical choice. Scientists typically 
choose this format against other alternatives, such as writing for a lay audience. For this 
reason, my juxtaposition in this chapter is promising. Identifying a space in which 
psychiatrists and depressives address the same audience—the lay public—allows 
conflicting rhetorical strategies to emerge most clearly.255  
 In the next section, I offer an introductory literature review of the scholarship on 
rhetoric, science and medicine. The goal of this review is to situate my inquiry in an 
extensive, ongoing theoretical and critical conversation, noting specifically that: 1) 
rhetoric is integral to medicine and science, 2) medicine and science reference each other 
as a means of persuasion, and 3) medical experts comprise a discourse community whose 
cohesion and professional practices are rhetorically constituted. Understanding this 
scholarship is imperative to the rhetorical analysis I undertake. A comparison between 
the persuasive strategies of a patient and the persuasive strategies of a doctor makes most 
                                                 
253 Phillip C. Wander, "The Rhetoric of Science," Western Speech 40 (1976): 226-235. 
254 Wander, 230. 
255 A note on vocabulary: To designate the group of essayists representing the patients’ side of medical 
expertise, I use primarily the word “depressives.” This implies nothing more about them than that they self-
identify as suffering from—or having in the past suffered from—depression. In addition, using this term 
circumvents the image of a “patient,” which risks suggesting passivity. I use the term patient only in 
hypothetical examples, or when discussing the relationship between doctors and patients on a macro-scale, 
that is, as social roles.  
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sense in the context of a much-theorized tension between rhetoric and science/medicine. 
Following a review of the literature is a two-part analysis wherein I examine Dr. 
DePaulo’s book and the essay collection containing personal stories of depression. To 
examine these artifacts, I deploy the series of eight critical probes used in Chapters Two 
and Three. These probes serve as a methodology for unpacking the rhetorical techniques 
featured in the texts. Finally, I offer concluding remarks about the rhetoric of medical 
expertise based on similarities and differences found between the two artifacts. 
Rhetoric, Science, and Medicine 
In his major treatise on the arts, Plato distinguished rhetoric from medicine.256 He 
inaugurated a categorical separation that, buttressed by Empiricism, lingers in modern 
times. There is a still a strong cultural assumption that nature—including the human body 
and its processes—exists beyond human understanding. To simplify: galaxies and 
mountains and planets and molecules exist, not because humans study them; humans 
study them because they exist. Our methods of observation and ways of talking, while 
useful and important, do not construct the natural world. Our ways of understanding and 
rhetoricizing the body are not constitutive. This view of the world is common both in the 
scientific community and the popular mind. Even in the rhetoric of science literature this 
attitude survives. J. E. McGuire and Trevor Melia caution against “the too easy 
assumption that scientific texts are as susceptible to rhetorical analysis as are texts in 
other disciplines.”257 There is a difference, they insist, between “what is constructed out 
                                                 
256 Plato, Gorgias, trans. Donald J. Zeyl (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987). 
257 J. E. McGuire and Trevor Melia, “Some Cautionary Strictures on the Writing of the Rhetoric of 
Science,” Rhetorica 7 (1989): 87. 
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of science’s practices and what can be referred to through those practices.”258 Natural 
referents are not constructed by, or dependent on, the practices of a community. McGuire 
and Melia acknowledge the trend to examine science as a social and discursive 
production, but insist that “it would be a mistake, however, to replace an arrogant 
scientism with a rampant rhetoricism.”259 
As a response to this “scientism,” rhetorical scholars have studied extensively the 
relationships between rhetoric and science (or inquiry), as well as between rhetoric and 
medicine.260 Alan Gross argues against McGuire’s and Melia’s reliance on recalcitrance 
                                                 
258 J. E. McGuire and Trevor Melia, “The Rhetoric of the Radical Rhetoric of Science,” Rhetorica 9 (1991): 
310. 
259 McGuire and Melia, Some Cautionary Strictures, 88. 
260 For literature on the rhetoric of science, see Paul N. Campbell, "Poetic-Rhetorical, Philosophical, and 
Scientific Discourse," Philosophy and Rhetoric 6 (1973): 1-29; Alan G. Gross, The Rhetoric of Science 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); Michael A. Overington, "The Scientific Community as 
Audience: Toward a Rhetorical Analysis of Science," Philosophy and Rhetoric 10 (1977): 143-163; 
Herbert W. Simons, Rhetoric in the Human Sciences (London: SAGE Publications, 1989); The Rhetoric of 
the Human Sciences: Language and Argument in Scholarship and Public Affairs, ed. J. S. Nelson, A. 
Megill and D. N. McCloskey (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); Phillip C. Wander, 
"The Rhetoric of Science," Western Speech 40 (1976): 226-235; Walter B. Weimer, "Science and a 
Rhetorical Transaction: Toward a Nonjustificational Conception of Rhetoric," Philosophy and Rhetoric 10 
(1977): 1-29. See also three special issues on the rhetoric of science: “Rhetoric of Science,” Special Issue 
of Argumentation 8 (1994); “Rhetoric of Science,” Special Issue of Rhetoric Society Quarterly 26 (1996); 
“Rhetoric in the Rhetoric of Science,” Special Issue of Southern Communication Journal 58 (1993). For 
literature on the rhetoric of inquiry, see James W. Hikins and Kenneth S. Zagacki, "Philosophy, Rhetoric, 
and Objectivism: An Attenuation of the Claims of the Rhetoric of Inquiry," Quarterly Journal of Speech 74 
(1988): 201-28; John Lyne, "Rhetorics of Inquiry," Quarterly Journal of Speech 71 (1985): 65-73; "The 
Culture of Inquiry," Quarterly Journal of Speech 76 (1990): 192-208; John S. Nelson and Allan Megill, 
"Rhetoric of Inquiry: Projects and Prospects," Quarterly Journal of Speech 72 (1986): 20-37; Herbert W. 
Simons, "Chronicle and Critique of a Conference," Quarterly Journal of Speech 71 (1985): 52-64; The 
Rhetorical Turn: Invention and Persuasion in the Conduct of Inquiry, ed. H. W. Simons (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1990). For literature on the rhetoric of medicine, see Heather D. Bell, 
Kathleen A. Walch and Steven B. Katz, “Aristotle’s Pharmacy’: The Medical Rhetoric of a Clinical 
Protocol in the Drug Development Process,” Technical Communication Quarterly 9 (2000): 249-269; 
Celeste M. Condit and Melanie Williams, “Audience Response to the Discourse of Medical Genetics: 
Evidence Against the Critique of Medicalization,” Health Communication 9 (1997): 219-235; Thomas J. 
Darwin, “Intelligent Cells and the Body as Conversation: The Democratic Rhetoric of Mindbody 
Medicine,” Argumentation and Advocacy 36 (1999): 35-49; Michael J. Hyde, “Experts, Rhetoric, and the 
Dilemmas of Medical Technology: Investigating a Problem of Progressive Ideology,” in Communication 
and the Culture of Technology, ed. M. J. Medhurst, A. Gonzalez and T. R. Peterson (Pullman, WA: 
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as a rationale for realism.261 He insists that “no line can be successfully drawn between 
rhetoric and scientific knowledge.”262 To identify what is at stake in the debate, he states, 
“By means of the rhetorical analysis of the hard sciences—biology, chemistry, and 
physics—rhetoric of inquiry inserts itself into the inner sanctum of epistemological 
privilege.”263 In a sense, Gross’s “insert” is a powerful retort echoing back to Plato. 
Rhetorical scholars have insisted for well over three decades that rhetoric is integral to 
science and medicine. They claim that conducting any kind of scientific inquiry entails an 
argument and a theory, which implies language, and that engaging in medical practices 
requires an argument and a discursive relationship.264  
To clarify, the labels “rhetoric of science” and “rhetoric of medicine” can mean 
three different things. First, they can refer to the rhetoric that any inquiry or practice 
necessarily entails. That is, rhetoric is not only one way of knowing, but integral to all 
ways of knowing.265 As philosophy traditionally has defined it, knowledge is justified 
                                                                                                                                                 
Washington State University Press, 1990); “Medicine, Rhetoric, and Euthanasia: A Case Study in the 
Workings of a Postmodern Discourse,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 79 (1993): 201-224; Lisa Keränen, 
“The Hippocratic Oath as Epideictic Rhetoric: Reanimating Medicine’s Past for Its Future,” Journal of 
Medical Humanities 22 (2001): 55-68; John Lyne, “Contours of Intervention: How Rhetoric Matters to 
Biomedicine,” Journal of Medical Humanities 22 (2001): 3-13; Roy Porter, “Perplex’t with Tough Names’: 
The Uses of Medical Jargon,” in Languages and Jargons: Contributing to a Social History of Language, 
ed. P. Burke and R. Porter (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1995); Judy Segal, Health and the Rhetoric of 
Medicine (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2005); “Interdisciplinarity and Bibliography in 
Rhetoric of Health and Medicine,” Technical Communication Quarterly 14 (2005): 311-318; Barbara F. 
Sharf, “Physician-Patient Communication as Interpersonal Rhetoric: A Narrative Approach,” Health 
Communication 2 (1990): 217-231. 
261 Alan G. Gross, “Rhetoric of Science without Constraints,” Rhetorica 9 (1991): 283-300. 
262 Gross, Without Constraints, 285. 
263 Gross, Without Constraints, 285. 
264 For a treatment of scientific argumentation, see Weimer, 5; for a treatment of medicine and a discursive 
relationship, see Hyde, Medicine, Rhetoric, and Euthanasia, 203. 
265 Here we discover an important intersection of the literatures on rhetoric of science and that of rhetoric as 
epistemology. Robert L. Scott’s seminal piece from 1967, which suggested that rhetoric is a way of 
knowing, triggered an avalanche of critical and theoretical responses in speech communication journals 
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belief; such justifications are necessarily rhetorical. To justify a philosophical tenet is to 
make an argument. Alternatively, when knowledge is synonymous with empirically 
verifiability, then the human interpretation of empirical instruments is nevertheless 
rhetorical. There is a rhetorical dimension to a biochemist’s use of his laboratory. Even 
with quantitative measurements, the process of knowing cannot get outside of language. 
Second, the labels “rhetoric of science” and “rhetoric of medicine” also designate 
the language produced by a professional discourse community. As Wander explains, 
“Grant proposals, journal articles, and convention papers are designed to influence a 
professional audience (granting agencies, journal editors, and so on). In order to be 
successful, they must convince this audience that the research topic is worthy of study, 
the appropriate tools were used, and used correctly, and that the researcher knew what he 
or she was doing.”266 This language of/by science is either internal or external; it is either 
directed at an audience of peers or an audience of laypersons. Dilip Gaonkar summarizes, 
“The general aim of the RS project is to show that the discursive practices of science, 
                                                                                                                                                 
(“On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic,” Central States Speech Journal 18 (1967): 9-17). Because this essay, 
by his own account, is frequently misconstrued or misinterpreted, I would opt to use the following 
quotation from one of Scott’s later publications to summarize his thesis on the subject: “I argue that the 
twentieth century answer to the seventeenth century question, ‘How can one be certain?’ is that one cannot. 
In contemporary physics (Heisenberg) and mathematics (Godel) as well as in politics, sociology, and 
psychology, uncertainty cannot be obviated. In such a world rhetoric has a genuine role” (“Epistemic 
Rhetoric and Criticism: Where Barry Brummett Goes Wrong,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 76 (1990): 
300-303. For an introduction to the extensive literature on rhetoric and epistemology, see Barry Brummett, 
"A Eulogy for Epistemic Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech 76 (1990): 69-72; Richard A. Cherwitz, 
"Rhetoric as a Way of Knowing: An Attenuation of the Epistemological Claims of the New Rhetoric," 
Southern Speech Communication Journal 42 (1977): 207-219; Richard A. Cherwitz and James W. Hikins, 
"Toward a Rhetorical Epistemology," Southern Speech Communication Journal 47 (1982): 135-162; 
"Burying the Undertaker: A Eulogy for the Eulogists of Rhetorical Epistemology," Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 76 (1990): 73-77; James W. Hikins, "The Epistemological Relevance of Intrapersonal Rhetoric," 
Southern Speech Communication Journal 42 (1977): 220-227; Robert L. Scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as 
Epistemic: Ten Years Later," Central States Speech Journal 27 (1976): 258-266. 
266 Wander, 227. 
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both internal and external, contain an unavoidable rhetorical component. Internal here 
refers to those discursive practices that are internal to a specific scientific language 
community; external refers to the discursive practices of that scientific language 
community in respect to its dealing with other scientific (or nonscientific) communities 
and society in general.”267 Third, the labels “rhetoric of science” and “rhetoric of 
medicine” delineate a subfield of rhetorical scholarship, manifest in the literature that 
examines the scientific and medical establishment’s language practices and artifacts. 
Because my dissertation is an analysis of the rhetorical strategies that groups of 
experts employ to be persuasive, the labels’ second meaning is most relevant. “Rhetoric 
of science” and “rhetoric of medicine” designate the language produced by an expert 
community. Scientists and doctors are bound together by language practices that define 
their professional identity, both among themselves and to the outside world. Being fluent 
in this language marks an individual as a member of the expert community. It is 
interpreted as consistent with the community’s shared practices and values. Recall from 
the previous chapter that certain language practices similarly define a community of 
academic historians. The same is true for the community of scientists; their ability to 
follow certain linguistic habits is imperative to establishing membership. Fluency in 
“academese” or “scientese” is a way of participating in professional communities. 
The rhetoric of science and medicine thus has a sociological aspect. Scientists and 
medical professionals operate within expert communities that abide by certain implicit 
                                                 
267 Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, “The Idea of Rhetoric in the Rhetoric of Science,” Southern 
Communication Journal 58 (1993): 267. 
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rules. Kenneth Zagacki and William Keith offer scientific revolutions as an example of 
how the professional community conducts itself.268 They argue that “stages of scientific 
revolution are accompanied by particular rhetorical exigencies, which themselves give 
rise to rhetorical topoi that advance the process of scientific argument and change.”269 
The implication is that scientists make deliberate rhetorical decisions based on audience, 
message and situational constraints. “Scientific topoi are requisites of doing science, 
revealed in the communicative choices and the persuasive tactics employed by 
scientists.”270 Michael Overington similarly argues that rhetorical analysis of scientific 
knowledge production is warranted because it involves argumentation before an 
audience. He conceptualizes this knowledge production as “a way of speaking about 
specific experiences before a limited and specially trained audience that is authorized to 
establish that discourse as knowledge.”271 Zagacki’s and Keith’s scientific revolutions as 
well as the authorization of knowledge that Overington identifies illustrate the 
significance of a rhetoric of expertise. 
Another related way to approach the rhetoric of the scientific establishment is to 
examine methodology. As argued in previous chapters, a shared methodology is integral 
to a community of experts and its rhetoric. In the scientific community, universal 
adherence to methods of inquiry is imperative to “true findings.”272 Overington examines 
                                                 
268 Kenneth S. Zagacki and William Keith, “Rhetoric, Topoi, and Scientific Revolutions,” Philosophy and 
Rhetoric 25 (1992): 59-78. 
269 Zagacki and Keith, 59. 
270 Zagacki and Keith, 60. 
271 Overington, 144. 
272 William Keith and Kenneth Zagacki, “Rhetoric and Paradox in Scientific Revolutions,” Southern 
Communication Journal 57 (1992): 168. 
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the persuasive element in this process, and notes the inherent irony in an objective 
standard of truth that comes quite close to sensis communis, a testability by scientists’ 
collective agreement.273 McGuire and Melia analyze the scientific community’s habit of 
assent as a special nexus of author, text and reader.274 They argue that “faced with 
refutation, writers of scientific texts rarely argue that they have been misunderstood by 
their critics. Rather, the dispute is said to be not about meanings intrinsic to the text, but 
about how the text relates to extra-textual matters.”275 In sum, the internal rhetoric of the 
scientific community serves many functions—identification, social cohesion, and 
methodological consistency; all such functions are part of the scientific community’s 
rhetoric of expertise. 
Martha Solomon’s essay on the Tuskeegee Syphilis Project is an instructive 
example of these functions.276 Specifically, she examines how scientists produce an 
audience of peers. Solomon argues that the lack of criticism against a deeply inhumane 
study can be partly attributed to the genre of scientific writing. “The generic conventions 
of scientific writing not only encouraged neglect of ethical questions but also played an 
important role in the study’s continuation. […] Scientific writing employs rhetorical 
conventions which by their very nature tend to obscure or de-emphasize any ethical, 
‘non-scientific’ perspective.”277 In her pentadic analysis of the Tuskeegee reports, 
Solomon highlights how, when the patients are rhetorically constructed as an agency for 
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the purpose of scientific discovery, both the authors and readers are relieved of ethical 
responsibility. The rhetors and audience members are united in the scientific 
community’s rhetorical practices; these practices harbor powerful myths of progress and 
objective knowledge. 
While the internal rhetoric of the scientific and medical establishment is ripe for 
rhetorical criticism, the focus of my chapter is on the rhetorical relationship between 
medical experts and the general public.278 I am primarily concerned with the discourses 
that medical experts produce when they are speaking to a lay audience. This is indeed a 
hotly debated relationship, one that gets at the heart of my dissertation. Quite often, the 
most challenging form of argument in which an expert engages is that which refuses her 
expert vocabulary. When a doctor speaks to a patient, she must use different persuasive 
appeals than when speaking with a colleague.279 Identifying those appeals—specifically 
their construction of expertise—and contrasting them with alternative strategies is the 
purpose of my chapter. How, I ask, do psychiatrists and depressives get us to accept that 
                                                 
278 To this point, my discussion uses science and medicine if not interchangeably, as closely linked. They 
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Protocol in the Drug Development Process”; Barbara F. Sharf, “Physician-Patient Communication as 
Interpersonal Rhetoric: A Narrative Approach.”). Some analyses even emphasize the persuasive elements 
of those habits. For the most part, these works have a corrective orientation; their goal is to improve 
communication between patients and health care providers. My focus, instead, is on rhetorical tactics in 
conflict. 
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their interpretation of a particular condition, combined with their experience of dealing 
with it, render them medical experts?  
Analysis: Biomedical Psychiatrist 
The popular notion of a medical doctor is relatively modern; not until the 
Industrial Revolution did the white coat-wearing, stethoscope-wielding physician appear. 
At that time of technological advancement and professional specialization, “health care 
was transformed into a highly scientific endeavor requiring expert intervention.”280 
Today, biomedicine is a scientific enterprise. Unlike traditional and homeopathic 
methods, it “considers biological entities more or less as equal to the sum of their 
anatomic parts (a view opposite to holism) and endeavors to elucidate molecular, 
physiological, and pathological mechanisms believed to form the basis of biological 
processes.”281 In terms of therapeutic practices, “biomedicine generally places an 
emphasis on interventions that treat biological pathologies as opposed to preventing 
illness or creating the conditions of health.”282 As the psychiatrist whom I analyze in this 
chapter says, biomedical allopathy is “a system of medicine that relies on proven 
remedies for treatment.”283 
Psychiatrists are physicians who, in addition to medical school and residency, 
have four years of specialized training in psychiatry. They are certified to diagnose and 
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his definition. Specifically, I highlight how persuasive it is to ground one’s expert practice in something 
that enjoys as much cultural capital as scientifically “proven” knowledge. 
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treat mental illness, including the use of prescribed medication. In this section, I explore 
how one psychiatrist, Dr. Raymond DePaulo, uses a variety of persuasive strategies to 
construct medical expertise. In my treatment of his book Understanding Depression, I 
focus especially on the dialectics between science and medicine, DePaulo’s manipulation 
of academic writing, and his “intimate” rhetorical style. These rhetorical tactics, I argue, 
portray DePaulo as an able and extensively experienced expert with the public’s interest 
in mind.   
The most common strategy in DePaulo’s rhetoric is the balance he strikes 
between science and medicine. More than a balance, it is a rhetorically sensitive 
oscillation: DePaulo’s major tactic is to demonstrate that his medical expertise integrates 
both scientific theory and clinical practice. The very format of his book illustrates this. 
For example, Part Two is entirely dedicated to popular science. It is a lesson—complete 
with classic textbook graphics—in genetics and hormonal brain functions. It also 
introduces what DePaulo calls the “four sciences of depression”: epidemiology, genetics, 
neuropharmacology, and brain imaging. Part Three subsequently is about different types 
of treatment. In a guidebook format, these chapters gently walk the reader through the 
basics of a hospital visit, explaining the process of rehabilitation and recovery. Further 
securing the connection between medicine and science—notably chemistry—Part Three 
also includes a whole chapter on antidepressant drugs. So, while one section of the book 
anchors the process of understanding depression in science, another reinforces the 
message that science must lead to medical care. 
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Science and Medicine 
DePaulo negotiates a dialectic between science and medicine on two levels: social 
and personal. On a social level, he treats science and medicine as co-dependent 
institutions. He paints a compelling picture of the relationship between the scientific 
establishment writ large and a professional community of medical practitioners. Within 
this image are a variety of available tropes that DePaulo uses to his advantage. This 
facilitates constructing psychiatry as expertise. A very common scientific trope is 
progress, or gradual and continuous exploration covering more and more uncharted 
territory to serve humankind. DePaulo enthusiastically notes, “We’re poised on the brink 
of some remarkable discoveries about depressive illness. That’s because of the genetic 
technology and advanced brain imaging techniques that will allow us to understand brain 
structure and function in ways we could only dream about even in the late eighties, when 
many of these innovations still didn’t exist.”284 Science, according to DePaulo, “unravels 
the secrets of depressive illness.”285 By using phrases like “the brain is still largely 
unexplored territory [and] our most important and mysterious organ,” he affirms its 
importance.286 DePaulo secures the relationship between scientific discovery and 
advancements in the clinical treatment of depression. 
In rhetorically manipulating this relationship between the institutions of science 
and medicine, DePaulo is able to present psychiatry as a scientific—read: superior—form 
of medical expertise. He offers science as an answer to those things that puzzle clinicians 
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as well as laypersons. For example, DePaulo frequently comments on how confusing 
depression can be. He writes, “It’s difficult for many depressed patients to give an 
account of their illness when they are depressed. […] The confusion of the illness affects 
their ability to see things as they are. […] One of the most disabling aspects of depression 
is that often you don’t know that you have it.”287 This ambiguity is a perfect space for 
expertise to flourish. Whenever a layperson—even someone who experiences an illness 
first-hand—is unable to understand it, the medical expert’s role is highly significant. The 
implicit argument is that depression is fraught with uncertainty, and that the answer is 
more science. “We are closing in on what happens in our brains to cause depressive and 
bipolar disorders. The sequencing of the human genome, achieved in 2000 and 2001, is 
certain to provide us with new approaches to finding the genes responsible for 
depression.”288 Note the trajectory in DePaulo’s forecast. Science has come far but much 
remains unknown; because the illness is still confusing, more science (e.g. genetic 
research) is needed.  
DePaulo also highlights another principal trope in the rhetoric of science, viz., 
systematic epistemology and methodology.  As mentioned earlier, adherence to method is 
what the scientific community claims as requisite for reliable, replicable and predictive 
results. DePaulo draws on this collective value when he comments on a psychiatric 
classification system. DePaulo writes, “A good classification system offers a framework 
in which to evaluate and treat these differences. A system not only offers a simple and 
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powerful way to approach the treatment of patients, but serves as a guide for research as 
well.”289 The classification system that he discusses specifically is the DSM, the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, which categorizes depression in different ways. “The 
DSM III in 1980 was an important step forward in that it provided a mechanism for 
making reliable or reproducible diagnoses for clinicians and researchers who would 
attempt to make good the assumption of a brain disease underlying severe disorders of 
mental function.”290 In this excerpt, DePaulo makes a powerfully persuasive appeal to 
expertise. Not only does psychiatry have a system for knowing and practicing—for 
epistemology and methodology—but the system is the product of science!  
It is important to note how DePaulo uses the word “expert” in his book. Indeed, 
he is one of the few rhetors in my dissertation who uses the term explicitly. When 
analyzing the other experts, I must typically reconstruct their understandings of what an 
expert is. DePaulo, by contrast, applies the term directly, always and only to scientists 
and psychiatrists: “My message to all readers is that you should know what the experts 
know and you should know what we don’t know about causes, precipitants, and 
treatments for depression and manic depression.”291 He continues, “Trying to determine 
exactly where the lines should be drawn between mania and mixed mania is probably 
impossible even for expert diagnosticians.”292 This strategy permeates the text: “Some 
experts have argued that, when you come right down to it, all antidepressants are 
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basically the same.”293 Later he writes, “Some psychiatrists refer to themselves as 
psychopharmacologists, a term meant to indicate their expertise in the use of 
psychotropic medications.”294 According to DePaulo, a medical expert is a scientist. This 
equation of roles is central to his rhetorical strategy. 
Establishing this dialectic between science and medicine on a social level 
supports DePaulo’s rhetoric of expertise in several ways. I mentioned above that 
medicine highlights its relationship to biochemistry, physiology, etc., because doing so 
“taps” the status that natural sciences enjoy in Western culture. At the same time, there is 
a rhetorical pay-off for science. When science is portrayed as the answer to depressives’ 
prayers, it means hope. Science becomes the hero for both clinical practice and patients 
with depression. “For some patients, just knowing that serious research in the causes of 
these conditions is being pursued offers reason for hope.”295 This sense of hope is a 
powerful justification for DePaulo’s expertise. When he connects psychiatry to science’s 
slow-but-steady mastery of a mysterious illness, it makes psychiatry seem noble. Such 
nobility is tantamount to an ethos-based appeal. By demonstrating that science serves the 
public’s interests, DePaulo offers proof of eunoia, concern with the greater good, on 
behalf of the scientific establishment.  
The importance of expert ethos moves my analysis to the second level where 
DePaulo balances science and medicine. On a personal level, he demonstrates the 
inextricability of being a scientist and being a doctor. For example, the book is filled with 
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proofs of DePaulo’s expert clinical experience—his “view from the trenches.”296 In fact, 
that is how he frames the book’s purpose in the introduction: “This book presents my 
experience—as a psychiatrist who has seen in consultation, teaching, research, and 
treatment settings some 8,000 people—with clinical depression and manic-depressive 
illness.”297 The text repeatedly returns to the impact that clinical work has had on 
DePaulo’s understanding of depression: “From the doctor’s point of view, eating 
disorders—or smoking or alcohol or drug dependence—are distinguished from disease 
states.”298 Further, when describing a laboratory research study at Columbia University, 
he writes himself, a clinician, into the story “at the other end of the telescope in a clinic 
specializing in depression and manic depression.”299 Note the implication of expert 
collegiality, the idea that the scientists at Columbia and the specialist clinicians work at 
opposite ends of the same enterprise.300 
The point for DePaulo is to emphasize the value of his own practical wisdom in 
conjunction with theoretical knowledge. Just as that balance operates on a social level 
between the institutions of science and medicine, it also enhances his self-portrait as an 
expert. Many of his personal anecdotes illustrate this: “When I was a first-year medical 
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student I also had the impression that ECT [electro-convulsive therapy] was outmoded 
and harmful, until one of my professors introduced me to a patient who was getting ECT. 
I witnessed firsthand the transformation of the patient from a hopeless individual back to 
a relaxed caring person.”301 DePaulo states in another section that psychiatrists “can also 
miss making a correct diagnosis if we rely too much on a textbook description of mania 
or even the most typical type of depression.”302 In these excerpts, we learn that clinical 
experience is as integral to medical expertise as “textbook” learning. As explained in 
previous chapters, practical wisdom, or phronesis, is a prerequisite for an expert’s ethos. 
Should DePaulo overemphasize one side of the dialectic, he would not be as persuasive. 
For this reason, both are constantly present in his discourse: “I can’t emphasize how 
powerful dependence is, or how enduring its impact. And this isn’t an observation that 
comes out of my experience with patients alone. Research in the labs has established 
what happens in the brain when dependence takes hold.”303 Experience with patients and 
laboratory research are continually coupled. DePaulo cannot be without either the 
scientist or the clinician part of his expert identity, lest he lose favor with the audience. 
In light of his book’s lay audience, it is significant that DePaulo puts clinical 
experience on par with scientific knowledge. Consider how different his treatment of this 
balance would likely be in a peer reviewed publication. It is plausible that he would 
weigh the two differently, both on the social and personal levels. In contrast, when citing 
his credentials before a lay audience, DePaulo distances himself from the image of a 
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“cold” scientist by balancing it with the ethos of a “warm” doctor. This becomes a 
demonstration that he cares about his patients; it is his rhetorical performance of 
concern.304 The reader is invited to identify with the numerous patient stories that 
DePaulo includes.305 So, while the conventionally academic stance of science may be 
objectivity and detachment, DePaulo’s ethos also comprises “compassion, pragmatism, 
subtlety, and an obvious affection and respect for the many thousands of patients he has 
so effectively treated.”306 Thus an alternative set of attributes, or tropes, construct 
DePaulo’s expert identity.   
The Academic Standard 
Even though Understanding Depression is designed for a popular audience, and 
many of its characteristics may be attributed to that purpose, it is important to recognize 
the subtle ways in which the book retains an academic format. Doing so allows DePaulo 
to speak to the general public while still marking himself as an academic author—again, 
a scientist. He demarcates fellow experts from what essentially amounts to constituents or 
patients. Put another way, to an academic reader DePaulo’s scholarly writing habits are 
like a secret handshake inviting identification. The habits suggest that, because author 
and reader speak the same “language,” they are (expert) colleagues. At the same time, 
constituents are those who simply recognize the academic form as different and special, 
and locate its user in a different and special category. They are the lay audience. In both 
cases, a particular writing format is a strategy for constructing expertise.  
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One of the elementary habits of scholarship is to argue by definition. This 
includes not only defining terminology but also establishing categories and noting 
differential characteristics. For example, “Depression and manic depression are diseases, 
not behaviors.”307 DePaulo continues, “We define a delusion as a fixed false, 
idiosyncratic idea, or judgment, that is almost always so self-absorbing that it doesn’t 
leave much room in the mind for anything else.”308 He explains, “Severe anxiety can be 
seen as a manifestation of depression. But I don’t mean to suggest that all people with 
anxiety have depression. Anxiety disorders can also affect patients who have never had a 
clinical depression.”309 As illustrated in these examples, arguments by definition are 
germane to the genre of academic writing. More specifically, they belong to academic 
experts like professors of psychiatry. They are pedagogical in tone, which is to say that 
DePaulo shapes the expert-layperson relationship between himself and the reader; he is 
the one defining the terms. 
Moreover, an argument by definition is a very persuasive way to stake out 
expertise. It distinguishes what is within the purview of a particular expert from what is 
not. DePaulo notes that a “painful experience is not a clinical depression. Bereavement is 
normal and it serves as a catharsis; death brings people together in mourning but also in 
love.”310 In this and other similar excerpts, DePaulo in effect determines that depression 
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is not “normal” or “natural.”311 Inherent in this negative definition—the classification of 
what depression is not—DePaulo “medicalizes” the condition, thus locating it within his 
domain of expertise.312  
Closely related to arguments by definition is the use of dialectics. As explained in 
the chapter on historical expertise, dialectics is one of the most distinguishing features of 
academic writing. It is profoundly persuasive as an expert rhetorical strategy because it 
performs systematicity in an elegant and parsimonious way. Consider the following 
statements by DePaulo: “Just as a descending sense of self-worth and self-confidence is 
the central experience of the depressed state, an ascending or inflated sense of self is the 
crux of the manic state.”313 “Treatment can be pursued on two levels, tactical and 
strategic. On a tactical level, I’m talking about the basics of care. […] By strategic I mean 
that the treatment of a patient requires an overall game plan.”314 He additionally identifies 
“two different levels of diagnosis in medicine: the clinical level, and the level of cause (of 
symptoms) or, as it’s known in the medical profession, the level of etiology.”315 These 
brief excerpts demonstrate that even the most complex subject such as depression is 
manageable when broken down at its natural joints, and examined from several angles. 
Once a topic has been subdivided, the dialectician defines the two parts against each 
other.  
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Another academic standard that DePaulo’s work illustrates is the practice of 
contextualization. It is important for an expert to situate his subject matter historically 
and culturally. DePaulo repeatedly takes the reader on historical excursions noting 
influential scientists, major discoveries and different treatment methods for depression.316 
He also contextualizes his expertise in social epidemiology, analyzing the general 
statistics of depression in the United States. DePaulo writes, “In Western countries, males 
are two to four times more likely than females to commit suicide. More women make 
parasuicidal attempts than men, and they tend to be younger (18-30) and come from 
somewhat lower than average socioeconomic backgrounds.”317 Continuing this 
contextualizing of his expertise, DePaulo discusses the statistical differences between 
males and females, different ages, and different socioeconomic groups.318 
This contextualization is a persuasive strategy in the rhetoric of expertise for 
several reasons. It demonstrates that the expert has a kind of “across-the-top” vision; he is 
able to reflect on his expertise with a sense of perspective. He knows where his work fits 
in the general scheme of things. For instance, DePaulo’s portrayal of historical scientists 
and doctors indicates that he considers himself one of their direct heirs. He takes over 
where they left off. Some of DePaulo’s external circumstances differ from Freud’s, but 
their overall objectives cohere, viz., to improve mental health. Contextualizing an area of 
expertise also lends it a certain exigency. The intricate links between psychiatry and 
important social dimensions like age and gender are a way of saying: my expertise is 
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connected to things that are so important that they—and by association I—must not be 
ignored. This argument, however implicit, creates a sense of urgency, a need for 
DePaulo’s expertise. 
The idea of an urgency or exigency for expertise is a key rhetorical tactic. I have 
noted it in previous chapters as well. Readers will recall from Chapter Three that 
academic historians create an exigency for their expertise by emphasizing crises in US 
foreign policy. In DePaulo’s case, generating exigency amounts to awareness raising. He 
claims that a disease as costly and debilitating as depression must be taken seriously by 
employers and policy makers. The condition effects everyone, yet not enough is “being 
done.”319 DePaulo notes, “We know that depression on the job exacts an enormous toll in 
lost productivity. The direct cost of depression to the United States in terms of lost time 
at work is estimated at 172 million days yearly.”320 He argues that “If we are to do this, 
though, the country will need to make a sizable investment, not only in money but also in 
talent. We would like to recruit our brightest young medical professionals and scientists 
to participate in the effort, but this can only happen if they have sufficient incentive.”321 
These claims connect depression to two concepts of major importance in American 
society: money and science. DePaulo calls our attention to the deleterious consequences 
of disregarding his expertise. His argument establishes a need for experts, and announces 
what must be done to support their work.  
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The Intimate Style: A Doctor-Patient Conversation 
Somewhat in opposition to his adherence to the academic format is DePaulo’s 
style or tone. The book is quite obviously designed for a popular audience; its style 
represents a clear departure from the writing that a psychiatrist would typically produce, 
such as a journal article or a conference paper. In his book, DePaulo speaks to the reader 
in a soft and compassionate voice. He is remarkably humble in his concessions of what 
remains unknown to psychiatry: “We are all in the dark about the fundamental brain and 
genetic mechanisms underlying these conditions. And to be honest, we have very little 
knowledge about how our treatments for depression work even though we’ve found that 
they are usually quite effective.”322 He continues, “Even we doctors and therapists are not 
able just to sit and listen to patients repeatedly threaten suicide forever. We, too, become 
fearful of losing the patient whom we care about and we also feel we are failing and will 
be blamed if the patient ever follows through on the threat.”323 In these concessions 
DePaulo confides in his readers. He admits to a professional weakness in a way that 
could potentially threaten his expert status. But, because the confiding gesture serves a 
rhetorical purpose, DePaulo includes it.  
That purpose might best be characterized as a stylistic parallel between DePaulo’s 
doctor-patient relationships and his author-reader relationships. This style changes the 
nature of the book’s otherwise academic tone. In doctor-patient relationships, mutual 
identification and trust are imperative. A doctor cannot work without a patient’s 
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compliance. Considering this dynamic, we discover a rhetorical strategy in DePaulo’s use 
of an intimate and personal style. It buttresses his claim to medical expertise as a 
clinician. For example, he frequently addresses the reader directly as “you”: “Maybe 
you’re familiar with chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) because of all the attention it has 
received in the media in the last several years.”324 “If you’re like most people you 
probably remember your adolescence as an exciting but possibly tumultuous and 
sometimes painful period.”325 Further, “When a loved one or a friend tells you that he or 
she is thinking of suicide, what are you supposed to do? How do you respond? If you’re 
like most people, you’d say, ‘Okay, let’s go get some help.’”326 DePaulo speaks to his 
reader as he would with a patient. To recognize the significance and purpose of this 
conversational trope, consider how starkly it contrasts with other formats. The norm in 
scientific writing is to bury not only the addressee, but the author as well, using the 
passive voice.  
DePaulo integrates into his doctor-patient dialogue a gentle pedagogy. He 
educates the reader about different theories and concepts, in a sense introducing us to 
“science 101”: “Typically, you inherit one copy of each gene from your mother, and one 
from your father. Your parents’ copies come from your maternal or paternal 
grandparents. Thus, there are four copies of the genes that you can inherit.”327 DePaulo 
explains, “Two differing explanations have been proposed to account for [the association 
between socioeconomic deprivation and overall rates of depression]. One is the social 
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causation theory and the other is the social drift theory.”328 This level of instruction 
recurs throughout the book: “I use the word stress in both the layperson’s and the medical 
sense of the word. If I refer to the stress response, I mean the body’s physical and 
behavioral response to the event. If, on the other hand, I talk to a patient about a stressful 
event, then I am referring to an even or circumstance that he or she finds very 
upsetting.”329 DePaulo’s pedagogy is reminiscent of a doctor explaining to his patient the 
prognosis and treatment. The line between patient and reader is blurred. 
The style of a doctor-patient relationship recurs in DePaulo’s writing when he 
addresses personal responsibility. It then becomes an argument for deference to his 
expertise. Consider the following disclaimer: “I can prescribe drugs prudently, I can 
assess how they are working, and I can give them in adequate doses for the right amount 
of time. I can make myself readily available to patients and provide them with supportive 
and even protective care […]. But I can’t make the patient take the medicines correctly, 
or make the patient magically stop destructive behavior unless he or she is ready to work 
at it, too.”330 What DePaulo argues, in other words, is that, in order for him to exercise his 
expertise, requires full compliance. Patients are obliged to defer to his wisdom and 
experience. DePaulo even provides several cautionary tales about those patients who fail 
to comply: “One of my patients—a very bright school teacher—insisted that she wouldn’t 
take any substance as unnatural as lithium, but unfortunately she had no compunction 
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about doing cocaine because, as she said, it came from the ground.”331 DePaulo 
continues, “Another young woman regularly indulged in cocaine and took excessive 
amounts of Xanax and Valium as well, but told me that she wouldn’t touch anti-
depressants because she felt she could work her emotional problems out on her own.”332 
Note the palatable condescension in these accounts, signaling the expert’s shaming 
stance; patients who do not follow doctors’ orders deserve what they get. The first 
woman was ignorant, the second emotionally deluded. 
DePaulo finally implores, “You also need to accept the doctor’s traditional, 
pastoral caring role, at least partially, and view us as modern competent practitioners in 
treating a diseased body or body part.”333 Deference, in short, is the major thrust of 
DePaulo’s rhetoric of expertise. The take-home lesson is that understanding and curing 
depression is the business of experts. What his patients and readers of his book need 
above all else is medical expertise. What society needs is science. In the next section, I 
examine how those who suffer from depression respond to this argument. As I shall 
demonstrate, their descriptions and stories reveal a much different rhetoric of medical 
expertise. 
Analysis: Depressives 
All human beings are and have physical bodies. For most of us, those bodies at 
one point or another malfunction. It is during those times that we realize how little we 
know about the physiological processes that normally are taken for granted. I know that 
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my body can run for about forty-five minutes in a hilly terrain before it is exhausted, 
sweaty, and winded. But I do not know the chemical reactions that turn a bowl of 
spaghetti into “running energy” or how heavy breathing transports oxygen to my blood. 
In the same way, I do not know what has gone wrong when my bad knee gives out. I 
know how painful it feels but I cannot explain technically the nature of the damage. 
While it is true that my doctor can explain the nature of my injury, she could 
never know precisely how I experience it. This difference is the core of conflicting 
medical expertise. To understand it, one could pursue an analysis of epistemological 
foundations. Physicians’ epistemology is different than the first-person epistemology of 
bodily experience. My dissertation, however, is about rhetorical strategies. Therefore, my 
objective is to trace how doctors and patients respectively formulate their experiences as 
claims to expertise. I am interested not in what they say about a particular illness, such as 
depression, but rather how their arguments construct medical expertise. This section 
analyzes the depressives’ essays, focusing on how they situate their illness relative to 
everyday life, the use of narrative form and metaphorical description, and the rhetorical 
significance of an embodied epistemology.  
The patients I analyze all suffer from depression. Some were struck by it 
seemingly “out of nowhere” in the middle of an otherwise contented life. Others have 
waged life-long battles. One became clinically depressed as a result of heart surgery. By 
virtue of personal, intimate, sometimes traumatic experiences, these individuals are 
experts on depression. More importantly, they construct a rhetoric of expertise that both 
relies on and sustains their experience. On this premise hinges my analysis’ juxtaposition 
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of different medical experts. To put it in perspective, the depressives’ experiential 
rhetoric of expertise is comparable to the rhetorical strategies used by the 9/11 witnesses 
in Chapter Three. Both the depressives and witnesses construct their claim to expertise 
around bodily experience. Both are experts because they know what an experience feels 
like. Witnesses smelled and heard the 9/11 events in a way that makes their persuasive 
strategies entirely different from academic historians’. In the present chapter on 
depression, the comparison is between the rhetoric of personal experience and that of 
medical training (and therapeutic experience). It is once again important to point out that 
depressives understand what the public defines as a medical expertise. To my knowledge, 
they do not call themselves “experiential psychiatrists.” To them, as to most of us, 
doctors hold a monopoly on the category of medical expertise. They are the ones with 
accreditation and a set of professional guidelines. What they lack is that ambiguous claim 
to “having been there.” Personal, embodied experience, which carries a lot of cultural 
credence, is not a warrant for doctors since they have not experienced depression; it is not 
an available means of persuasion in their rhetoric of expertise. 
Family and Daily Life 
Unholy Ghost, the book that I use to represent an alternative to the medical 
establishment’s rhetoric of expertise, includes essays by both depressives and close 
family members. This editorial decision clearly marks the place where the authors locate 
depression, viz., in ordinary life. Even though I have chosen to focus on those writers 
who personally suffer from depression, the diversity of perspectives is important to note. 
The first thing that the reader learns about depression is not neurophysiology or 
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pharmacology but the impact that depression has on day-to-day experiences. As one 
author writes, “The shadows of nightfall seemed more somber, my mornings were less 
buoyant, walks in the woods became less zestful, and there was a moment during my 
working hours in the late afternoon when a kind of panic and anxiety overtook me.”334 
Another echoes this sentiment, “I felt like a guest in someone else’s falling-apart life—
unanswered phone calls, unopened mail, rotting fruit on top of the refrigerator, and 
something unidentifiable and reeking inside, piles of dirty dishes, tumbleweeds of dust, 
books I didn’t remember reading, furniture I couldn’t remember buying, pictures of 
friends and family that seemed to belong to a stranger.”335 Depression, from this 
perspective, is more about living than it is about illness or treatment. 
The reason why locating depression in daily life serves the depressives’ rhetoric 
of expertise is its powerful invitation to identify. Everyone can identify with unopened 
mail and dirty dishes; the groundwork for persuasion is laid simply because the reader 
connects to the author’s mundane experience. Moreover, private life is something that an 
ordinary person can master to a point of being an expert; it does not require special 
training. Every individual presumably “knows” herself. There is a level of unquestionable 
authority when a person speaks about her personal life. The reader recognizes herself in 
the depressives’ depictions and grants them a certain credibility.  
Family is an affect-oriented trope with which the depressives make their 
argument. Maud Casey, for instance, appends her own story with excerpts from the diary 
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that her mother kept during her daughter’s most depressed periods. Casey says, “I am 
doing research, trying to find out what the experience of my depression was like for other 
people.”336 Another essayist explains, “Unless you are rich, and can convalesce in a 
sanatorium estate (where visitors come down a tired, oceanside lawn to find you at your 
easel), you have to keep going when you’re depressed. That means phone calls, 
appointments, errands, holidays, family, friends, and colleagues.”337 As a trope, family is 
strongly enthymematic. The reader knows on an emotional level what neglecting family 
obligations entails. This creates a persuasive connection between rhetor and audience—
persuasive precisely because it operates implicitly.  
We might ask what the differences are between the depressives’ use of family as a 
rhetorical strategy and DePaulo’s case narratives. After all, he too discusses how families 
are affected and how they should cope. What separates the two strategies is the difference 
between a hypothetical and a flesh-and-blood testimony. The essayists offer their intimate 
accounts of depression as a gesture. It is a great risk to share details that make one 
vulnerable. However, the reward for taking that risk is the persuasive power it brings. 
DePaulo’s pedagogical examples, even when he names them and assures the reader of his 
extensive therapeutic experience, are case studies. They remain clinical and intangible, 
their pain beyond the reader’s empathy. By contrast, Casey describes her vision of herself 
and her sister in a way that refuses detachment, revealing her visceral self-contempt: “She 
was my fairy-princess and my tentacles slithered out of their alien pod, wrapping 
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themselves around her.”338 With the kind of risk it entails to reveal this personal imagery, 
we are more likely to believe her. The persuasiveness of her story generates a kind of 
expertise that is fundamentally contingent on personal testimony. Because she produces 
such a testimony in the essay, she becomes rhetorically an expert in the experience of 
pain.  
Narrative Form 
The way that writers situate their depression in the middle of an ordinary life is 
inseparable from their heavy use of narrative form. Almost all the authors offer their life 
experiences as a story, complete with main characters like mothers, spouses, psychiatrists 
and close friends. The depressives allow the reader to consider illness in a chronological 
sequence. Sometimes, this chronology is rather explicit. One author incorporates dated 
diary entries during her pregnancy.339 At other times, the influence of time is more subtle. 
One women writes, “There are times when I feel like I’ve known depression longer than 
I’ve known myself. […] I’ve always been aware that something in my life was not quite 
right, if not totally wrong. My scales were never balanced.”340 Another woman recounts 
her childhood tendencies toward depression: “When my father’s twenty-seven-year-old 
godson shot himself, it had seemed to me like the mysterious act of a grown-up who had 
seen things that I, at the age of eleven, hadn’t. But even then I knew those mysterious 
things might be waiting for me, and when I was two years older than he would ever be, I 
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could understand the general impulse.”341 A third woman describes the moment when she 
realized that depression had periodically shaped her past: “Without knowing it exactly, I 
had felt this way before. Sitting on the steps of the concrete shower/bathroom unit at 
Camp Coniston when I was chubby and eight […]. It came back: at sixteen, after my first 
breakup, outside a high-school dance, when the lacrosse captain Carl told me he had slept 
with someone on his summer abroad. […] I sank again during my sophomore year in 
college and called [my mother] during the long weekends spent entirely in my room.”342 
These excerpts reflect a narrative trajectory, a sense that depression progresses 
throughout a lifetime.  
Persuasive narratives are strategically punctuated by significant episodes. So is 
the case with depressives’ stories. Many of them incorporate major incidents that shaped 
both subsequent events and the experience of depression itself. One author notes, “I date 
the beginning of what I would later understand to be major depression to Tessa’s 
marriage and the being dumped by the architect, but I do it the way you locate the spirit 
of a decade in some vivid, attention-focusing event Woodstock, say, or Watergate.”343 
Others speak more agnostically about discovering past depressions. Styron’s essay 
searches for an “initial triggering mechanism” like his withdrawal from alcohol, his 
sixtieth birthday, or dissatisfaction with his writing productivity.344 Alvarez dramatically 
narrates his suicide attempt over a Christmas holiday; he notes the daily events that took 
place between the time he swallowed sleeping pills and a disastrous New Years Eve 
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party.345 Virtually every one of the writers has a “path of depression” story, dotted at 
irregular intervals by important landmarks. 
The fact that personal experiences lend themselves to narrative form may seem so 
natural as to make commentary awkward. What is worth analyzing, however, are the 
specific characteristics of that form. How do theories of narrative discourse inform my 
inquiry on medical expertise? Specifically, what features of narrative are important to the 
rhetorical strategies of expertise? Since these questions could easily inaugurate a different 
research project, let me speak briefly about two such features: sensemaking and 
identification. Both are integral to narrative and likewise integral to the rhetoric of 
expertise. 
As Walter Fisher theorizes, symbols communicated as stories give order to human 
experience.346 His narrative paradigm suggests not only that human beings inherently are 
storytellers but that activities which are typically attributed to rational argument exist in 
aesthetic communication as well. Stories, in short, are sensemaking devices. They 
facilitate understanding, relating a “truth” about the human condition.347 Many instructive 
examples of this can be found in the depressives’ essays. When they offer a story of their 
illness, or a particular triggering event, the authors search, however tentatively, for a 
satisfactory rationale. One woman suggests, “If depression came into my life attached to 
heartbreak, as one virus piggybacks another, it soon asserted its independence, bringing 
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conclusions to my mind that were captious, adamant, and dark.”348 This writer goes on to 
say that, “I wasn’t depressed at all. I had broken free, in fact, and was out from under 
some social tyranny. I was let loose into a liberty of desperate unhappiness, which was in 
fact glory” (Heffernan, 16). Another woman concludes, “Because I am mentally ill, I’ve 
decided it’s essential hat I get an abortion. Can a mentally ill woman be a good mother? 
It’s such a sane question; I’d like to take a poll.”349 A third woman poses a series of 
questions attempting to make sense of her depression: “Did depression find me because 
of my stepfather’s touch? Did depression rush to fill the shocked space left when he 
withdrew his touch? Or was depression a consequence of my essential chemical 
constitution? Or did events themselves create the chemistry? I don’t know.”350 The 
depressives’ narratives reach for acceptable reasons; their authors seem to test different 
rationales—perhaps by speaking them aloud—that might invest otherwise senseless 
suffering with a purpose.  
This narrative sensemaking is a part of the depressives’ rhetoric of expertise. It is 
a demonstration of how a person understands and masters her experiences. In other 
words, it is a means of proof in the rhetoric of expertise. At the same time, as Fisher 
explains, the narrative paradigm equalizes experts and laypersons by positing them as 
discursive partners.351 Lay audience members are not mere observers; they are active 
participants in the meaning-making function of a story. So, while depressives build their 
expert status by narrating a personal experience and by making sense of it, they also 
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invite the lay audience—the readers—to identify. Identification between rhetor and 
audience is key to narrative.352 It is possible to identify with a story and its main 
characters in an entirely different way than with a formal argument. Imagine how 
awkward it would be to attempt “consubstantiality” with a case study in a psychiatric 
journal.353 Personal experiences are radically different from statistical analyses. Because 
the readers of Unholy Ghost have personal experiences of ordinary life, we can identify 
with the depressives’ trauma, even when we cannot identify with the experience of 
depression itself. We can imagine a rupture of normalcy because we understand 
normalcy. Because we identify at least partially with the experience of depressives, we 
find them persuasive. Because we find the narration of their experience persuasive, we 
grant them expertise—an experience-based kind of expertise rather than a professional 
kind. 
Metaphorical Description 
One of the most noticeable things about the depressives’ essays is their reliance 
on description. They do not argue the validity of their perspectives by providing warrants 
or data. They simply state the nature of their experiences, almost in a presumptuous 
manner. This, of course, is a strategy for claiming expertise of the experience. These 
descriptions are matter-of-fact and almost always metaphorical. Depression is a 
“flickering basement light,” a “game of telephone” in which “the message gets lost as it 
travels, eventually affecting cellular metabolism, hormone balance, and the circadian 
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system, the clock that determines cycles of rest and activity.”354 Depression is “a place 
that teems with nightmarish activity. It’s a one-industry town, a psychic megalopolis 
devoted to a single twenty-four-hour-we-never-close product.”355 Depression is 
“deadness […] but also a hyperawareness, a needle on the floor, shining like the highest 
wheedling note of a violin; a person’s face all funny, in separate pieces, the isolated 
mouth moving, the blink of en eye excruciating, the silky crash of lashes.”356 
Metaphorical description here functions as a kind of narrative “argument” by definition. 
It establishes definitions for an alternative theory of illness. 
Similarly, the authors metaphorically describe the transformation they underwent 
while ill. One states, “I was in a last-straw zone. On that day, I shipped way out, leaving 
the secular shores of sanity behind me.”357 Another contrasts two versions of himself: 
“From being a living person with a distinct personality I began to feel more or less like an 
outline of that person—and then even the outline began to fade, erased by what had 
happened inside. I felt as if I was vanishing—or more accurately, had vanished.”358 He 
explains, “I felt spectral—the personality that had been mine for fifty-five years was 
simply no longer there—or it there, it was fragmented, it was dust particles swirling 
around, only occasionally and briefly cohering.”359 One woman observes, “My heart 
pumped dread. It was an actual substance I could feel coursing through my 
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bloodstream—some days a barely-there awareness, other days a carbonated liquid that 
seemed to have replaced my blood.”360 Note that the woman whose heart “pumped 
dread” does not provide any justification or warrant for the claim. From an argumentation 
perspective, she does not substantiate it. What, then, is the virtue of a metaphorical 
description in the rhetoric of expertise? 
To begin, metaphors are linguistic devices that rely on the contagion of meaning. 
They transpose meanings from one object or experience to another order of objects or 
experiences. Saying that depression is a flickering basement light—as in the example 
above—transposes meaning from the reader’s/hearer’s experience with flickering 
basement lights onto depression. Readers apophantically understand the “tenor,” 
depression, by way of the “vehicle,” the basement light.361 Contrary to classical theories 
of figurative language, metaphors are far more than ornamentation; they are integral to 
linguistic and cognitive processes.  
 The authors of Unholy Ghost use metaphors strategically to explicate the 
experience of depression. As part of the rhetoric of their expertise, they describe what the 
illness feels like, what the body goes through in a depressive state. Much has been written 
about the relationship between bodily experiences and metaphor.362 To summarize, 
consider two different directions for the relationship. In one, bodily experiences give rise 
to metaphors. In the other, metaphors structure the ways in which we experience the 
world. For example, human beings are thoroughly familiar with the bodily experience of 
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physical containment. “We are intimately aware of our bodies as three-dimensional 
containers into which we put certain things (food, water, air) and out of which other 
things emerge (food and water wastes, air, blood, etc.).”363 This embodied knowledge 
produces a series of containment metaphors. Conversely, a language that continually 
references the body as a container, likely causes its users to experience the body that way. 
These two directions are not necessarily mutually exclusive; the reality is probably a 
combination or cycle of meaning and experience. 
There is also a third possibility in the depressives’ use of metaphor as a rhetorical 
strategy, viz., a theorizing function. Metaphors not only structure the way we experience 
something but the way we interpret it. In other words, while the writers’ metaphors do 
not generate an experience of depression for the reader, they do generate a viable 
theoretical understanding of it. They enthymematically invite the reader to realize an 
experience through the use of a familiar vehicle. To further unpack metaphors’ theorizing 
function, consider what Anthony Paul calls I.A. Richards’ “indispensability thesis.”364 
According to Richards, the co-presence of the tenor and vehicle results in meanings that 
could not be attainable without their interaction.365 Metaphors, so understood, 
aesthetically communicate things that literal meaning—if such a thing is possible—
cannot. Depression, described metaphorically by those who experience it personally, can 
perhaps be theorized only in that form. This notion has profound implications for the 
rhetoric of expertise. It posits metaphor as an aesthetic resource for talking about a 
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subject that is uniquely ambiguous or incompletely theorized by science. Moreover, it 
foregrounds certain epistemological claims in the depressives’ rhetoric of expertise.  
Experiential Epistemology 
Part of their rhetoric of expertise are the essayists’ frequent references to bodily 
experience—something mentioned earlier in the chapter. For instance, bodily experiences 
are present in the depressives’ narratives of daily life and are subject to metaphorical 
description. In short, bodily experiences are the depressives’ ways of knowing, their 
expert epistemology. As one woman notes, “I’ve studied the properties of each drug in 
the laboratories of my mind and body, and have made some unsettling but ultimately 
consoling discoveries.”366 Another writer emphasizes the physical pain of depression: “I 
feel the pain. And pain exists in the present tense only. It has no past, it has no future, just 
a never-ending now—NOW—where is relief?”367 For both authors, bodily experience is 
an epistemological foundation. But, even more significant, referencing it is a powerful 
discursive strategy in the rhetoric of expertise. 
This trope is another rhetorical strategy that the depressives share with the 9/11 
survivors analyzed in Chapter Three. For the survivors, recounting a lived experience—
smelling the smoke inside the towers, hearing the roar of the jet engine, etc.—means 
claiming expertise. For depressives, lived experience is likewise a form of proof. What 
distinguishes the two groups of experts—one historical and one medical—is the potential 
for successful transmission. They have different approaches to the teaching of expertise. 
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9/11 survivors indicate that, while they cannot teach their process of knowing (such 
embodied knowledge of trauma exists only in primary form), they can and must teach its 
object. They have a duty to spread their unique perspective. They are experts teaching a 
particular and important lesson.  
Depressives, by contrast, seem not to believe that any part of their expertise can 
be taught. Without personal experience of depression, the condition is impossible to 
understand. One claims, “I say, ‘It’s back, depression’s a real mental illness you know,’ 
and he nods. He doesn’t know.”368 Another writes, “Over and over, I would say I was 
sick—sick with any documented ailment that came into my head, any ailment I could 
think of except ‘depression,’ which no one, no matter what the brochures with grainy 
girls’ pictures and the word ‘reuptake’ say, will ever believe is a real sickness.”369 Many 
indicate that words themselves fall short of conveying depression: “What words could I 
come up with to describe the bitterness I felt toward myself for my failings? Words were 
too small.”370 “To be depressed is not to have words to describe it, is not to have words at 
all, but to live in the gray world of the inarticulate, where nothing takes shape, nothing 
has edges or clarity.”371 Verbal expression is dismissed as inadequate: “Whatever I say 
sounds like a bad soap opera. I recount the five hospitalizations, the slow suck of 
depressions, the slashes on the arms, and none of that captures the experience. How can I 
explain it?”372 For these authors, the impossibility of sharing what they know may 
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possibly even compromise their expert status. If the experience of depression cannot be 
communicated, how likely is the reader to believe the “expert”? 
On the other hand, the incommunicability of experiencing depression is a 
challenge that the depressives extend to science. By suggesting that depression can only 
be known by those who experience it with their own bodies and minds, the depressives 
question the psychiatrists’ expertise. They implicitly accuse the medical establishment of 
missing the mark. One author states, “As for suicide: the sociologists and psychologists 
who talk of it as a disease puzzle me now as much as the Catholics and the Muslims who 
call it the most deadly of mortal sins.”373 Another echoes his concern with scientific 
terminology: “One of the many things I hate about the word ‘depression’ is the 
assumption of blankness attached to it, as if the experience of depression is as absent on 
the inside as it looks to be from the outside.”374 To these writers, truly understanding 
depression is beyond the scope of science. It is beyond scientific measures. Depressives 
incorporate this indictment of the medical establishment’s lack of expertise in their own 
claims to expertise. In the concluding section, I examine this and other major tensions in 
the rhetoric of medical expertise. 
Conclusions for the Rhetoric of Medical Expertise 
Expertise is rhetorically constructed and struggled over by those who compete 
with each other for affirmation and authority. It is about being persuasive. My 
dissertation examines the rhetorical strategies that different groups use in order to claim 
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expertise. Specifically, this chapter focused on the rhetorical construction of medical 
expertise. I compared two types of medical experts in the context of dealing with 
depression: a psychiatrist and a group of depressives. By analyzing how they frame 
expertise on the subject of depression, I identified several characteristic tactics. These 
tactics constitute two distinct rhetorics. In this final section, I highlight a few recurring 
themes, and comment on how they unite and divide the field of medical experts. 
First, both the depressives and the psychiatrist emphasize the importance of 
personal experience. This is a major strategy in both rhetorics of expertise. What 
distinguishes them is the source and nature of the experience. For essayists, medical 
expertise must be more than specialized training; it is not enough, they imply, to study 
depression in theory. It does not tell the whole story. Understanding depression, that is, 
being an expert on the subject, requires personal exposure. When depressives say 
personal experience, they mean the visceral, physically painful kind. Only someone who 
has known depression in and through her own body and mind fully comprehends it. 
Science and medicine as forms of expertise are helpful but incomplete.  
For Dr. DePaulo, personal experience is an equally powerful element in the 
rhetoric of expertise. It is what allows him to identify not only as a scientist, but as a 
clinician. As we learn several times in his book, DePaulo has extensive experience 
treating thousands of patients. He is an experienced psychiatrist. Experience is a more at 
arm’s length for him than for depressives, because he is in control. To understand the 
difference between the depressives notion of experience and Dr. DePaulo’s, let us take a 
lesson from basic English grammar. In an active clause, the subject is that which 
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performs the predicate; it is the doer of the verb. In the phrase “John suffers,” John is the 
subject of the predicate “to suffer.” In addition, some clauses take an object—dative or 
accusative depending on the language structure—that is affected by the predicate. For 
example, the phrase “Depression struck Lisa” posits Lisa as the object of the predicate 
“struck.” She is not the subject of the clause, nor in control of its action. What is the point 
of this grammatical detour? It illustrates the difference between DePaulo’s and the 
depressives’ expert experience. DePaulo is experienced as a doctor; he collects 
professional experience deliberately, even with pride. Metaphorically speaking, he is the 
subject of a predicate. In contrast, depressives are struck by the experience of depression. 
They are the object of the imagined clause. Their record of experience is not a collection 
of accomplishments but a story of survival. 
Another way to approach the notion of experience is phronesis, part of a rhetor’s 
ethos. Practical wisdom is integral to the rhetoric of expertise for both depressives and 
the psychiatrist. The former, as just explained, draw much of their persuasiveness from 
the difference between theoretical knowledge and lived, bodily experience. DePaulo, 
conversely, foregrounds his clinical experience to balance his reliance on laboratory 
science. Working with patients “in the trenches” equips him prudently to apply “a 
rational principle to practical situations that call for choice about action.”375 Lived 
experience, or phronesis, is powerfully present in both the depressives’ and DePaulo’s 
rhetoric of expertise. 
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A second theme in this chapter is the reluctance to share expertise. Both 
depressives and DePaulo indicate that certain experiences (see above) have put them in a 
unique position to understand depression. This expert vantage point, they imply, cannot 
be replicated or reconstructed. To be sure, DePaulo nobly states that he hopes to impart 
some of his expert knowledge to the lay public. In several places, however, he indicates 
the unfeasibility of this project. He writes, “It is not possible for a doctor or anyone else 
to compress twenty years of medical training and experience into a half-hour or even a 
half-day.”376 Of course, a natural follow-up to this statement would be to ask whether it is 
possible to condense medical training into a book designed for the general public. 
DePaulo’s rhetoric safeguards the credentials that make him a member of the biomedical 
establishment; doing so strategically privileges his medical expertise. Depressives 
likewise put little faith in the possibility of imparting what they know. Their essays 
reflect a deep commitment to the notion that depression can only be understood “from the 
inside.” Again, a lack of experience is what separates the audience, the lay public, from 
expertise on depression. 
A third theme in my analysis is the use of aesthetic forms, particularly narrative 
and metaphor. Both DePaulo and the essayists integrate storytelling and figurative 
description in their persuasive moves. Since narrative and metaphor are typical ways of 
conveying intimate and personal struggles, they make perfect sense in the depressives’ 
essays. I address those aesthetic rhetorical choices extensively in the analysis section. For 
DePaulo, however, the turn to aesthetic form is more noteworthy; even he uses narratives 
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and metaphors to talk about depression. In addition to numerous patient stories, the book 
includes a variety of animations of depression, that is, phrases wherein depression 
assumes subjectivity. Depression “hits,” “masquerades,” “warps reasoning,” and “saps 
your ability to think clearly.”377 Furthermore, in DePaulo’s account, neurotransmitters 
come alive and speak: “They say to the cells with whom they connect via synapses: ‘Do 
more’ or ‘Do less of whatever you are doing!’ Norepinephrine is a classic inhibitory 
neurotransmitter. It says, ‘Slow down!’”378 DePaulo’s “depression story” features a few 
major characters, not unlike the depressives’ narratives. 
The commonalities I just described—emphasis on personal experience, reluctance 
to share expertise, and reliance on aesthetic forms—are significant because they are 
surprising. Specifically, they are surprising in light of how little else DePaulo and the 
authors of Unholy Ghost have in common. DePaulo is a biomedical heavy-weight; he is a 
psychiatry professor at Johns Hopkins, one of the nation’s most prestigious medical 
schools. As such, his medical expertise has its feet firmly planted in Western culture’s 
most established institutions: natural science and post-industrial professionalization. Far 
from this institutionally-sanctioned medical expertise is the limited but powerfully 
persuasive expertise of depressives. The authors I analyzed in this chapter are not 
doctors; they are poets and journalists. Their persuasiveness as experts lies in cultural 
affirmation of lived, embodied experience. It is remarkable, therefore, that their rhetorical 
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strategies are so similar to Dr. DePaulo’s. And it is in these similarities that we can begin 
to develop a vocabulary for the rhetoric of medical expertise. 
 To conclude, doctors are not the only bidders for medical expertise; those who 
experience an illness like depression first-hand also strive for the public’s 
acknowledgment. Their physical experiences of pain and humiliation become warrants in 
an argument for expert status. Depressives employ the available means of persuasion to 
make us believe their stories. What my chapter ultimately asks is, what distinguishes 
these stories from biomedical rhetoric? As much as medicine clings to natural science 
and ideals of objectivity, it remains inextricably discursive. Indeed, the appeal itself to an 
objective and scientific foundation is a persuasive move. Representatives of biomedicine, 
including psychiatrists like Dr. DePaulo, maintain expertise through a rhetorical strategy. 
It is that strategy which ensures an expert-layperson relationship with the American 
public. Medicine as a professional domain makes the rhetorical nature of expertise 
evident. It illustrates how much power the public grants to those we consider to be 
credible experts, including over our minds and bodies. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
WIKIPEDIA AND THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA: THE RHETORIC OF 
INFORMATIONAL EXPERTISE 
Since its inception in 2001, the use of Wikipedia is an irrepressible issue on 
college campuses. It is in every bibliography in every “research” assignment. 
Consequently professors revise lectures on source evaluation, pleading with students to 
be critical information consumers. Nevertheless, the attraction to Wikipedia is powerful. 
Wikipedia is so irresistibly accessible. It’s so immediately gratifying. It’s so easy. In the 
fall of 2006, the National Communication Association’s list serve CRTNET featured a 
brief dialogue between Shannon Vanhorn of Valley City State University and Richard 
Olsen of the University of North Carolina Wilmington. At stake were instructional 
policies regarding the use of Wikipedia for course assignments. Should college instructors 
permit students to use Wikipedia as a reference? Under what conditions? How ought we 
use it ourselves?  
Curricular policy, however interesting, is less pressing for my purposes than 
Wikipedia’s impact on the culture of expertise. Conventional thinking says that a person 
who is a credentialed expert in a subject matter speaks and writes about that subject. This 
has long been the philosophy of non-fiction writing. But Wikipedia’s “anyone can edit” 
policy is a radical departure from that logic. It challenges the traditional ways in which 
information and knowledge are managed and disseminated. On Wikipedia, scholars and 
laypersons are indistinguishable; one edits the other’s work with no special designation 
for degrees or affiliation. This is a recurring target of comedian Stephen Colbert’s satire. 
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When news spread that Microsoft had paid consultants to publish flattering information 
on Wikipedia, in essence advertising the company, Colbert coined the term 
“Wikilobbying.” His television program The Colbert Report made audiences an offer: 
“I’ll give five bucks to the first person who goes on Wikipedia and changes the entry on 
Reality to “Reality Has Become A Commodity.” And to those who say, ‘That’s not what 
Reality is,’ I say ‘Go look it up on Wikipedia.’”379 Colbert’s humor contains a serious 
question, viz., What are Wikipedia’s standards for reliable information? Why the 
enormously positive response to the subversion of accreditation? What effect will it have 
on the dissemination of expertise as we know it?  
Agnostics suggest that Wikipedia and traditional reference sources like the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica function as fundamentally different discursive activities. It is 
possible, they claim, that the public uses Wikipedia and the Encyclopaedia Britannica for 
different purposes, to learn about different kinds of topics. This division of the 
information market, to use an economic logic, would mean that Wikipedia does not 
compete with other encyclopedias. Others posit that there may be more than one audience 
for reference materials; the readers of Encyclopaedia Britannica may be a different group 
than Wikipedians. And perhaps the twain shall n’er meet. Be that as it may, the point of a 
rhetorical analysis is to understand why and how—regardless of whether the two are 
“actually” competing—their discursive identities are constructed. The rhetorics that 
construct Wikipedia and the Encyclopaedia Britannica respectively as informational 
experts also contain a certain enmity. Put differently, the tone of tension is present even if 
                                                 
379 Quoted in Nora Miller, “Calling Out the Symbol Users: Wikipedia Revisited,” ETC (April 2007): 148. 
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statistics reveal a different story. Even if in reality they two are not competitors for the 
same audience, they are portrayed as such in the media. For example, an article in The 
New Yorker quotes Britannica CEO Jorge Cauz saying, “Wikipedia is to Britannica as 
‘American Idol’ is to the Juilliard School.”380 Journalist Mick O’Leary writes, “With all 
of the information on the Internet, why is this well-intentioned reference source treated so 
badly? Because, while most of the nonsense on the Web knows its place, Wikipedia has 
the chutzpah to deem itself a real encyclopedia.”381 This claim to “real encyclopedia” 
expertise begs the question: How does Wikipedia challenge traditional forms of 
information dissemination through an alternative rhetoric of expertise? 
My dissertation posits expertise as a rhetorical construct. It investigates how 
expertise is negotiated as a function of the rhetorical situation, its participants and 
constraints. I ask: What rhetorical strategies do different groups employ to compete for 
expert authority and legitimacy when they conflict with one another? In this chapter, I 
focus on the rhetorical strategies of informational expertise, specifically the emergence of 
alternative reference sources and the challenges they pose to traditional reference 
publications. I contrast Encyclopaedia Britannica with Wikipedia.382 By analyzing texts 
                                                 
380 Stacy Schiff, “Know It All: Can Wikipedia Conquer Expertise?” The New Yorker 82 (31 July 2006): 36-
43. 
381 Mick O’Leary, “Wikipedia: Encyclopedia or Not?” Information Today (Sep 2005): 49. 
382 In other words, my comparison of these encyclopedias posits them as separate and singular entities. This 
brackets the thousands of individual contributors to Wikipedia, as well as the various publication stages to 
which Britannica is subject. For the purposes of my analysis, the two can be readily distinguished and 
operationalized. An alternative approach might have been to compare Wikipedia with Britannica’s online 
version to eliminate the possibility that my conclusions identify differences between reference publication 
on- and offline. This concern is superseded by the importance of comparing the two publications in their 
most “essential” forms. While Wikipedia does not exist offline, Britannica has been a hard-copy 
publication since 1768. A principal claim to its ethos, I argue in this chapter, is precisely this venerable 
history. To use the online version would be misdirected. Even though the information itself is almost the 
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produced by and about these publications I examine how expertise is constructed. I 
include both meta-discourse (i.e., information that the publications produce about 
themselves) and three different entries, or “articles,” from each publication.383 I 
complement this with some media commentary about the publications and their 
relationship.384 For the articles, I compare and contrast how Wikipedia and 
Encyclopaedia Britannica define 1) time, an abstract idea, 2) photosynthesis, a concrete 
and scientific phenomenon, and 3) censorship, a controversial subject.385 
                                                                                                                                                 
same on and offline, Britannica’s organization and level of interactivity—central to my analysis—are 
radically different. 
383 As historian Roy Rosenzweig attests, “writing about Wikipedia is maddeningly difficulty.” See Roy 
Rosenzweig, “Can History Be Open Source? Wikipedia and the Future of the Past,” Journal of American 
History 93 (2006): 119.  For a rhetorical critic, the multiple layers of text make Wikipedia a virtual 
funhouse. As a result of hyper linking and the multi-user philosophy all text is open to edits. This creates a 
prolific and ongoing text machine. At the basic level, Wikipedia publishes content--information about a 
topic—such as hypochondria or ice cream. Almost all topical articles are subject to public editing. A tab 
marked “Edit this page” allows users to change information about hypochondria and ice cream. These edits, 
in turn, are the topic of discussion on so-called talk pages. On the talk pages, users do not discuss the 
subject matter, but rather the editorial practices. Contributors and administrators post their reactions to what 
has been added or revised. There are, however, discussion pages where different subjects can be discussed 
and debated substantively. Finally, Wikipedia publishes information about itself and its policies; these 
pages are both descriptive and prescriptive. Wikipedia administrators, or Wikipedians, instruct users on 
courteous and productive practices. To some extent, even these “project pages” are subject to editing and 
discussion. The result is a sophisticated and highly self-reflexive process of rhetorical production. In 
addition, Wikipedia is subject to constant change. Like any rhetorical critic who chooses online texts for 
analysis, I risk obsolescence. Note, however, that my objective is not to evaluate Wikipedia as a web 
community or even to analyze it generally as a rhetorical artifact.  
384 This chapter relies on some secondary sources such as articles from the popular press as a complement 
to the original analysis. There are several reason for this inclusion: 1) It is in the media that representatives 
of Wikipedia and Encyclopaedia Britannica engage each other directly. Unlike some of my dissertation’s 
earlier experts, notably the political experts in chapter two, encyclopedists do not often interact with each 
other. The ways in which Britannica’s spokespersons, for example, comment on the Wikipedia movement 
in the press is significant for my analysis of competing rhetorics of expertise. 2) When Britannica’s and 
Wikipedia’s representatives comment on their work in the media, it is a statement of methodology that is 
otherwise difficult to find, particularly in Britannica’s case. 3) Relatively little scholarship exists about 
Wikipedia in the fields of communication and rhetoric; an inaugural analysis like my chapter must be as 
inclusive as possible if it hopes to grasp this complex text. 
385 Other comparisons of Wikipedia and the Encyclopaedia Britannica exist. These studies, however, 
generally focus on the accuracy of the former in relation to traditional sources. The most widely cited study 
was published in Nature magazine. See Jim Giles, “Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head to Head,” Nature 15 
(December 2005): 900-901. A group of experts was asked to assess 42 scientific entries from Wikipedia 
and Encyclopaedia Britannica respectively. The entries did not identify the source. Findings reported that 
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This chapter differs from the preceding ones in some significant ways. It is not 
situated in the context of a specific subject matter. While the Chapter Two focused on the 
rhetoric of political expertise and Chapter Three on the rhetoric of historical expertise, the 
present chapter transcends disciplinary lines. Because it examines the construction, 
ownership and proliferation of information, it integrates political, historical and medical 
matters. Wikipedia and the Encyclopaedia Britannica both contain articles that fit within 
those categories. Note, however, that I am principally interested in how the two construct 
themselves as expert resources. I study what they publish about a particular topic only in 
so far as that content reveals something about the rhetorical construction of informational 
expertise. 
The notion of an “informational expert” is somewhat confounding. It is not quite 
like being an expert on caterpillars or Shakespearean sonnets. Rather, informational 
expertise raises complex questions of specialization and generalism, of content and 
process. Consider, for example, whether an informational expert is a master of a 
particular subject matter or an expert on the process itself of managing information. 
Unless we can say that information management is a subject matter, I propose that an 
informational expert is a procedural expert. And while this orientation is a departure from 
                                                                                                                                                 
an average Britannica article contained about three errors, while the same average article in Wikipedia 
contained four. The Nottingham University Business School conducted another study in which Wikipedia 
articles were distributed to 30 academic subject specialists and 24 nonexpert volunteers; according to the 
findings, the experts rated the articles higher on accuracy than did the nonexperts. See L.B., “Wikipedia’s 
Stock Rises,” School Library Journal (Jan 2007): 24. Subsequent popular magazine articles have likewise 
undertaken their own comparison shopping. See Robert Eiffert, “Wikipedia, The Review: How the Online 
Behemoth Compares to Standard Reference Works,” School Library Journal (March 2006): 82-83. My 
analysis differs from the abovementioned comparisons in that it focuses on the rhetorical struggle over 
expertise, not the accuracy of different encyclopedias. I examine how Wikipedia challenges traditional 
forms of information dissemination through an alternative rhetoric of expertise.  
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the rest of my dissertation, the chapter is no less important. Thus far I have focused 
primarily on experts’ rhetorical invention; this chapter shifts perspective, and examines 
the role of disposition, another part of the classical canon, in the rhetoric of expertise. 
Since my dissertation’s ultimate goal is to offer a theory of the rhetoric of expertise, 
disposition must have a prominent place, especially given that we live in the so-called 
information age. 
In the following section, I survey the history of encyclopedias. This 
contextualizing gesture introduces readers to a rather complex publishing ideology. It is 
imperative to understand how encyclopedic experts historically and in the present have 
constructed themselves and their relationship to the public. Many of the ideological 
assumptions that structure today’s encyclopedia’s are products of historical factors. The 
section on encyclopedic history is followed by my analysis of Wikipedia and 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. Unlike previous chapters, the analysis section does not 
separate the chapter’s two artifacts. Instead, I weave my reading of the two texts together, 
noting how their responses to each other form a rhetoric of expertise. Using the critical 
probes laid out in Chapter One, I focus especially on methodology, anonymity and 
community, audience participation, and the rhetoric of play. Finally, I conclude with a 
few remarks about the differences and similarities between Wikipedia’s and the 
Encyclopedia Britannica’s forms of expertise. 
A Brief History of the Encyclopedia 
The history of the encyclopedia is fraught with tension between hubris and 
populism. It chronicles a culture’s desire to understand itself in a comprehensive way and 
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disseminate that knowledge. As Robert Collision notes, a fundamental hope of 
encyclopedic publishing is that it is “possible to compile a work that would supersede all 
other books and render them unnecessary.”386 Indeed, etymology reveals encyclopedists’ 
ambition; the word “en-cyclo-pedia” is a Latinization attributed to Quintilian meaning a 
round or circle of all human knowledge and education.387 Around 1244, a Dominican 
friar named Vincent of Beauvais, who published the encyclopedia Speculum Majus (The 
Great Mirror), is said to have defined encyclopedic knowledge as “all that is worthy of 
contemplation.”388 This definition, and its normative emphasis, survives. It inspires those 
who deride publications like Wikipedia for including articles about, for example, 
Barcaloungers and meatballs.389 As Richard Yeo acknowledges, encyclopedists ascribe to 
a guiding myth of a “work containing the collective knowledge of a community which 
might be put together again if all other books were lost.”390 To encyclopedists, the circle 
of learning is a claim to immortality.  
In order to understand the history and philosophy of encyclopedias, as well as 
their relationship to the idea of expertise, we must begin by recognizing their creators’ 
moral and pedagogical aspirations. The populist beginnings of the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica must not be overlooked, even now that the work enjoys a high-culture literary 
status. In the eighteenth century the European Enlightenment, with its free and open 
                                                 
386 Robert Collision, Encyclopaedias: Their History Throughout the Ages (New York: Hafner Publishing 
Company, 1966), 2. 
387 Richard Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions: Scientific Dictionaries and Enlightenment Culture (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6. 
388 Yeo, 5. 
389 At the time of writing, each term has an entry in Wikipedia. 
390 Yeo, 3. 
 209
exchange of ideas, introduced a revolutionary approach to information. As Yeo explains, 
“The encyclopaedias of the eighteenth century were a practical embodiment of the notion 
that knowledge should be accessible to a wide public and, as such, their purpose was not 
just to collate knowledge used by elites, but to facilitate conversation and 
communication.”391 What had previously been “dictionaries of arts and sciences” became 
more extensive texts, whose goal was to make science, literature, philosophy, etc., 
publicly accessible. In line with this ideology, Enlightenment encyclopedias were 
typically written in the vernacular rather than in Latin. Their contents were addressed to a 
much wider audience than their predecessors. 
The Encyclopaedia Britannica is an Enlightenment encyclopedia, founded in 
1768 in Edinburgh, Scotland by an engraver, a printer and an editor.  Andrew Bell, Colin 
Macfarquhar and William Smellie published the first edition, which contained forty-five 
principal subjects with a total of thirty lengthy articles. After many editions and a 
hundred and forty years, the encyclopedia’s eleventh edition was the last published in the 
United Kingdom in 1911. For almost thirty years following, it was owned and marketed 
by the American department store Sears Roebuck, before becoming affiliated with the 
University of Chicago in 1941. In 1974, the Britannica underwent major structural 
changes. A three-part set was released, consisting of the Propaedia, the Micropaedia, and 
the Macropaedia. To date, the Macropaedia is a 17-volume set of long articles, the 
Micropaedia a 12-set volume of short articles, and the Propaedia outlines the major 
                                                 
391 Yeo, 12. 
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categories of human knowledge. In addition, the Britannica adapted to the introduction of 
digital technology in 1994 by offering a CD-ROM, and in 1997 with an online version.392  
The Encyclopaedia Britannica is the oldest continuously published encyclopedia 
in the world, and has long been the principal reference source in the English-speaking 
world.393 To many it has “come to define what an encyclopedia is.”394 Despite its firm 
historical anchoring, however, the Britannica has not been impervious to mounting 
threats from new information technologies. Its early online versions struggled with both 
purpose and identity as they tried to keep up with information users. For example, the 
Britannica Internet Guide was initially a search directory of websites, an effort to guide 
internet users through the rapidly expanding World Wide Web. Susan Clark explains that 
“this was an attempt to extend Britannica’s brand name to the Internet with a search 
directory of quality sites in keeping with Britannica’s mission ‘to select, organize, and 
present the best information.’”395 A few years later, the encyclopedia also published its 
entire text online, restricted by subscription to higher education institutions. Not until 
1999 did Britannica launch its free website: www.Britannica.com. The site was well 
received by the public, but its medium transformation—the sudden appearance of old 
information in a new format—raised questions. The shift from printed to online 
encyclopedias is not just about creating a virtual presence; it is not just about being 
                                                 
392 For an instructive overview of the Encyclopaedia Britannica’s history, see Dorothy Auchter, “The 
Evolution of the Encyclopaedia Britannica: From the Macropaedia to Britannica Online,” Reference 
Services Review 27 (1999): 291-299; Jeff Loveland, “Unifying Knowledge and Dividing Disciplines,” 
Book History 9 (2006): 57-87. 
393 Auchter, 291. 
394 Yeo, 170. 
395 Susan E. Clark, “In Search of the Right Formula: Encyclopaedia Britannica Ventures from Print to 
Online to Both,” Reference and User Services Quarterly 41 (2001): 136. 
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available on the web. Rather, online encyclopedic publishing also highlights the 
complexity of different types of information. To clarify with a small example: 
Britannica.com does not have an entry for “paper clip.” Wikipedia does. Even 
Britannica’s “book of the year” additions do not correspond to the information that other 
virtual encyclopedias publish. Precisely what that difference implies regarding content 
and culture is one part of my investigation of the rhetoric of informational expertise. 
Wikipedia is a novelty in more than one sense. It is not only a new species of 
encyclopedia, but an interactive form of online communication. Founded in 2001 by 
James Wales and Larry Sanger—the latter of whom later denounced the project—it is 
currently one of the ten most popular websites in the world.396 According to its records, 
Wikipedia contains 8.2 million articles in 253 languages.397 It is maintained by a large 
community of volunteers and operated by the Wikimedia Foundation, a non-profit 
organization that also features Wikinews, Wikiquotes, Wikibooks, and Wiktionary. The 
prefix “wiki” denotes open software, which allows any user to edit a page or create a new 
entry.398 This openness is Wikipedia’s raison d’être and the heart of its claim to expertise. 
It proudly calls itself the “free encyclopedia that anyone can edit.” 
Wikipedia’s pride resonates in important ways with earlier encyclopedias’ 
ambitions. The same philosophy that undergirds the “circle of learning” and the ideal that 
all human knowledge can be compiled seems to fuel Wales’s enthusiasm. In order to 
promote his product, he asks skeptics to “imagine a world in which every single person 
                                                 
396 Katherine Mangu-Ward, “Wikipedia and Beyond,” Reason 39 (2007): 18-29. 
397 Figures current as of September, 2007. See Wikipedia, s.v. “Wikipedia,” available at: 
http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia (accessed September 25, 2007). 
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on the planet is given free access to the sum of all human knowledge.”399 Additionally, 
Wikipedia’s article about itself describes “an effort to create and distribute a free 
encyclopedia of the highest possible quality to every single person on the planet in their 
own language.”400 In an interview, Wales states simply that “We make the Internet not 
suck.” In these excerpts, it appears that the Scotsmen who founded the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica and Jimmy Wales have a lot in common as experts of information; their 
beliefs in what their encyclopedias will accomplish are comparably astronomical. 
Related to the tension between hubris and populism is another dialectic: 
specialization and generalization. At stake in this second dialectic is whether or not it is 
possible to be both comprehensive and generally accessible, while simultaneously 
maintaining scientific and intellectual depth. Collision summarizes the challenge:  
There is something in the discipline imposed that confronts the specialist 
with an interesting problem. Is it possible to condense the salient points of 
his subject in readable fashion in only a few hundred words? The 
controversies so familiar to him—can they be explained in such a way that 
the ‘man in the street’ can appreciate them and their significance without 
paying more attention to the questions they raise than to the main outlines 
of the subject?401  
Collision invites us to ask: Is it possible for a specialist to make herself generally 
intelligible? In a modern context, should the public perhaps demand that she try? If she 
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cannot, should information that is written for the general public be authored by someone 
other than the specialist? These are the questions of informational expertise that link the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica and Wikipedia.  
In Britannica’s early years, generalism was still considered a virtue. Before the 
scientific and industrial revolutions, being knowledgeable in a wide range of topics was 
prized higher than being “expert” in a specific subject matter. (Indeed, the word “expert” 
was originally employed in its adjectival, rather than nominal form to mean general 
competency in a technique, not a theory). The emergence of specialized professions 
changed the status of generally erudite writers and public intellectuals. So too for 
encyclopedists, whose ancestors were generalists. The three men who founded the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica were well-educated but by no means scientists as we now 
understand the term. Beginning in the early 19th century, however, contributors were 
invited experts.402 What they wrote for the Britannica were “treatises,” long essays 
designed as general introductions to, for example, biology. The essays were much longer 
than what the modern reader would expect in an encyclopedia. They were meant to be 
read rather than used for reference. They instructed the reading public in topics of interest 
such that “any man of ordinary parts, may, if he chooses, learn the principles of 
agriculture, of astronomy, of botany, of chemistry.”403  
For this reason, encyclopedias in the 18th century were charged with “peddling 
superficial information rather than profound accounts of knowledge.”404 They clashed 
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with the novelty of scientific discovery, which made details and specificity imperative. 
Decades, even centuries later, when specialization had grown further in importance, 
encyclopedias were criticized for being too technical, making themselves inaccessible to 
a lay public. Contributing scientists had lost some of their ability to speak to non-
scientists. Today, one of the most common accusations against Wikipedia is that it 
elevates trivia to an unwarranted status. By devoting entire articles to the paper clip, for 
example, Wikipedia does indeed seem to “peddle superficial information.”405 Important to 
note here is the inescapable and irresolvable tension between what is generally 
intelligible and what is sufficiently specific in any historical or modern encyclopedic 
undertaking. We still recall the Dominican friar, asking anxiously what is “worthy of 
contemplation.” In an encyclopedia, what should be included, and how should it be 
organized?  
The organization of information has always been a major concern for 
encyclopedists. During the middle ages and the Renaissance, encyclopedias were 
typically governed by a thematic structure. Subjects were presented in a hierarchy such as 
the seven disciplines of the liberal arts, the faculties in a university, or the cosmological 
chain of being topped by “divine things.”406 This structure reveals and perpetuates a view 
of knowledge as orderly, even teleological. In its prime, it inspired beautiful art reflecting 
epistemological and ontological visions. As science and discovery advanced, however, 
the hierarchical organization became untenable. What was known about a particular topic 
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changed so rapidly that encyclopedists could not keep up. Chemistry, for example, was 
quickly becoming inseparable from the other natural sciences in a way that must have 
flustered encyclopedists. In that time of change, an alphabetical organization seemed 
more flexible and adaptive. It also allowed for easier reference use, as the habits of 
encyclopedic reading changed. Rather than reading entire treatises on a science, users 
began to search directly for specific answers. This approach to using encyclopedias still 
thrives. A modern reader is more likely to go and look something up in the encyclopedia 
than she is to read it cover to cover. 
It is important to note how the Encyclopaedia Britannica and Wikipedia 
respectively respond to the challenge of organization. It is what most distinguishes them 
from each other. Additionally, it gets at the heart of this chapter’s analysis of the rhetoric 
of informational expertise, viz., disposition. From its inception, Britannica was designed 
to use both a thematic and an alphabetical structure. This tactic is arguably why it 
endured so long. Its alphabetical order facilitates continuous revision. The thematic 
approach of earlier encyclopedias remains in Britannica’s treatises (see above). By also 
incorporating long essays , Britannica’s editors retained the idea that sciences must be 
considered systemic and integrated.407 Even as empirical breakthroughs were making 
their jobs difficult, the editors did not want to chop up scientific articles into tidbits. 
Interconnectivity was an ideal that Britannica prized and continues to safeguard. 
For that reason, the introduction of virtual hyperlinks into encyclopedic writing is 
revolutionary. It is an essential difference between an online and a hardcopy 
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encyclopedia. Hyperlinks are those parts of an html document that a user “clicks on” to 
access a different page. They take us from place to place on the Internet. Using 
hyperlinks online is now so commonplace, so integral to our computer habits, that 
describing them seems almost odd. Nevertheless, the impact of hyperlinks on 
encyclopedias cannot be overstated. For centuries, encyclopedists labored tirelessly to 
facilitate cross-referencing. They created indices and intricate ways of getting from 
shorter articles to longer essays and from one article to another. Connecting one piece of 
information to another is messy, confusing, and arduous. It is also imperative in the 
learning process. The advent of hyperlinks made cross-referencing both instant and 
infinite. There is no limit to how many hyperlinks an online encyclopedia can feature in 
one article. For example, the Wikipedia article that defines “dance” as “movement used 
as a form of expression, social interaction or presented in a spiritual or performance 
setting” contains a hyperlink on the words movement, expression, social interaction, 
spiritual, and performance. By clicking on any of the words, a user moves to a different 
but related topic.  
The emergence of hyperlinks in online documents brings my historical overview 
up to date. It turns attention to the irreducible difference between the two encyclopedias 
that is the focus on my rhetorical analysis. Wikipedia is a moving object. It is accessible 
to a world-wide audience of participants, and the hyperlinking makes contributions 
“virtually” limitless. The Encyclopaedia Britannica, in contrast, is static. It is frozen in 
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time from the point of going to press.408 Until a new edition is released, or the “book of 
the year” amends any problems, nothing can be challenged, withdrawn, or added. 
Britannica, like all conventional writing, is the target of Plato’s scorn. It “can neither 
defend itself nor come to its own support.”409 While Wikipedia’s organization of 
information is in constant flux, Britannica retains its age-old format.410 There are costs 
and benefits to both.  
In the rhetoric of encyclopedic, or informational expertise, above-mentioned 
issues of hubris and populism, specialization and generalism, structure and accessibility 
play key roles. They are integral to Wikipedia’s and the Encyclopaedia Britannica’s 
persuasive appeals. Primarily, they are issues of rhetorical disposition. That is, they 
pertain to the management and organization of a message. The next section focuses on 
the specific ways in which management and organization construct two different 
rhetorics of informational expertise.  
Analysis: Encyclopedic Experts 
The actual articles featured in Wikipedia and the Encyclopaedia Britannica are, 
perhaps surprisingly, not so different. Both texts conform to an encyclopedic style or 
voice. Both contain diagrams and pictures, Wikipedia more than Britannica. Britannica’s 
articles contain fewer redundancies. Both offer historical background information. Both 
end every article with a bibliography; Wikipedia’s version is more up-to-date and 
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includes citations for newspapers and magazines as well as scholarly sources. The 
differences between Wikipedia and the Encyclopaedia Britannica, in short, are not 
primarily a matter of content. It is not what is published that distinguishes them. The 
major difference between the two encyclopedias is information management. Moreover, 
it is precisely in the managerial strategies that the encyclopedias’ rhetorics of expertise 
emerge and compete. 
Expert Methodologies 
As mentioned in earlier chapters, demonstrating intentionality in one’s practices is 
central to the rhetoric of expertise. An expert needs to be able to theorize his/her 
methodology in order to “prove” competency and accountability. The senators analyzed 
in Chapter Two, for example, explicate how they exercise their expertise through voting 
and deliberation. The psychiatrist studied in Chapter Four explains clinical procedures as 
a way of reassuring his patients and readers. Experts offer these theories as a means of 
persuasion. Likewise, Wikipedia is highly cognizant of its own practices, and presents 
this self-reflexivity as expertise. To begin, the site does a great deal of meta-posting, 
publishing information about what Wikipedians do and why. It states, “To understand 
Wikipedia, it is easiest to think of this website as having two types of pages: pages that 
are part of the encyclopedia itself, and pages of the community (used by contributors to 
help build and operate the encyclopedia). […] Wikipedia’s community pages include 
instructions, help pages, policies, guidelines, discussion forums, places to make requests, 
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pages to report problems, and user pages.”411 In many ways, the so-called community 
pages are Wikipedia’s way of explicating its expert methodology.412 
Wikipedia encourages all contributors to adopt this level of self-reflection. The 
invitations to participate are always tagged with a notice to comment and, in a way, 
reveal one’s agenda. Under “safe behaviors,” Wikipedians are told that “Other editors 
need to understand your process, and it also helps you yourself to understand what you 
did after a long leave of absence from an article. Please state what you changed and 
why.”413 The policy states, “If one of your edits has been reverted, and you change it 
back again, it is good practice to leave an explanation on the talk page and a note in the 
edit summary that you have done so.”414 In the discussion pages, contributors lay out 
what they have added and editors explain how they have edited. The form is equivalent to 
a scholarly paper that begins with first assumptions. Furthermore, there are guidelines for 
dealing with behaviors that disrupt Wikipedia’s preferred practices: “Inappropriate 
changes are usually removed quickly, and repeat offenders can be blocked from 
editing.”415 Such policy statements are tantamount to a theory of expert method.  
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In contrast, the Encyclopaedia Britannica does not comment on its practice of 
informational expertise. More specifically, it does not make such commentary 
concomitant with the substantive content. It does not make its publishing process public 
to the same extent as Wikipedia. Instead, it emphasizes how its form of encyclopedic 
work parallels academic scholarship. Britannica imports some of the academy’s ethos by 
demonstrating that its content is scholarly work. For example, it profiles itself as an 
encyclopedia of specialization and credentials, noting that “most serious encyclopaedias” 
rely on “outside specialists for articles.”416 As Director of Corporate Communications 
Tom Panelas claims, “We don’t have an article on extreme ironing, and we shouldn’t. 
Wikipedia does what it does, and their strengths come at a cost. The cost of piling up 
large numbers of articles is a high level of inaccuracy, sloppiness, and just pain poor 
articles.”417 Panelas insists that such qualities of mind as skepticism and curiosity “do not 
occur naturally in the population, even among well-educated people. It takes years of 
training to acquire them, which is why there’s a rigorous laying on of hands between our 
senior editors and the junior ones.”418 Panelas’ remarks reveal the way Britannica 
competes rhetorically with Wikipedia’s popularity. 
A significant difference between Wikipedia’s and Britannica’s experts is motive. 
It is of course difficult to determine exactly why a person engages in a behavior; 
nevertheless, there is a recurring set of motives to which informational experts attribute 
their work. Wikipedians are often characterized as “amateurs of scholars [who] care 
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passionately about a subject and want to share their knowledge.”419 They are “interested,” 
and their knowledge is not a specialty but a “hobbyhorse.”420 As Robert Levine explains, 
Wikipedia is “the online encyclopedia that anyone can edit, but in practical terms, it is 
mostly a cadre of devotees who contribute to the site and obsess over it.”421 Wikipedians 
do what they do for fun. This affective motive, which both Wikipedians and outsiders 
mention, is radically different from the neutrality of conventional scholarship. Scholars, 
including those who write for the Encyclopaedia Britannica are explicitly dis-interested. 
They are not supposed to feel passion for their discoveries. The deep-rooted ideal of 
objectivity requires experts, particularly scholars, to deny personal investment.422 
Expertise, according to Britannica, is principally the product of the expert’s 
historical record. It is a status and practice developed over time, in this case centuries. 
While Britannica does not comment publicly on expert practices, as does Wikipedia, it 
offers an extensive account of its history as “the oldest and largest English-language 
general encyclopaedia.”423 The Encyclopaedia Britannica collection includes an article 
about itself, which is the closest it comes to meta-publishing. The article is dominated by 
an historical timeline of the encyclopedia’s different phases. The story begins with the 
first edition in Scotland and moves through generations of editors and PR struggles. The 
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article reads, “An outline of the scope and history of encyclopaedias is essentially a guide 
to the development of scholarship, for encyclopaedias stand out as landmarks throughout 
the centuries.”424 Britannica even claims that encyclopedias “are worth preserving—even 
those that appear to be hopelessly out-of-date—for they contain many contributions by a 
large number of the world’s leaders and scholars.”425 Important to note here is how 
Britannica’s autobiographical timeline instills a sense of progress in the reader. As we are 
taken through the encyclopedia’s developmental stages, we recognize gradually how it 
reached its current cultural status. This is a rhetorical strategy, a means of impressing 
upon the reader how expert methodology is a scholarly practice with venerable history. 
For Britannica, truth belongs to experts with a documented historical record.  
Central to Wikipedia’s expert methodology, in contrast, is the notion that truth 
emerges from dialectical confrontation. This conviction is more than a theory on 
Wikipedia; it is a habit of expert-engagement. One of the most prevalent arguments that 
Wikipedia makes for its expertise is that two minds are better than one. Moreover, the 
idea is that two lay minds are better than one mind with a diploma. “Wikipedia appeals to 
the authority of peer-reviewed publications rather than the personal authority of experts. 
[…] Disagreements should be resolved through consensus-based discussion, rather than 
through tightly sticking to rules and procedures.”426 In line with the site’s own emphasis 
on dialectics, there is virtually no magazine or newspaper article about Wikipedia that 
does not mention “consensus.” One journalist writes, “If you combine your knowledge 
                                                 
424 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. “Encyclopaedias and Dictionaries.” 
425 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. “Encyclopaedias and Dictionaries.” 
426 See Wikipedia, s.v. “Wikipedia.” Wikipedia, s.v. “What Wikipedia is Not,” available at: 
http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:What_Wikipedia_is_not (accessed September 25, 2007). 
 223
with my knowledge, with the knowledge of 7,000 or so others around the world, chances 
are good that we are collectively a whole lot smarter than we are individually.”427 
Another writer echoes the same experience, claiming that the most powerful insights she 
gleaned from Wikipedia “could never have been plucked from Britannica or any 
traditional reference source. That knowledge comes only from the act of sharing.”428 The 
point is that individuals’ ideas clash with one another so as to generate expertise 
collaboratively. 
Dialectics is the classical theory that when one idea collides with another, a higher 
order of insight rises from the ashes. This approach to expert knowledge—to 
epistemology and pedagogy—appears in different forms throughout Western intellectual 
history. If it might be said to have begun with Socratic elenchus, Wikipedia turns it into a 
form of online constructivism. The way in which Wikipedia hosts information reveals 
what it believes about reality, viz., that it is a social negotiation. Truth on Wikipedia rises 
from multiple interactions between opposing arguments within the discourse community. 
It is a process of collaborative invention rather than the property of a single person. Note, 
for example, how Wikipedia acknowledges the inevitability of mistakes. “Be sure to read 
the above pages! They are very important, and they will help you – even if you’re not 
perfect the first second tenth time.”429 The “strike through” on the words “first” and 
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“second” in the sentence testify to Wikipedia’s dialectical ambitions. The site’s hope is 
that the presence of many voices will adjust inaccuracies.430  
Wikipedia’s constant reference to the dialectical process links its rhetoric of 
expertise to that of scientists. The link is sensis communis, an essential practice in the 
scientific community. Among scientists, truth value is assigned to a theory that 
withstands the community’s tests. When a chemist discovers a new compound, she brings 
it first to her chemist colleagues for evaluation. Through rigorous deliberation, the 
community distinguishes true discoveries and scientific facts from false ones.431 Note 
how formally similar this process is to Wikipedia’s interactivity. A posting is accepted as 
true if it endures the community’s scrutiny. Both the scientific community and Wikipedia 
identify this critical dialectic as a path to accuracy.  
The notion of accuracy highlights an important feature in rhetorical expertise, 
viz., trust. Both Wikipedia and the Encyclopaedia Britannica rely on trust as a vital 
expert trope, albeit in different ways. For the latter, trust is couched in traditional, 
patriarchal appeals – “trust me, I’m an expert.” The public is encouraged and expected to 
trust Britannica’s content because its authors are “busy and serious people.”432 Britannica 
claims that “in using a reputable encyclopaedia, the reader is inclined to accept the 
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authenticity of any article he or she happens to read. Subconsciously the reader is aware 
that the highly organized staff of scholars credited for the work must inevitably have 
ensured the severe scrutiny of all material.”433 Note the call for deference when 
Britannica insists further that “readers of modern encyclopaedias are rarely aware of the 
numerous aids that have been provided to make their search for information so easy and 
efficient.”434 The Encyclopedia Britannica reassures the public that, even when we are 
unaware of how its expertise functions, we can trust it. Asking for trust, and 
incorporating trustworthiness into its persuasive strategy, are integral to Britannica’s 
rhetoric of expertise. 
In a more subtle or less deferential sense, trust is part of the rhetorical force of 
Wikipedia as well. Its notion of “network trust” is about community practices.435 It is a 
description of how trust emerges in a community when there is consistent adherence to 
accepted practices. Those who participate in Wikipedia trust that their work will be 
treated with respect as long as it retains high quality. They trust that their postings on the 
“talk pages” will be treated with civility. They trust other participants and visitors not to 
vandalize the site. When vandalism occurs, Wikipedia’s reprimands reaffirm the 
importance of trust: “You are requested to stop doing mischief. Please do not do that, it is 
really bad. I trust that you will listen to reason. May God bless you so that your 
‘creativity’ finds expression in good endeavors.”436 In response to a publicized incident 
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of vandalism, one administrator said that the case “is about the community, the trust the 
community depends on in terms of being able to review the work we each do.”437 So 
while Britannica insists that the public trust and defer to a singular “authority,” Wikipedia 
asks the participating public to trust itself. In both versions, trust is integral to expertise. 
Unlike Britannica’s familiar model—delineating providers and consumers of 
information—Wikipedia links, even hyper-links, trust and expertise in a (public) 
community. 
Anonymity and Community 
There is a tension in the rhetoric of expertise between owning one’s work and 
submitting it to a larger, ongoing discourse. Put differently, there is a rhetoric of expertise 
to claiming authorship, but there is an equally powerful rhetoric of expertise grounded in 
anonymity. Both Wikipedia and the Encyclopaedia Britannica publish articles 
anonymously; the authors do not get personal credit for the contents. This anonymity is 
important to note, since authorial credit is so central to scholarship. Conditioned by 
professional norms, academics are acutely aware of authorship – being first author or 
second, having our names associated with a particularly prestigious journal, etc. We are 
judged by the quality and quantity of our names in print. What, then, motivates 
encyclopedic anonymity? What alternative pay-off is there for Wikipedians and scholars 
who give their work to encyclopedias? To begin, anonymous expertise is difficult to 
interrogate. Along with the impersonal encyclopedic tone, anonymity wields a sort of 
absolute truth. The absence of an individual author who might conceivably be 
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misinformed makes content seem unimpeachable. Experts in both Wikipedia and the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica rely on this as a rhetorical force field. 
Moreover, in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, anonymous articles are a tradition. 
Since the encyclopedia’s 18th century inception, all materials have been published 
without the authors’ signatures. And, in the early years, this was not a major concern. As 
Nora Miller notes, “Only after the development of movable type and modern publishing 
methods did authorship acquire a legal and universal meaning. Copyright laws 
established the right of the person who penned a work to profit from it and control its 
publication.”438 One reason why Britannica does not feature contributors’ names thus 
may be that it never has. As stated earlier, maintaining certain historically-mandated 
practices is integral to Britannica’s expertise. It uses appeals to continuity in a rhetorical 
relationship with the public. 
Another potential reward for being an “anonymous expert” is in the ethos it 
generates. If an author’s name is not attached to his/her article, ownership of said work is 
uncertain. If personal ownership is uncertain, the expert can claim that he/she donates the 
work to the public, in a sense offering it for the greater good. Both Wikipedia and the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica make these arguments. They construct the product of their 
expertise as a public service. Miller confirms this: “Wiki authors understand that the 
recording of information by any one of us really only builds on the efforts of all the other 
thinkers, readers, and writers who have gone before. It embraces the process nature of 
reading and writing, preferring the constantly-evolving-but-never-finishing to the static 
                                                 
438 Nora Miller, “Wikipedia and the Disappearing ‘Author,’” ETC (January 2005): 37. 
 228
and rapidly obsolescing ‘product’”439 Once again the role of ethos—specifically eunoia—
in the rhetoric of expertise is evident. Anonymity creates the impression not only of 
accuracy and trustworthiness, but of virtue. An expert that can claim to submit her work 
for the community’s betterment is likely a rhetorical success.  
Anonymity may seem antithetical to community. However, Wikipedia and the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica both illustrate that this is not the case. Indeed, within their 
rhetorics of expertise, community trumps individualism. It is to their respective 
communities and expert methodologies, as stated above, that they attribute intellectual 
quality. For that reason, maintaining community is a priority, especially for Wikipedia, 
which does not have off-line resources for social or professional cohesion. It states, 
“Wikipedia is an online encyclopedia and, as a means to that end, an online community of 
people interested in building a high-quality encyclopedia in a spirit of mutual respect.”440 
It notes that “Every user is expected to interact with others civilly, calmly, and in a spirit 
of cooperation.”441 When such a spirit is abused, Wikipedia’s self-policing community 
adjusts. “Given that there is no official structure policing the quality of articles, the 
Wikipedia community has spawned its own rules, procedures and values, which continue 
to evolve.”442 Katherine Mangu-Ward describes this process: “The evolution of a 
praise/shame economy within Wikipedia has been far more effective at keeping most 
users in line than the addition of formal rules to deal with specific conflicts.”443 The 
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Wikipedia community, like the scholarly community to which Britannica contributors 
belong, serves many functions—both social and professional. What I identify here is how 
two communities of experts can exist without names, without personal authorship. This is 
not to imply that being anonymous before the general public means a lack of personal 
relationships among the experts; to be sure, regulars on Wikipedia “know each other.” I 
do not doubt that friendships form online as they do in the scholarly community. Even 
when proper names are subordinated as part of a community of experts’ rhetorical 
strategy, that community can thrive. 
Audience and Participation 
Two of my dissertation’s critical probes pertain to audience: who the target 
audience is for different kinds of expertise, and what response experts expect from that 
audience. In the case of informational expertise, the audience, potentially any user of 
reference materials, is rather diverse. Britannica’s audience consists of “the curious and 
intelligent layman [sic].”444 Britannica states broadly that “People look to encyclopaedias 
to give them an adequate introduction to a topic that interests them.”445 Wikipedia’s 
audience, on the other hand, is narrower. It comprises primarily intellectuals in their late 
twenties and thirties, predominantly college students and academics.446 These 
intellectuals are typically male and English-speaking.447 In short, Wikipedians are in most 
cases exactly who we think they are. They have access to the internet. They are proficient 
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in the use of wiki software and other computer applications. And they have the time that 
sustained participation requires.  
On Wikipedia, the distinction between experts and audiences is blurred. The roles 
of reader and writer change very quickly; it is not always clear who provides information 
for whom. This dynamic is Wikipedia’s defining characteristic. It distinguishes the 
Wikipedia encyclopedia from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, as well as from the other 
kinds of experts examined in my dissertation. Wikipedia’s invitation to the public to 
participate is a departure from how informational expertise typically works. The lay 
public is not asked to keep its distance. Wikipedia says, “It’s nice to have you aboard. 
We’re glad you wish to help develop this encyclopedia. We hope you enjoy participating 
in the Wikipedia community as much as we do.”448 The invitation furthermore asks the 
public to spread the gospel: “Encourage others, including those who disagree with you, 
likewise to Be bold!”449 Wikipedians encourage the public to become informational 
experts, just like them. 
What is noteworthy is how Wikipedia does more than simply ask the public to get 
involved. It systematically teaches us how to participate, and what specific tasks must be 
undertaken. The introductory page of Wikipedia states, “How can I help? Don’t be afraid 
to edit—anyone can edit almost any page, and we encourage you to be bold! Find 
something that can be improved, whether content, grammar, or formatting, and make it 
better!”450 The same page gives a set of 5-step instructions on making “your first edit 
                                                 
448 Wikipedia, s.v. “Welcome to Wikipedia.”  
449 Wikipedia, s.v. “Simplified Ruleset.”  
450 Wikipedia, s.v. “What Is Wikipedia?” 
 231
now.” Wikipedia tells the public what contributions are needed for the site calling 
attention to specific informational gaps. Some articles begin with a notice that “this 
article needs additional citations for verification.” The article on photosynthesis, for 
instance, invites users to “please help improve this article by adding reliable references. 
Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.” Nothing comparable to this 
hortative discourse appears in Britannica.451 Wikipedia’s informational expertise is 
inseparable from its interactive structure. Its novelty in the public sphere and challenge to 
traditional forms of reference publication would be moot without the inclusion of the 
general public’s input. 
Nonetheless, there is a remarkable tension on Wikipedia between democratic 
practices and exclusivity. In fact, the site’s populist ideals may not always correspond to 
the reality of its participating community. Wikipedia claims inclusiveness calling itself 
the encyclopedia that anyone can edit; it claims to eliminate the line between expert and 
layperson. We must ask, however, who is this “anyone”?  To be sure, including “every 
single person on the planet” is a laudable goal.452 But if in reality most Wikipedians are 
affluent, well-educated, English-speaking white males, that reality must be recognized. 
And it must be part of the conversation about Wikipedia’s potential and claim to 
expertise.  
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In addition to time and resources, contributing to Wikipedia takes technological 
savvy. It demands more than substantive knowledge. In order to edit the article on the 
French Revolution, a person would need to know more than the fact that insurgents 
stormed the Bastille July 14, 1789. She would need a particular techne, knowledge of 
how to use the site. There is a methodological skill to Wikipedia’s informational expertise 
that the public may lack, even those segments of the public who wish to share their 
passion for 18th century France. If so, it may not make much difference how enthusiastic 
Wikipedia’s invitations are. Although there are pages on Wikipedia that address this gap 
the entry barrier is not completely eliminated. Posting on Wikipedia is not as easy as it 
sounds. As one novice user points out, “Undergirding the Wikipedia is an intricate system 
of procedures and methods, in fact a whole world of Open Source software out of which 
Wikipedia grew and which now has a life of its own.”453 What is most remarkable, 
however, are the arguments that Wikipedians make while considering how to update their 
site. According to Kirschner, users debate “whether an easy word-processing-like format 
might alienate some of the ‘old-timers,’ who seem to consider technical prowess as 
something approaching a moral litmus test.”454 Evidently, expertise can only be so 
democratic and/or invitational without being compromising. And Wikipedia’s experts 
appear to have chosen technology as the means for selection. Those who cannot operate 
the necessary software are excluded. As always, systemic barriers that go unspoken are 
just as effective in screening public participation as explicit norms of exclusion.  
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Scholars represent Wikipedia’s personae non gratae; they are not welcome on the 
site. This is especially noteworthy considering the implications for expertise. Brock Read 
notes that “not all of Wikipedia’s most-active contributors want academics in their club. 
They argue that an army of hobbyists, teenagers, and even the occasional troll can create 
a more comprehensive, more useful, and possibly even more accurate resource than can 
be found in the ivied halls.”455 When asked whether he thought Wikipedia was anti-elitist, 
WikiMedia CFO claimed to prefer the term “anticredentialist.”456 The idea is not to give 
special privilege to those with credentials and degrees. This anti-credentialism, 
democratic as it sounds, may in fact be an additional form of exclusion. It is not the same 
as the one discussed above; scholars are not necessarily being kept off Wikipedia because 
they cannot operate the software. Rather, scholars may bring with them certain 
undesirable connotations – intellectual snobbery, theoretical heavy-handedness, etc. 
Theirs may be a conflicting kind of expertise, one that belongs in the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica and the like. Thus the limits of even radical openness define Wikipedia’s 
expertise, allowing its members to distinguish themselves. 
Certainly, skepticism between Wikipedia and the academy is mutual. For a 
number of reasons, many scholars choose not to contribute to Wikipedia. Its postings do 
not count toward the tenure and promotion. They are shorter and more fragmented than 
the traditional scholarly publication. And there is always the risk that the work might be 
torn apart by a layperson to whom the scholar is unused to answering. As one Wikipedia 
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critic notes, “to many professors, it seems to be a waste of time to negotiate with people 
who in any other context would be taking  a class from them.”457 The reasons why more 
scholars do not embrace Wikipedia are less significant than asking why Wikipedians react 
with such skepticism toward those scholars who do. It prides itself, after all, on being the 
encyclopedia that “anyone can edit.” This apparent discrepancy begs the question of what 
it is that Wikipedians appreciate about their site: Is it the accuracy and quality of the 
content? Or are users perhaps even more driven by the desire to “stick it to the man”? 
(Or, more poignantly, stick it to the experts?) Is Wikipedia’s tension between inclusion 
and exclusion a challenge to tradition, or the emergence of an alternative, though equally 
elitist, expertise? 
Play with/and Tradition 
In its construction of expertise, Wikipedia relies on a rhetoric of play. This sets it 
apart from other experts investigated in my dissertation who frame their expertise as 
serious, potentially a matter of life and death (e.g., the psychiatrist in Chapter Four). A 
rhetoric of play is a stance, a way of assuming a posture relative to subject matter. The 
playful tone suggests that a link of accountability may be rhetorically undone. For 
example, the Wikipedia logo is a jigsaw puzzle shaped like a sphere. Angled as though 
turning on its axis, the sphere is almost unmistakably a globe. The icon’s polysemy 
implies a variety of things: that Wikipedia is international, that interactive construction of 
knowledge is a global effort, etc. The image of a puzzle, too, carries several connotations: 
mystery, the piece-by-piece progress of discovery, and play. A jigsaw puzzle is a toy, a 
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game. The ultimate definition of expertise that the logo offers is play; compiling pieces of 
information is Wikipedia’s international game. 
Wikipedia uses this rhetoric of play, of fun and games, to stimulate audience 
participation. It welcomes users by encouraging them to “have fun.”458 As an example of 
rhetorical play, the site offers so-called “sandboxes,” in which new users practice posting 
before editing a real article. The sandboxes are “for editing experiments.”459 They are 
modeled to look like regular articles but are designed specifically for non-serious posting. 
They are for practice—or, as the term implies, for child’s play. Wikipedia reassures the 
audience that no amount of fun can damage the site: “You can’t break Wikipedia. 
Anything can be fixed or improved later. So go ahead, edit an article and help make 
Wikipedia the best information source on the Internet.”460 Remarkably, the same page 
that lists policies also includes the suggestion to “ignore all rules.” It says, “Every policy, 
guideline or any other rule may be ignored if it hinders improving Wikipedia.”461 The 
same argument that characterizes Wikipedia as fun, and assures participants that fun can 
cause no permanent damage, ultimately prioritizes play over policy. This is key to 
Wikipedia’s invitational rhetoric; its constant self-correction—the interactivity that lets 
all users edit each other—lets administrators urge participants to be bold, less serious, 
more playful. 
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The rhetoric of play is a strategy, a rhetorical line of defense for Wikipedia’s 
expertise. Play, which compared to Encyclopaedia Britannica’s solemnity is rather 
unassuming, deflects attention from Wikipedia’s recurring problems.462 For example, 
when asked to comment on Wikipedia vandalism, founder Jim Wales was casually 
dismissive. With a “boys will be boys” attitude, he characterized the controversies as 
“growing pains” for Wikipedia. This shrugging gesture circumvents public scrutiny of the 
events. If the founder himself does not worry, why should we? By not appearing too 
alarmed, Wales protects Wikipedia’s Achilles heal: inaccuracy and sabotage. A site as 
open as Wikipedia is extremely vulnerable. A user can literally add or alter any content. 
Therein lies critics’ principal concern; what if something blatantly erroneous slips past 
administrators? What level of reliability can reasonably be expected? Fraud, slander, and 
distorted information are serious offenses in the publication of information. Yet Wales’ 
response is comparable to that of a teacher whose students have pulled a silly, but 
harmless prank.463  
                                                 
462 A few incidents of Wikipedia vandalism or misuse are widely publicized: A contributor using the 
pseudonym Essjay edited thousands of Wikipedia articles as well as mediated disputes. He purported to be 
a tenured professor of religion specializing in canon law; in reality, Mr. Ryan Jordan was a 24-year old 
college drop-out from Louisville, KY. See Cohen. In 2005, a man named Brian Chase suggested on 
Wikipedia that journalist John Siegenthaler, who once worked for Robert Kennedy, was intimately linked 
to the John F. Kennedy assassination. Siegenthaler, who months later discovered the misinformation and 
complained to Jim Wales, criticized Wikipedia’s lack of accountability in USA Today. See Jon Udell, 
“Wikipedia’s Future,” Infoworld.com, 9 January 2006, p. 30.  
Another blogger named Alex Havalais, director for the informatics school at the University of Buffalo, 
logged onto Wikipedia under the pseudonym “Dr. al-Halawi,” and inserted thirteen minor errors into 
different Wikipedia entries—including the claim that Frederick Douglass lived in Syracuse, NY for four 
years. He reports that, after two and a half hours, every error had been corrected by site visitors. See Kathy 
Ishizuka, “The Wikipedia Wars,” School Library Journal (Nov 2004): 25. In addition, there have been 
reports of Senate office staff deleting or altering WP entries about political opponents. See Eiffert, 82. 
463 Both the nature of the vandalism, and the public’s reaction, suggest an attitude of play. For example, an 
article about President George W. Bush included the word “jerk” twelve times; in the essay on Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice, the word “pianist” had been changed to “penis.” Responding to these seemingly 
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Play may be Wikipedia’s method for creating a discourse that challenges 
conventional forms of informational expertise. Traditionally, the objective of 
encyclopedias was to summarize and organize existing knowledge. It was not to publish 
new discoveries or data. The Encyclopaedia Britannica confirms this orientation, as does 
Wikipedia. One of Wikipedia’s more emphatic policies is the “no original research” 
rule.464 Only previously published facts that can be linked to several reliable sources may 
be included.465 Thus not even the world’s leading scientist can post a new discovery; this 
would constitute original research. However, there may another way of thinking about 
Wikipedia, an alternative to the idea that the site simply reproduces. While Wikipedia 
claims only to publish pre-existing knowledge, it is in effect doing something quite 
different. It actually generates information that is distinguishable from a traditional print 
encyclopedia. And the distinction is not reducible to media; Wikipedia’s expertise is not 
new or different only because it appears online. Indeed, Wikipedia’s informational 
expertise is a shift in reference publishing writ large. The very act of presenting 
information about topics that are not included in traditional encyclopedias is a 
construction of new expertise. It is a performative argument explicating the kinds of 
things about which one can be an expert. For example, something like YouTube or 
                                                                                                                                                 
puerile transgressions, Craig Whitney, the New York Times’ standards editor, said that “you can only 
shake your head.” See Katie Hafner, “Lifting Corporate Fingerprints from the Editing of Wikipedia,” New 
York Times, 19 August 2007, Late Edition. 
464 Wikipedia, s.v. “No Original Research,” available at: 
http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:No_original_research (accessed September 20, 2007). 
465 The policy defines original research as “editors' personal views, political opinions, and any unpublished 
analysis or synthesis of published material that appears to advance a position.” The policy mandates that 
“any facts, opinions, interpretations, definitions, and arguments published by Wikipedia must already have 
been published by a reliable publication in relation to the topic of the article.” It does not comment on the 
potentially problematic notions of “fact,” “interpretation,” or “reliable publication.” 
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“couch surfing,” which more or less require a playful attitude, can be subject to expertise 
in Wikipedia. Through the rhetoric of play as expertise, Wikipedia asserts: these topics 
warrant encyclopedic publication. 
Conclusions for the Rhetoric of Informational Expertise 
Expertise is constructed rhetorically in a struggle over authority, power, and 
cultural influence. My dissertation investigates that struggle, specifically the rhetorical 
strategies that different groups use against one another. This chapter focused on the 
rhetorical construction of informational expertise and the emergence of alternative 
reference sources. I assessed the challenge that texts like Wikipedia pose by comparing 
two types of encyclopedias: the Encyclopaedia Britannica and Wikipedia. My analysis 
combined three articles from each publication, as well as meta-discourse (i.e., 
information that the publications produce about themselves), and some media 
commentary. By identifying how the two reference sources manage and disseminate 
information—both substantive and self-reflexive—I theorized how they construct 
themselves as experts. In this concluding section, I suggest what the two artifacts reveal 
about informational expertise. 
Because this chapter was about informational expertise, it emphasized the 
significance of disposition. Whereas the previous chapters focused primarily on different 
experts’ rhetorical invention, this chapter expanded the dissertation’s scope to include 
rhetoric’s managerial functions. It is important to recognize that, as much as this chapter 
polemicized the two texts, they nevertheless have a lot in common. It is not in what they 
publish that Wikipedia and the Encyclopaedia Britannica differ. For example, between 
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their articles about photosynthesis a fair amount of overlap exists. Wikipedia and the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica do not disagree significantly about levels of carbon dioxide or 
the importance of chlorophyll. What does set them apart is everything else – how content 
is compiled, how it is organized for the reader, who gets to write and edit it, when it is 
updated, etc. These are important concerns. And they are concerns of rhetorical 
disposition – informational expertise. 
The principal difference of expertise between the Encyclopaedia Britannica and 
Wikipedia is indeed disposition. One is static and the other dynamic. One is in its 
fifteenth edition since 1768 and the other reinvents itself by the minute. Britannica’s 
approach to information exists in a frozen format. It compiles the best writings from 
scholars with the highest renown and freezes the outcome. Its hardcopy format is both the 
result of and the perpetuating force in this tradition of publishing. Put differently, 
Britannica reflects the ideal that, when information is deemed accurate and valuable, it 
can be kept that way; the fact that it continues to publish information based on that ideal 
sustains the ideal. Britannica’s expertise requires absolutely no dialogue. The audience 
receives information. We look up concepts like photosynthesis and censorship but, once 
we have ingested the material, we cannot comment or reciprocate. Deference is the 
response that Britannica invites. It asks its audience to acquiesce to trust the expert.  
Just the opposite is true for Wikipedia. It cannot exist without the audience’s 
commentary and reciprocation. Its interactive system of hyperlinks and edit-buttons lets 
the audience become participants; it blurs the distinction between user and producer. 
This, in the rhetoric of informational expertise, is a radical move. And this is why 
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Wikipedia requires scholarly attention: not because it might divert our students’ attention 
to trivial things but because it forces scholars to examine fundamental assumptions about 
the production of expertise. Encyclopedic interactivity threatens, thereby makes us aware 
of, the accepted order of symbolic interactions. While we think of knowing as prior to 
speaking, Wikipedia enforces a dialectic. If knowledge—indeed reality—is actually 
socially constructed, speaking can come before knowing, as it does on Wikipedia. 
Wikipedia offers this rhetorical working and reworking as a form of expertise, as a means 
of being expert. 
On the other hand, Wikipedia and the Encyclopaedia Britannica are strikingly 
similar in terms of ethos. Both appeal to eunoia, a concern with the greater good, in a way 
that concurs with traditional encyclopedic ideals. Recall that the original goal of 
encyclopedias was to compile all human knowledge and make it public for the betterment 
of civic life. Britannica and Wikipedia both embody this aspiration but with different 
results. The former grounds its claim to public service in “valuable” information; 
Britannica screens the mass of available information for the public’s good. This function, 
according to Britannica, constitutes expertise. Wikipedia, in contrast, represents the 
argument that everyone has something to contribute; its claim to eunoia is inextricably 
linked to interactivity. Wikipedia claims to serve the public by letting it be heard, by 
accommodating a plurality of experiences in something as prestigious as an encyclopedia. 
Ultimately, both Wikipedia and the Encyclopaedia Britannica offer themselves as 
something noble. They are their creators’ gift to humanity. It is a remarkable rhetorical 
feat that both manage to align this idea with the encyclopedic tradition. 
 241
The encyclopedic tradition is significant for both Britannica and Wikipedia as a 
condition for rhetorics of expertise. It represents the trope of time which the two use in 
very distinctive ways. Britannica draws much of its credibility as an expert from a long 
and well-lived life. It continually references the importance of a documented historical 
record in arguments about accountability. Time, according to Britannica, is a testament to 
quality. It is what has fine-tuned expert practices of reference publication. A 
spokesperson explains:  
This business about how often things are revised, which everyone asks all 
the time, tends to miss important things about the craft of encyclopedia 
making. Encyclopedias are not newspapers and should not be newspapers. 
[…] Part of being reliable means that you don’t go chasing every 
intellectual fad.466  
Britannica relies on the trope of time in a particular sense, what might be termed 
diachronos, extended time. As a rhetorical resource, diachronos is proof of something 
worth preserving.  
Once again, Wikipedia is just the opposite. It too folds time as a trope into its 
rhetorical strategy; but it does so in a much different way. Wikipedia’s time is fast, so fast 
in fact as to make one think of increasingly rapid increments approaching infinity. The 
site can be updated as quickly as a user can click the edit button. New articles appear 
almost as quickly as the phenomenon being defined hits mainstream pop culture. As one 
journalist writes, “Wikipedia has harnessed the power of ‘now’ on the Web through its 
                                                 
466 Berinstein. 
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army of thousands of contributors.”467 It constantly updates itself to follow new trends. 
The speed of Wikipedia, and its invitation to participate, make the site a continuous 
rhetorical exigency. There is always an imperfection marked by urgency. Every article 
that requires updating or revision calls for a rhetorical response. Rhetorical agility, or the 
ability to keep up with an ever-changing culture, is a way for Wikipedia’s expertise to 
maintain its own importance.  
Each of these text is in its own way emblematic. Wikipedia and the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica represent different moments in time. Their rhetorics of expertise are products 
of different cultural movements. Some argue that Britannica originally embodied the 
possible good in British imperialism.468 It was a promise of leadership and enlightenment, 
however problematic those ideals turned out to be. As Britannica proudly announces, “a 
great encyclopaedia is inevitably a sign of national maturity and, as such, will pay tribute 
to the ideals of its country and its times.”469 Likewise, media analysts frequently use 
Wikipedia as a symbol for the new world wide web, Web 2.0.470 Along with sites like 
YouTube and MySpace, which let internet users post their own content, Wikipedia 
represents a new generation of web-based interactions. These interfaces are allegedly 
more collaborative, more productive, less unidirectional and commercial than earlier 
versions. Wikipedia, in short, exists in public discourse as a symptom or triumph of our 
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times. Whichever attribute is more appropriate—whether Wikipedia is a blessing or a 
curse—the site invites us to evaluate the encyclopedic project. By its intervention in 
popular discourse, Wikipedia raises questions of authorship and anonymity, specialization 
versus general erudition, comprehensive information versus universal accessibility. The 
intersection of Wikipedia’s and the Encyclopaedia Britannica’s rhetorical strategies 
challenges Americans’ conceptions of informational expertise.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION: THEORETICAL POSTULATES OF THE RHETORIC OF EXPERTISE 
American culture depends on a system of expertise. We exchange expert services 
and goods for money and status, outsourcing some of the most important parts of our 
lives. All of us depend on a variety of experts in everyday matters. We give them power 
over our lives by voting for them, by paying them and by acknowledging their 
interpretations of the world. This is the way we manage a highly specialized and 
professionalized society. Doctors, lawyers, technicians, scholars, accountants and 
politicians participate in that culture. They are experts to whom we delegate and defer. 
Reliance on expertise now has become so commonplace that it is impossible to avoid.  
Conventional wisdom defines an expert as someone who knows more about a 
topic or can perform better than the average person. Expert chess players and expert 
musicians are those individuals who practice their craft with greater proficiency than the 
general population. The cognitive sciences and many other academic disciplines confirm 
this view by approaching expertise as an autonomous ability. Their theories center on the 
mental or motor-skill mastery of a subject matter. These approaches are not incorrect. 
Indeed, real knowledge, experience, training, skill and qualification are part of expertise. 
But, as I have argued, existing theories of expertise are incomplete. They do not reflect 
the complexity of the concept, partly because they isolate it from its social and discursive 
contexts. Expertise is more complex than psychologists and sociologists would have us 
believe. It is not simply about one person’s skills being different from another’s. It is also 
fundamentally contingent on a struggle for ownership and legitimacy. Thus, expertise is 
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subject to rhetoric. S/he who successfully persuades the public that s/he is an expert, and 
that s/he is a better expert than another, earns credibility, acknowledgement and power. 
Being recognized as an expert generates financial gain and social status. Experts use the 
available means of persuasion to make a case for the legitimacy of their expertise. To be 
an expert, in short, is to rhetorically gain sanctioned rights to a specific area of 
knowledge or experience. 
The question posed in my dissertation is: What rhetorical strategies do experts use 
to compete with each other for authority and legitimacy? In each chapter I focused on a 
particular context for expertise—politics, history, medicine, and information. Within each 
context I analyzed two groups offering competing claims for expertise. Chapter Two 
focused on competing rhetorical strategies in the U.S. immigration reform debate of 
2005-2006. Using immigration as a contextual foil, I examined public statements made 
by two kinds of political experts: professional politicians Ted Kennedy and Bill Frist on 
one side and, on the other side, two activist groups—the National Council of La Raza and 
the Minuteman Project. Chapter Three analyzed rhetorical strategies in the tension 
between academic history and collective memory, specifically surrounding September 
11, 2001. Two essay collections claiming historical expertise were juxtaposed. The first 
is History and September 11th, a compilation of articles written by academic historians.471 
The second text is September 11: An Oral History, which contains personal narratives by 
survivors, rescue workers and close friends of 9/11 victims.472 Chapter Four explored the 
                                                 
471 Joanne Meyerowitz, ed., History and September 11th (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003). 
472 Dean E. Murphy, September 11: An Oral History (New York: Doubleday, 2002). 
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rhetorical strategies of medical expertise, specifically relating to depression. Two 
discourses were analyzed: Understanding Depression by Raymond DePaulo, professor 
and chairman of the Department of Psychiatry at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, 
and Unholy Ghost, a collection of first-person narratives written by sufferers of 
depression.473 Finally, Chapter Five interrogated different rhetorical strategies of 
expertise in the disposition of information, particularly alternative, emergent media 
sources such as Wikipedia. The chapter analyzed old and new assumptions about 
expertise by contrasting Wikipedia’s artifacts and commentary with the Encyclopedia 
Britannica. 
To unpack the claims to expertise in each of the artifacts, I deployed a series of 
critical probes. As explained in Chapter One, the probes reflect the distinctiveness of a 
rhetorical approach to studying expertise. One question focused on the construction of 
ethos. Another inquired about the integral role of the audience. Importantly, the probes 
served as a tool for getting beyond the surface of the artifacts being analyzed. They 
allowed me to see through the claims that different experts make, for example, about 
Congressional decisions and anti-depressant medications, and understand what those 
claims reveal about the rhetorical construction of expertise. In short, the probes were a 
methodology for interpreting experts’ discursive techniques. They were heuristically 
valuable tools for discovering the many rhetorical strategies for gaining expertise. 
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In this concluding chapter, I offer a series of theoretical postulates responding to 
my dissertation’s central question: What rhetorical strategies do experts employ? The 
postulates are a way of beginning to frame a theory of rhetorical expertise; by drawing 
parallels between different experts from different chapters, I identify recurring trends in 
the rhetoric of expertise. The postulates thus represent what I consider to be my 
dissertation’s most exciting discoveries. They reveal what may be termed, “unlikely 
allies.” The unlikely allies are experts that are connected by the similarities of their 
rhetorical strategies. Their rhetorical means of constructing expertise trump other 
differences. While many of the experts analyzed in this study seem to be quite different 
from one another, my analysis demonstrates that they have a great deal in common 
rhetorically. Indeed, the recurring use of the same rhetorical strategies through vastly 
different fields of specialization suggests that experts qua experts constitute a rhetorical 
community—that their discourses constitute a rhetorical genre. Only a focus on discourse 
allows us to discern these patterns. Rhetorical criticism lets us see, for instance, what a 
psychiatric expert has in common with a senator and an historian; it reveals that the 
arguments for expertise that a 9/11 witness makes are strikingly similar to those of a 
Wikipedian. Rhetorical analysis enables us to discover that experts face similar rhetorical 
challenges regardless of their subject matter. Among other things, experts must establish 
rhetorically a relationship with other experts. They must explicate their ways of knowing 
and acting as experts. They must create a sense of urgency around what they offer as 
experts. And somehow they must situate themselves in the midst of “everyday life.” 
These, I submit, are rhetorical prerequisites in the process of constructing expertise. They 
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are what experts need to achieve rhetorically in order to be received as experts. In the 
next several sections, I delineate the postulates comprising my theory of rhetorical 
expertise. 
Expert Networks 
All experts strategically associate themselves with other experts as well as with 
other areas of expertise. This is my first theoretical postulate. It identifies a 
contextualizing strategy that serves several purposes. First, these associations allow 
experts to import cultural capital from a field or academic discipline that enjoys high 
status. They are arguments by association. Just as young “wannabe” celebrities gain pop 
culture credibility by being seen with established super stars, so too do experts associate 
themselves with higher-status experts. The psychiatrist in Chapter Four illustrates this 
tactic. His repeated references to medical science capitalize on science’s cultural cache. 
Referring to himself and the expert scientists in the medical community, he states, 
“We’re poised on the brink of some remarkable discoveries about depressive illness. 
That’s because of the genetic technology and advanced brain imaging techniques that will 
allow us to understand brain structure and function in ways we could only dream about 
even in the late eighties.”474 In addition, the psychiatrist discusses his extensive 
experience not only in the clinical setting, but in research laboratories as well. By 
associating himself with two interrelated expert communities—medical and scientific—
Raymond DePaulo reaps the rhetorical benefits of both.  
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Academic historians make a similar associative gesture by referencing other 
scholars. In their case, however, referencing other experts takes the form of in-text 
citations. The essays analyzed in Chapter Three include multiple citations of research in 
history as well as political science and economics. Citing sources is a form of scholarly 
inter-textuality that creates a network of expertise. Beyond academic methodology, 
however, historians are a noteworthy example because they straddle the line between 
different kinds of expertise. They associate themselves both with other academics and 
with political experts. Because their scholarship is politically significant—their 
discoveries potentially have implications for political, economic and social policy—their 
expertise allows them to associate with many different specializations. One historian 
argues explicitly that historians use their expertise to advise policy makers.475 By 
providing perspective and context, they help political experts reach informed decisions. 
Politicians also link themselves with other experts, particularly other major 
political actors. As explained in Chapter Two, Kennedy and Frist both discuss their 
collaborations with other politicians, including the president. By demonstrating how 
closely associated they are with other experts politicians “borrow” legitimacy. This is 
particularly true when personal, even fraternal, relationships are emphasized. However, 
strategic associations of expertise serve other rhetorical purposes than allowing one 
expert to borrow cultural capital from another. They also create a structure or chart of 
expertise in the public mind. It is almost as though experts offer the American public a 
                                                 
475 Michael H. Hunt, “In the Wake of September 11: The Clash of What?” in History and September 11th, 
ed. J. Meyerowitz (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003), 8. 
 250
map representing where experts are located relative to each other. This mental map 
illustrates for the public how expertise organizes society. It functions much like one of 
those transparent tourist maps that superimposes an image of how something used to look 
onto another image of the object’s current form. The map is an instructional tool for 
joining two distinct mental and visual concepts. But instead of superimposing the original 
picture of something like the Forum Romanum onto what today lies in ruins, the 
American public imposes a map of expertise onto their perception of how society 
functions. We thus discern how one type of expertise relates to another and how they 
operate as a whole. 
This postulate emphasizes that rhetoric depends on identification and division. It 
suggests that in order to construct oneself as an expert, one must demonstrate the location 
of one’s expertise in a network. Experts strategically identify with other forms of 
expertise that have significant cultural capital. As much as the rhetoric of expertise is 
contested—experts compete with one another for legitimacy and power—it is also 
associative. Note that this rhetorical strategy is not reducible to various formal expert 
associations: professional networks and guilds are a familiar and well-established way for 
experts to organize. What this postulate claims, however, is that experts refer to their 
relationships with other experts as a rhetorical tactic. They demonstrate to the public that 
their expertise is linked to other forms of expertise for which the public has high regard. 
Thus expertise is indeed a rhetorical and social rather than exclusively an  autonomous 
phenomenon. Contrary to existing theories of expertise, the concept cannot be fully 
understood as an individual capacity. It is not simply about skills or credentials, but also 
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the deliberate referencing of the systems that verify those credentials. Experts reference 
each other as an argument demonstrating how they operate as a social network.  
Expert Techne: Explicating Epistemology and Methodology 
All experts explicate their epistemologies and methodologies; this is a persuasive 
effort. They state what they know, how they know it and how they practice or implement 
what they know. Because the notion of expertise is so closely related both to knowledge 
and to the practice of a craft, references to epistemology and methodology are a key 
rhetorical strategy. Indeed, they are persuasive indicators of an expert techne. A techne, 
or an art, is a productive activity that can give a theoretical account of itself. In the 
Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines an art as a “reasoned habit of mind in making” or 
a “productive quality exercised in combination with true reason.”476 Aristotle uses 
architecture to illustrate his point. It produces or makes things according to a set of 
rational principles for which it can give a theoretical account. Similarly, the experts 
analyzed in my dissertation offer their epistemologies and methodologies as principles of 
a techne. 
Medical experts associate their epistemological and methodological accounts with 
foundational principals of science. This is particularly evident when the psychiatrist in 
Chapter Four comments on the psychiatric classification system: “A good classification 
system offers a framework in which to evaluate and treat these differences. A system not 
only offers a simple and powerful way to approach the treatment of patients, but serves as 
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a guide for research as well.”477 Describing himself as a doctor and a scientist—
explicating epistemological and methodological mastery—proves to the audience that 
psychiatrists are indeed experts. 
Likewise, politicians and activists explicate their expert practices by discussing 
various standard procedures of the American political system. Specifically, they recount 
where in the system their achievements and contributions fit. Discussing in detail how 
party hierarchies, committee collaborations and Congressional decision-making work is a 
way of demonstrating political expertise. As quoted in Chapter Two, Bill Frist states, 
“After consulting our various caucuses and the people who are interested, […] in the very 
near future we will bring that bill back to the floor of the United States Senate, […] we 
will have appropriate procedure with debate and amendment, and then we will pass a bill 
that will be comprehensive.”478 Ted Kennedy makes a similar methodological reference, 
explaining that “this is the way that the Senate should work and has worked at the times 
that we dealt with the great civil rights issues and Medicare and education issues.”479 
These excerpts reflect the idea that familiarity with the political system is a form of 
expertise. Explaining how the political system works means explicating an expert 
method; it says, “This is how we do our expertise.” 
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By comparison, historians and the Encyclopaedia Britannica present their 
academic ways of knowing less by explicit commentary than by implicit performance. 
While they do not lay their epistemological or methodological cards on the table, they 
reveal them through the ways in which they “do” scholarship. As demonstrated in 
Chapter Three, historians’ practices follow the typical academic model. The editor of 
History and September 11th is also the author of the introductory and concluding 
chapters. In the introduction she relates the history and conception of the project, 
previews each of the essays and rationalizes the inquiry by situating it in an academic and 
sociopolitical context. The book includes a table of contents, an index of terms and 
acknowledgments to the editorial and publishing staff. And just as the book is an 
illustration of academic habits, so too is each chapter, beginning with a reader invitation 
followed by a thesis statement and a preview. Likewise, all Britannica articles follow the 
same format. They mimic an academic methodology to generate the impression that 
encyclopedic experts are scholars. Britannica does not make methodological commentary 
concomitant with substantive content. It does not make its publishing process public to 
the same extent as Wikipedia. Rather, both the Encyclopedia Britannica and the 
historians’ essays are implicit descriptions of academic ways of knowing and practicing. 
Like all expert methodologies, they are to some extent formulaic. 
Perhaps more surprising than the epistemological and methodological accounts of 
academic experts (i.e., the psychiatrist and historians) are the ones offered by alternative 
experts. The historical witnesses in Chapter Three and the depressives in Chapter Four 
both discuss epistemology, but not in the manner that we typically expect from experts. 
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Instead, they posit lived, embodied experience as the epistemology of their first-person 
expertise. They offer their ways of knowing as inextricably linked to their bodies. They 
know things because bodies know things. The witnesses have historical expertise because 
they felt the Twin Towers tremble, heard the jet engines roar and smelled the smoke. One 
of them recalls, “You could smell the jet fuel. Lots of smoke. Lots of confusion. Lots of 
sunlight from the windows illuminating both.”480  The depressives similarly have medical 
expertise because their bodies know the fatal incapacitation that depression causes. One 
woman describes her experience metaphorically: “My heart pumped dread. It was an 
actual substance I could feel coursing through my bloodstream—some days a barely-
there awareness, other days a carbonated liquid that seemed to have replaced my 
blood.”481 For several of the experts analyzed in my dissertation, the explication of 
epistemology includes the body.  
In sum, the reason why experts explicate their epistemologies and methodologies 
so elaborately is that doing so creates the impression of a techne. It suggests to an 
audience that expertise exists and that the expert is real. If a techne is defined as a 
productive activity with rational principles, perhaps the establishing of rational principles 
in conjunction with almost any productive activity constitutes a techne, or indeed an 
expertise. To illustrate, recall from Chapter Five that Wikipedia publishes copious 
information about how the site works. Its “community pages” describe at length how the 
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encyclopedia is run, what constitutes permissible behavior, etc. These are Wikipedia’s 
rhetorical proof of a “reasoned habit of mind in making” an online encyclopedia.  
When experts discuss what they know, how they know it and what they do with 
their knowledge, their accounts establish “criteria of demarcation.”482 These criteria 
distinguish one type of expert activity from another. And thus they delineate a special 
area of expertise. Experts imply, “I am an expert in this particular area because I have a 
rational account of what it is.” The question is: How deep does this rhetorical 
construction of expertise go? Does the explication of epistemology and methodology—
rational principles—indicate the existence of a techne or expertise or does it constitute 
them? Does the explication persuade the lay public that a form of expertise exists, or does 
the persuasive gesture itself toward a form of expertise produce what it implies? Of 
course these questions may be the ultimate issue at stake in my dissertation. As always, 
the answers depend on a set of circumstances. Some experts’ epistemology and 
methodology—such as psychiatrists’, historians’ and the Encyclopaedia Britannica’s—
are well established by a cultural tradition. Their rational principles may in fact reference 
a techne that exists independent of experts’ persuasion that it does. But to what purpose? 
Other forms of expertise—like Wikipedia or the witnesses and the depressives—may be 
so new or so alternative that the referencing of a techne indeed creates its referent. 
Moreover, the answer here is likely not a simple one. Even a form of expertise whose 
techne is well established requires persuasive referencing of its principles if it is to 
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continue to enjoy cultural status. Related to these questions of epistemology and 
methodology is the issue of pedagogy. 
Expert Pedagogy 
One of my dissertation’s critical probes originally asked whether experts seek 
more to persuade their audience that they are in fact experts or to teach their audiences 
their expertise. As the dissertation progressed it became evident that this was not the 
appropriate question. All experts analyzed in my dissertation attempt to persuade the 
public that they are experts. Indeed, as the section above discusses, this persuasive move 
is fundamental to expertise. One cannot be an expert in all senses of the term without 
participating in its rhetorical construction. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this is 
political expertise, as represented by both senators and activists. For them, the reward for 
a successful persuasive appeal to expertise is political support. The rhetorical success of 
their expertise is measured in number of votes or recruited members.  
A more productive question about pedagogy emphasizes the difference between 
experts who teach the object of their expertise and experts who teach a process. Put 
another way, some experts teach the public what they know, but none teach how they 
know it. And very few teach the public how they practice their expertise. As an example, 
consider the historians in Chapter Three. By explaining the political, social and economic 
factors of the historical context that precipitated 9/11, they impart the object of their 
expertise. They teach the audience what they know—the product that their expertise 
renders. Likewise, the psychiatrist shares with his audience what he knows but not how 
he knows it. His book is a product of his expertise; it represents what scientific and 
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clinical methods have produced. And, as explained in the previous postulate, a discussion 
of epistemology is a part of that effort. Note, however, that the psychiatrist does not 
instruct the reader in his epistemology or methodology. He does not teach the scientific 
or clinical processes of his expertise. He talks about scientific ways of knowing but does 
not teach readers how to replicate those practices. The book is not a “how-to” text about 
psychiatry. Indeed, the format of the artifact—a book designed for the general public—
makes such instruction unfeasible.  
Note also that neither witnesses nor depressives share with their audience how 
they know what they know. They teach the object or product of their expertise. They do 
not instruct us in the process by which they have expertise. How could they? In their 
cases, the privileged position of first-person expertise makes it impossible to impart 
epistemology. Several textual excerpts bespeak this privilege and the impossibility of 
sharing the perspective that comes with lived experience. One witness says, “You have 
no idea what that scene was like. No picture or video can convey the pandemonium.”483 
Another states, “People don’t really understand what I’ve been through, which is 
probably better.”484 Similarly, one of the depressives recounts, “I say, ‘It’s back, 
depression’s a real mental illness you know,’ and he nods. He doesn’t know.”485 Without 
personal experience of trauma survival or depression, the experience is impossible to 
understand. Thus, that form of expertise is unavailable to the public. Only the outcome of 
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the experience is teachable: a personal story, replete with metaphorical descriptions, 
references to physical senses and declarations instead of arguments.  
To understand this pedagogical distinction further—the difference between 
teaching a product and teaching a process or practice—we must examine what responses 
are expected from different rhetorical strategies of expertise. 
Audience Responses: To Defer or Not To Defer? 
Experts invite the public either to defer or to participate. In other words, one of 
the functions of experts’ rhetorical strategies is to ask the audience to acquiesce or to get 
involved. Most of the experts analyzed in my dissertation present deference as the most 
appropriate audience response. The senators invite the citizenry to elect political 
representatives, putting the actual decision-making powers in expert hands. The 
psychiatrist, too, asks for a deferential response from the public. He states, “You also 
need to accept the doctor’s traditional, pastoral caring role, at least partially, and view us 
as modern competent practitioners in treating a diseased body or body part.”486 The 
message of deference is that curing illness is the business of experts. Likewise, 
Britannica responds to Wikipedia’s popularity by emphasizing that encyclopedic 
publishing is best left to the experts. It claims that such qualities of mind as skepticism 
and curiosity “do not occur naturally in the population, even among well-educated 
people.”487 Thus, the message to the public is: leave expertise to the experts. 
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There are many reasons why deference is the response that a majority of experts 
invite. It is possible that our culture has gone so far into specialization and 
professionalization that the general public really cannot be expected to participate in most 
forms of expertise. Perhaps deference is the most efficient and productive way to 
organize political, medical, legal and academic endeavors. Perhaps experts are the 
stewards of a post-industrial, information-saturated society. At least historically this has 
been the predominant cultural attitude. Popular belief assumes that the point of experts is 
selective deference: What do we have experts for if not to delegate certain responsibilities 
and tasks to specially-trained individuals? Another likely reason, however, why most 
experts invite a deferential response from their audience is that expert status has both 
material and symbolic value. And that value depreciates as more people are inducted into 
the expert class.  
That calculus, though, is only valid for certain kinds of expertise. Some experts do 
invite their audience to participate. Moreover, when they elicit active participation, they 
provide concrete instructions. Political activists, for example, explain exactly how they 
want the American people to become involved. They offer instructions for how the public 
might pursue various courses of action. On its website the Minuteman Project teaches 
visitors how to start a new chapter and how to send a fax to local representatives. The 
National Council of La Raza similarly publishes instructional material online, notably the 
NCLR Voter Guide and the Toolkit for Advocates. The organization vigorously 
encourages participation: “You must continue to be involved. Call and write your 
senators today! They need to hear from their constituents about the importance of 
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comprehensive immigration reform and what is means to your families, neighbors, and 
communities.”488 With the voter guide and the toolkit for advocates the NCLR not only 
encourages participation but facilitates it. As explained in Chapter Two, activists’ 
pedagogy is hortative or invitational. They call the public to join and provide the tools to 
do so. The distinction discussed earlier between teaching the product of expertise and 
teaching methodology thus aligns with the response that experts elicit from the public. 
Wikipedia is my dissertation’s other example of experts who invite participation. 
It publishes ample information about its expert practices—how the site works and what 
the rules are. In fact, the strategically blurred distinction between experts and laypersons 
is a defining characteristic of Wikipedia’s expertise. It distinguishes Wikipedia from the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica as well as from the other experts. Wikipedia’s invitation for the 
public to participate is a departure from how informational expertise typically works. The 
site does not ask the public to defer. Rather, it says, “it’s nice to have you aboard. We’re 
glad you wish to help develop this encyclopedia. We hope you enjoy participating in the 
Wikipedia community as much as we do.”489 The invitation encourages the public to join 
Wikipedia as informational experts. 
A pivotal difference between the invitational experts—Wikipedia, the Minuteman 
Project and the National Council of La Raza—and the other experts analyzed in my 
dissertation is that the former’s success hinges on popularity. Invitational experts have to 
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retain active popular support in order to be viable as experts. Their expertise is 
rhetorically contingent on broad and general identification. Wikipedia claims to reflect 
and contain “the people’s” knowledge; it elevates to encyclopedic status those things that 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica dismisses. Likewise, both the MMP and the NCLR imply 
that their political agendas represent the people’s wishes because, unlike elected 
politicians, they are part of the people. The appeal to identification is a petition for the 
public to grant political expertise and leadership. Because invitational experts offer 
themselves as the alternative to an established form of expertise, they must continually 
demonstrate their intimate contact with the public. By contrast, the other experts analyzed 
in my dissertation become more powerful the more the public defers. Participation from 
the public threatens the material and symbolic value of their expertise. The more the 
senators, scholars, and scientists persuade the public that their knowledge and experience 
is rare and special, the more their expertise is worth. Scarcity is a persuasive tactic that 
creates the impression of a special providence.  
A Necessary and Fitting Response 
Experts identify and/or construct a rhetorical situation in which their expertise is 
the most fitting response. This fifth theoretical postulate uses Lloyd Bitzer’s definition of 
the rhetorical situation as “a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting 
an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, 
introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about 
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the significant modification of the exigence.”490 Bitzer explains, “Any exigence is an 
imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be 
done, a thing which is other than it should be.”491 As my dissertation demonstrates, 
experts strategically generate a sense of urgency or necessity to which their expertise is 
the ideal response. They present themselves as uniquely capable of doing that which is 
“waiting to be done” thus correcting that which is “other than it should be.” Expertise 
becomes the solution to a problem or the answer to a question. 
Political activists create this sense of urgent need by identifying how previous 
policy efforts have failed. Both the NCLR and the MMP criticize what professional 
politicians have done or not done about immigration reform as a means of generating 
exigency. The latter states, “This [immigration] is a problem that our elected political 
officials, from the White House down to state governorships and local city councils, have 
ignored.492 The NCLR likewise dismisses one immigration policy initiative as “a laundry 
list of mean-spirited and intrusive provisions concocted by the most radical immigrant 
restrictionists in Congress.493 In both excerpts, criticism serves as a warrant for the 
organizations’ own expertise. Their expertise is rhetorically framed as an alternative 
response to a political exigency.  
Wikipedia, too, constructs itself as the alternative to an antiquated or flawed form 
of expertise. It emphasizes the public’s potential to contribute informational expertise, 
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contrasting their approach with more traditional ways of publishing information in 
scholarly reference sources. Wikipedia’s exigency lies in the limitations for which it 
criticizes publications like the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Its expertise is a fitting 
response to a rhetorical situation in encyclopedic publishing. That rhetorical situation is 
the need to publish and disseminate information in more vernacular and accessible ways. 
The significance of the relationship between expertise and a rhetorical situation 
lies in the sequence—what begets what? Bitzer’s basic idea is that an urgent or imperfect 
situation demands a fitting response thus giving rise to rhetoric. But, for those who are in 
the business of producing and marketing rhetoric, the impression of an exigency in the 
audience’s mind is advantageous. It behooves rhetors to create the idea that their artifacts 
respond to an urgent need. If this approach is unsuccessful, the artifacts seem to have no 
purpose. They seem to be responses with nothing contextual in which to fit. As an 
analogy, consider the publication of tabloid magazines. As media commentators note, it 
is unclear whether magazines print gratuitous sex and violence because the public wants 
those things, or if the public wants those things because they are marketed to us. It is 
clear, however, that claiming that their product responds to an existing need serves 
publishers’ interests. If they make this claim successfully, their magazines make sense as 
cultural artifacts. If they are unsuccessful, their products appear to have no exigency—
thus no purpose. For experts, an exigency is an implicit warrant. It makes expertise both 
worthwhile and important—a much needed response to a critical situation. It benefits 
experts to persuade the public that an exigency exists because when it does, expertise is 
fitting and necessary. 
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For many experts the same argument that generates an exigency for expertise 
serves as an appeal to eunoia. By demonstrating how they fulfill an urgent need experts 
purport to serve the greater good. They claim to offer something that neither laypersons 
nor other experts could. For example, the depressives from Chapter Four and the 
witnesses from Chapter Three characterize their motives for testifying as a moral 
obligation. The world needs to know the non-scientific story of depression as well as the 
non-political/non-academic version 9/11. Both groups of experts claim to speak from a 
sense of duty. And both intimate that this responsibility to tell one’s story must be 
fulfilled despite the inadequacies of words. Even those things which words cannot fully 
communicate—perhaps especially those things—must exist along with accounts from 
other experts. A similar argument regarding duty is made by the political activists who 
associate their work with a civic mandate. They imply that, since elected officials 
continue to disappoint, alternative efforts must be made. This claim is couched in terms 
of the greater good. The activists’ appeals to eunoia are linked to the argument that they 
serve an underserved purpose.  
Eunoia is an important rhetorical concern for all experts. It is an argument for 
legitimacy and purpose in the rhetoric of expertise. For Wikipedia and the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, appeals to serving the great good draw on a foundational myth of 
encyclopedic publishing. As explained in Chapter Five, encyclopedias reflect 
Enlightenment ideals: “a practical embodiment of the notion that knowledge should be 
accessible to a wide public and, as such, their purpose was not just to collate knowledge 
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used by elites, but to facilitate conversation and communication.”494 They are vehicles of 
free and widely accessible information. Both suggest that their creators consider them to 
be a gift to humanity. Britannica grounds its claim to public service in the screening of 
information. Distinguishing valuable knowledge from trivia, according to Britannica, 
constitutes informational expertise. Wikipedia represents the argument that everyone has 
something encyclopedia-worthy to contribute, the compilation of which is informational 
expertise. Wikipedia claims to serve the greater good by appreciating and incorporating 
the public’s experiences. 
Scholars, too, reference the desire to serve as part of their rhetorics of expertise. 
The psychiatrist repeatedly mentions his noble intentions. He announces that he supports 
intense scientific research surrounding depression in order to minimize suffering. By 
demonstrating that science serves the public’s interests, gradually mastering a mystery of 
nature, the psychiatrist offers proof of eunoia not only for himself but for the medical 
establishment. Similarly, the historians’ expert eunoia coincides with their appeal to an 
advisory function. They imply that their service to society lies in preventing us from 
repeating past mistakes. Providing the benefit of historical reflection is the historians’ 
claim to expert utility. Thus they identify a political or social exigency as their 
scholarship’s rationale. As the essays’ editor states, “Our authors comment on the 
dangers of forging or analyzing policy without keen awareness of history, and they tell 
cautionary tales involving critical moments in the past.”495 Because current events have 
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historical precedents, historians serve the greater good. This argument concurs with the 
idea that academic historical expertise is a response to a present exigency in “everyday 
life.” 
Expertise and/in “Everyday Life” 
My last theoretical postulate is about the relationship between expertise and 
“everyday life.” By “everyday life” I mean the confluence of persons, events and objects 
that constitutes an ordinary reality—the things that make up day-to-day life. This 
postulate states that all experts must orient themselves and their subject matter relative to 
the audience’s everyday experience. Indeed, all experts must situate and embed their 
expertise deeply in that experience. This rhetorical strategy is what makes expertise both 
relevant and accessible. Without it, expertise is doomed to be discarded or ignored. 
Importantly, this contextual grounding cannot happen without a rhetorical effort on the 
part of the expert. S/he cannot relate his/her subject matter to the public’s everyday life 
without a carefully crafted message. Whether or not some forms of expertise are actually 
more relevant than others is not the issue; all experts face the task of persuading the 
audience that their daily lives depend on expertise. 
Wikipedia achieves this relevance by way of its contributors and their interests. 
The articles reflect those objects, events and experiences that constitute everyday life. For 
example, both “house work” and “boredom” have their own Wikipedia entries. 
Additionally, Wikipedia’s popular accessibility means that use of the site is part of its 
relation to everyday habits. The site presents itself as the handy reference tool that 
responds to everyday informational needs. It markets itself as an easily accessible way of 
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incorporating reference information into daily life. Anyone can look up anything at any 
time.  
Along similar lines, the witnesses and the depressives locate their lived 
experiences—their expertise—in the midst of everyday life. The former describe how the 
events of 9/11 interrupted what was otherwise a normal day. One witness recalls, “I went 
to the cafeteria every morning to get Ed’s breakfast. That was the routine. Everything for 
me that morning was like clockwork.”496 Another witness says, “I had taken off my 
shoes, like I do most every morning. This pair was new and in particular need of being 
broken in.”497 These descriptions invite the audience to imagine their own daily routines. 
They then locate a form of historical expertise in the disruption of that experience. 
Similarly, the depressives in Chapter Four relate how periodic bouts of illness punctuate 
life. Their arguments for medical expertise are not grounded in neurophysiology or 
pharmacology but the impact that depression has on day-to-day habits. One of them 
states, “I felt like a guest in someone else’s falling-apart life—unanswered phone calls, 
unopened mail, rotting fruit on top of the refrigerator, and something unidentifiable and 
reeking inside, piles of dirty dishes, tumbleweeds of dust, books I didn’t remember 
reading, furniture I couldn’t remember buying, pictures of friends and family that seemed 
to belong to a stranger.”498 These objects—dishes and dust—are undeniable parts of 
everyday life. Thus the association that experts establish between their expertise and 
these objects makes expertise undeniably relevant. The audience recognizes witnesses’ 
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and depressives’ expertise as the function of suspended normalcy. What they know and 
what they have experienced exist in stark contrast to the mundane.  
Political experts connect awareness of everyday experience with an appeal to 
identification. They contextualize their expertise by describing the American public to 
itself. The NCLR states, “At the end of the day, the Latino community and the rest of the 
country want effective immigration reform that brings order and fairness to our 
system.”499 Senator Frist perhaps surprisingly agrees: “The American people want us to 
secure the border. We can’t have hundreds of thousands of people running across that 
lower border of the United States of America, and we’ve got to get control of it.”500 The 
Minuteman Project and Senator Kennedy echo these sentiments. The orienting of a 
political agenda relative to the everyday life of the public is a constitutive strategy; 
political experts demonstrate that they understand their audience. They know what the 
public needs and wants because they themselves are a part of that public. Specifically, 
politicians and activists identify with the public through the same argument that allows 
them a representative relationship; by claiming to be consubstantial with the public they 
propose to represent it.  
Being a successful expert requires that one locates one’s expertise at the center of 
everyday life and not at the periphery. The more relevant an expert makes him/herself 
seem to the public, the more powerful s/he will be. Consider the difference between 
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academic experts and political experts. When scholars address each other—that is, when 
they write for a peer audience—they do not make their expertise relevant to the public’s 
everyday life. In those circumstances, relevance is not part of the rhetorical effort. 
Scholars do not need to establish a connection between everyday life and their expertise. 
Of course this changes as soon as they address the general public. Then they face the 
same rhetorical challenge as other experts, as illustrated by my analysis in Chapters Three 
and Four. Political experts, by contrast, are constantly confronted with the need to be 
publicly relevant. Every initiative that they pursue must have some impact on people’s 
lives; therein lies the argument for the initiative’s value. In short, all experts who address 
the public must ensconce their expertise so centrally in everyday life that its relevance 
and importance cannot be refuted.  
Implications 
The six theoretical postulates discussed above are my dissertation’s answer to the 
question: What rhetorical strategies do different groups employ to compete for expert 
authority and legitimacy when they conflict with one another? The postulates are also the 
foundation of a rhetorical theory of expertise. They take up the conclusions from each 
chapter, which trace differences and similarities between the experts analyzed, and build 
on the idea of rhetorical parallels. These parallels, I argue, must be interpreted as 
indicators of the fundamentally rhetorical nature of expertise. Each postulate offers a 
lesson about what experts “do” rhetorically and the challenges they face as a category of 
specialists. My postulates highlight what rhetorical scholars investigate: recurring 
patterns in the persuasive use of language. Moreover, my postulates move our limited 
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understanding of expertise beyond the superficial differences between seemingly 
different experts. They theorize the generic patterns that emerge in the use of certain 
rhetorical strategies to construct and manage expertise.  
At the beginning of my dissertation, I proposed to study the notion of expertise as 
a rhetorical construct. This was a foundational assumption throughout the analyses that 
followed. Now at the conclusion what I offer is a theory of the available means of 
persuasion; my claim is that certain rhetorical strategies recur across contexts and 
contents of expertise. Whether someone is a political, historical, medical or informational 
expert, it appears that some arguments, tropes, and appeals comprise the stock persuasive 
means. These arguments and tropes are not specific to particular areas of expertise; they 
are common topics rather than special topics. As the postulates in this chapter theorize, 
these appeals entail references to networks of experts, the explication of expert technes, 
the construction of a pedagogical philosophy, the invitation to the lay public to defer or to 
participate, the creation of a rhetorical situation for one’s expertise, and the grounding of 
that expertise in everyday experience. Moreover, the stock persuasive appeals transcend 
not only context but other differences as well. As different as Senators Frist and Kennedy 
are politically, their appeals to political expertise are strikingly similar. And as different 
as Dr. DePaulo is from a poet who suffers from depression, they both emphasize lived 
experience as critical to medical expertise. And as little as the stereotypical Wikipedians 
have in common with the scholars who contribute to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, they 
all operate in the context of encyclopedic publishing. This context makes available 
certain rhetorical strategies for constructing expertise in the disposition of information. 
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Perhaps the most important postulate is the one about explicating an expert 
techne. As stated above, all experts explicate their epistemologies and methodologies as a 
persuasive effort. Doing so gives the audience the impression of a techne—a productive 
craft with a set of rational principles. This referencing of a techne is a way to claim that 
expertise exists. It delineates an area of expertise that an expert manages on the public’s 
behalf. The question is: Does the explication of epistemology and methodology—rational 
principles—indicate the existence of a techne or expertise or does it constitute them? Is 
an expert an expert because s/he possesses a techne which can be persuasively 
referenced, or does she become an expert in the rhetorical process of referencing a 
techne? Does claiming that expertise is a rhetorical construct mean that no “real” or 
material foundation exists?  
While these questions about symbols and referents are important, they ultimately 
are outside the scope of my dissertation. My question is not “What is expertise?” but 
“What rhetorical strategies do experts employ?” This is the real issue for rhetorical 
scholars. In other words, my conclusions explain how expertise works rhetorically; I do 
not evaluate the phenomenon’s ontology. Avoiding the vortex of “Is it all rhetorical?” I 
approach expertise as a malleable, discursive, contextual and real concept. 
What, then, are the implications for what my dissertation calls the “unlikely 
allies”? If expertise is a rhetorical construct and certain rhetorical strategies of expertise 
recur cross-contextually, what does that imply? Why is such an observation significant? 
As members of contemporary American culture, we need to understand the unlikely allies 
and their rhetorical practices because of the power that experts have over our lives. More 
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specifically, we ought to acknowledge how that power is rhetorically wielded. If we 
recognize that certain arguments and appeals “belong” to the rhetoric of expertise—i.e., 
that we are likely to hear them from those presenting themselves as experts—we might be 
more cognizant of experts’ tactics. What I am proposing is a sort of generic awareness. 
Whenever you hear these claims being made, beware: someone is attempting to construct 
expertise and/or construct themselves as an expert. Imagine a person who explains to you 
in detail what s/he does for a living and why it is critically important for the good of 
society. S/he hold you hostage at a social event, rhetorically building a case for a kind of 
expertise. S/he expounds on the “rationale principles” of this expertise, nods strategically 
at other related experts and enthusiastically explains why your life needs what s/he 
provides. You instantly recognize these rhetorical moves. They are familiar indicators of 
a rhetorical creature: the expert. What I am suggesting is that, if we understand expertise 
in terms of a rhetorical genre, we might be more critical as consumers and citizens—both 
of expertise and of rhetoric.  
Too, there are important implications of my findings for the larger study of 
rhetoric. There are lessons about the strategic use of language. Much of my dissertation 
draws on core concepts in the rhetorical canon: ethos, argument by association, dialectics, 
refutation, etc. Classical theories contribute to my analytical methodology. But the 
concept of expertise as I approach it is much broader and more complex than those terms. 
For example, expertise is not reducible to ethos because ethos does not account for all the 
other tropes that the experts analyzed in my dissertation use. Even as a rhetorical 
construct, expertise is not the same as simply being persuasive. In Chapters Three and 
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Four I explain that witnesses and depressives do more than simply attempt to be 
persuasive. They do more than invite the audience to accept their interpretations of an 
experience. Indeed they offer those interpretations as alternatives to more established 
forms of historical and medical expertise. Their arguments for expert status are designed 
to compete with other experts. Recall that the original question of my dissertation 
emphasized the strategies that experts use in conflict with one another. Different experts 
present alternatives views of the world. And the public ultimately chooses and validates 
one over the other. Put another way, expertise is rhetorical partly because it is subject to 
tension; it exists on contested ground where one expert’s arguments contend with 
another’s. 
In the process of exploring such contested grounds, one concept has captivated 
my scholarly interest for years. I call it “the Special.” It is a highly pliable term for a 
single, principal thing that everyone has and everyone seeks. It is different for each 
person. For a trauma witness, the Special is a personal memory, a lived experience, a 
connection to a unique but horrific moment. Having that memory acknowledged as a 
form of historical expertise means that someone else recognizes the witness’s Special. 
For an activist, a burning passion and a political cause constitute a Special. It is worth the 
activist’s time and labor, and somehow it connects him/her to a greater purpose. When 
what the activist does is considered political expertise, his/her Special becomes an 
alternative to more established forms of politics.  To wit, experts’ Special is their 
expertise. Expertise is one way to understand how people use rhetoric to carve out a piece 
of the world and make it their own. It is one term and one set of assumptions that allow 
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rhetorical scholars to study the Special.501 By studying the rhetoric of expertise, we learn 
about the rhetoric of the human condition.  
The postulates delineated in this chapter represent my theorizing of rhetorical 
expertise. They demonstrate the rhetorical parallels that connect seemingly different 
kinds of experts through argument. But of course answers beget more questions. With the 
foundation of a theory of rhetorical expertise, new issues and problems arise. 
Future Research 
These six postulates expose many potentials areas for future inquiry. Because 
each chapter examines a different context for expertise, these projects vary greatly in 
scope and subject matter. Pursuing them means building on the theoretical foundation 
that my dissertation provides. First, one might explore something called “expert 
functions.” These are the roles that experts assume and the identities they perform in 
different capacities. Recall from Chapter Three how the historians couched their expertise 
in terms of social and political utility. They present themselves as relevant to policy 
makers because they offer lessons from the past. Thus they construct for themselves a 
kind of advisory expert function. The notion of an expert function, while not part of my 
focus on the strategies that experts use to construct expertise and to compete with one 
another, seems worthy of study. An expert function is about locating oneself as an expert 
relative to various other social, political, or economic systems. Other expert functions 
that warrant scholarly investigation include the reporting function of the politicians in 
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Chapter Two, the paternalistic function of medical experts, and the managerial function 
of informational experts. 
Second, a concept that my dissertation mentions, but that requires more rigorous 
attention is dialectical tension in the rhetoric of expertise. As argued in Chapter Two, 
politicians and activists oscillate strategically between the tropes with which their 
ideology is typically associated and those tropes’ opposites. The Minuteman Project and 
Bill Frist reference America’s immigrant heritage as a counter-weight to their predictably 
conservative anti-immigration arguments; the National Council of La Raza and Ted 
Kennedy note the importance of law enforcement while promoting humanitarian 
immigration policies. This dialectical tension reappears in Chapter Four when the 
psychiatrist intersperses references to medical research with emphasis on clinical 
counseling and family. As a balance to his rhetorical use of science, the psychiatrist 
belabors the value of a social network in managing depression. In Chapter Three another, 
slightly different, dialectical tension emerges. The historians alternate between different 
dimensions of their identities and agendas. On one hand, their essays conform to 
academic standards of neutrality. They follow certain scholarly practices to ensure that no 
personal attachment or bias exists. On the other hand, many historians reveal what seems 
like a personal commitment when expressing the hope that their work will allow political 
decision makers to learn from the past. My question is: What can rhetorical scholars learn 
about a discourse by recognizing that is it characterized by dialectical tensions?  
Third, I am intrigued by the idea that different kinds of expertise have different 
myths of origin. For example, professional politics often is associated with Western 
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myths of progress and democracy. The story that elementary school children learn every 
year begins with Athens, moves through America’s founding fathers, and lands 
somewhere between the Civil Right movement and 9/11. Medical expertise subscribes to 
a different myth. Its story, too, follows a trajectory from Hippocrates through the 
empiricists and into our contemporary fusion of natural sciences and biomedicine. The 
Encyclopaedia Britannica and even Wikipedia share a myth of origin, albeit with 
different spins on the notion of “popular.” Both belong in an Enlightenment tradition that 
prizes free and publicly accessible information. And scholars have their own mythic 
imagined community. Their foundational heroes are also to be found in Antiquity and 
perhaps among the early scientists. What, then, is the purpose of a myth of origin? 
Certainly a historical record lends credibility to something like expertise, but what else?   
Fourth, two online trends merit further exploration. They might be thought of as 
either conflicting or complementary models of virtual expertise. First, the “expert for 
hire” model is represented by websites like WebMD, where visitors access information 
about illness and wellness and “ask the experts.” Another example of this kind of online 
expertise is a webpage published by the University of Texas at Austin. The Office of 
Public Affairs compiles a directory of the university’s faculty and staff that is searchable 
by topic. Visitors locate the expert and/or expertise that they seek from the comforts of 
their own homes. The other model of virtual expertise follows a “do it yourself” 
approach. A few of the experts analyzed in my dissertation illustrate this model, notably 
Wikipedia, the Minuteman Project and the National Council of La Raza. As explained in 
previous chapters, these websites are specifically instructive, encouraging visitors to get 
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involved and explaining how to do so. And there are other sites with a similar orientation. 
The hardware chain Home Depot—whose slogan is “You can do it. We can help.”—
features a page on its website where handypersons ask “certified professionals” about 
home improvement. As implied in the company motto, the expert is the customer. My 
question as a rhetorical critic is: What do these alternative trends suggest about our 
culture of expertise, particularly as other parts of our culture become digital? What 
conflicting or complementary rhetorical strategies sustain the two models? 
Concluding Remarks 
The six postulates presented in this chapter are my dissertation’s answer to the 
question: What rhetorical strategies do different kinds of experts use to compete with 
each other for authority and legitimacy? Whether the experts I analyzed make these 
rhetorical moves because they are experts or if they are experts because they do them 
may not be answerable. The point is that whatever their subject matter, experts engage 
their audience through a series of arguments that construct expertise. Put differently, 
experts have a finite set of rhetorical moves in their repertoire. All experts strategically 
associate themselves with other experts and areas of expertise in order to “borrow” 
cultural capital. All experts explicate their epistemology and methodology to generate the 
impression of a techne. All experts assume some pedagogical stance that determines the 
extent to which they impart their expertise to the public; this stance also prescribes either 
deference or participation as the most appropriate public response.  All experts create a 
demand for their expertise by identifying (and/or constructing) a rhetorical situation in 
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which it is the most fitting response. Finally, all experts make themselves relevant and 
accessible by situating their expertise relative to the public’s experience of everyday life. 
Experts are everywhere, pleading with us to vote for them or to pay them or to 
listen to them or to defer to them in other ways. We give power to experts because it is 
convenient and efficient. What is more, we give power to experts because that is what 
they invite and expect us to do. In this process, experts employ the available means of 
persuasion. They adapt to audience constraints. They compete with each other for the 
public’s trust. They make an argument for the validity and relevance of their expertise. 
The notion of a “rhetoric of expertise” connotes something systemic—a pattern, a 
rhetorical form, a genre. It means that experts with a wide variety of different specialties 
face the same rhetorical challenges and employ the same rhetorical strategies. In addition 
to all the other things that comprise expertise—knowledge, experience, skill, etc.—there 
is also an element of persuasion. My dissertation begins with the idea that expertise is 
both culturally pervasive and fundamentally rhetorical. It ends with a deepened 
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